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Abstract  
 
This thesis addresses three keys issues in economic development. The first relates to the 
interplay between foreign direct investment, institutions and natural resources. The 
second issue explored is the extent to which economic growth contributes to poverty 
reduction. The third question relates to the determinants of human capital, as proxied 
by secondary school grades. I explore the first two points with cross-country panel 
econometric analysis of developing economies, while for the last I first explore cross 
section variation and then focus specifically on the case of a middle-income country of 
transition: Russia. These topics are important not only from a scholarly point of view 
but also for practical policy purposes.  
 
In the first case I find that the presence of natural resources modifies the relationship 
between FDI and institutions. In particular, higher levels of natural resources, notably 
oil, mitigate the positive effect of good institutions on the amount of foreign direct 
investment. If this is the case the usual policy recommendation that improved 
institutions should attract more foreign investments may not be relevant in resource 
rich economies. In the second case I find, in line with the literature, that economic 
growth is an important instrument for poverty reduction. However I extend the 
literature by showing that a number of factors have a significant effect on the poverty 
elasticity of growth. The empirical analysis demonstrates how changes in human capital, 
as measured with health or schooling, have substantial impact on the poverty elasticity 
of growth. Finally, turning to the determinants of students’ performances, I find that in 
Russia, as in other countries, educational scores are robustly linked to the characteristics 
of students' families and schools.  In particular, I find some evidence that increased 
school resources and autonomy have a positive impact on student performance in 
Russia. This suggests therefore that policy makers can improve student performance by 
facilitating lower student-teacher ratios and increasing autonomy.  
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Introduction 
 
Between 1815 and 1914, and then again from 1945 onwards, the world witnessed 
sustained periods of economic growth leading to significant improvements in living 
standards. In the first of these periods, this growth was mainly concentrated in Western 
Europe and the Western offshoots, which had already established economic positions at 
the beginning of the 1800s (Maddison, 1995). More recently, a significant number of 
countries outside the Western world, notably the East Asian economies, have also made 
tremendous economic progress. However, it is well known that the gains of widespread 
economic growth have not been equally distributed and many countries are still beset by 
conditions of chronic poverty. For instance, the World Bank has calculated that today 
there are still 1.5 billion people living in absolute poverty (Chen and Ravallion, 2008).   
 
Economists have long been interested in why some countries fare better than others. 
The literature on economic development, in part aimed at explaining this range of 
economic performance, has advanced both theoretically and empirically. Despite this, 
many of the questions related to what promotes or hampers economic development 
remain open. While old questions remain unanswered sources of controversy, the 
continuously changing economic, social and political environment has presented new 
challenges for researchers. For instance, while it is well known that economic growth 
results in reductions in monetary poverty, the extent of these reductions is highly 
debated. 
 
Closely related to the role of growth in economic development is that of foreign and 
domestic investments. As countries have become more and more interconnected, the 
number of firms relocating to foreign countries has continued to increase, a 
phenomenon that has generated much interest both among business scholars and 
economists. One of the key questions that emerges in this context relates to the impact 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) on developing and emerging economies. While 
economic theory is able to establish a robust and positive link between FDI and growth, 
the empirical evidence, especially relating to low and middle-income countries, is 
somewhat controversial. Not only is there no consensus on the effect of FDI on host 
countries, but also the factors driving investors to relocate abroad remain subject to 
debate. There is no doubt that a country’s market potential, resource availability, 
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political risks and macroeconomic environment, to name a few factors, do influence 
internationalisation decisions. However, the inter-linkages between these factors are less 
clear. This is especially the case for resource-rich economies, where foreign investments 
are often concentrated in the primary resource sector. It has been argued that, in this 
instance, unlike in other countries, democracy could discourage FDI (Asiedu and Lien, 
2011).   
 
Although economic growth and investments, both domestic and foreign, are 
fundamental aspects of economic development, they are by no means sufficient to 
ensure an improvement in living standards. Human capital has long been seen as an 
important determinant of both individual and country-level performance. Economic 
theory explains that human capital has a positive effect on economic outcomes for at 
least three reasons. First, as predicted by the neoclassical growth models, human capital 
leads to a short-run increase in growth via its effect on labour productivity (Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil, 1992). Second, human capital can also lead to a long-run increase in 
economic growth as explained by endogenous growth theory. These models modify the 
production function to allow for a range of factors that can explain long-run growth, 
such as increasing returns and externalities (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). Third, human 
capital indirectly affects growth through technological catch-up and diffusion of 
knowledge, as explained by Nelson and Phelps (1966). Hence, innovation from human 
capital can generate spillovers and externalities that can feed back into faster economic 
growth. Given the importance of human capital, many economists have empirically 
investigated its determinants. Recently, the focus has shifted from simple measures of 
schooling, such as enrolment rates or the duration of education, to the quality of 
education. This shift has been made possible by the development and implementation 
of large cross-country educational surveys. The determinants of and changes in 
schooling quality are particularly relevant to transition countries, where persistent 
economic shocks in the 1990s had large implications for both physical and human 
capital. When looking at human capital, transition countries present an interesting case 
as they have inherited high enrolment rates from previous regimes but not necessarily a 
market-oriented provision of schooling. Nevertheless, the transition process has had  a 
complex impact on schooling. On the one hand, it has led to a reallocation of labour 
from heavy industry and agriculture towards manufacturing and services. As a 
consequence of this, many of the existing skills, such as those linked to vocational 
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schools, have become obsolete. On the other hand, the liberalisation of labour markets 
means there are greater potential returns to be gained from education, especially for 
graduates (Campos and Joliffe, 2002; Mickiewicz, 2010). 
 
Taking the above discussion into consideration, this thesis strives to advance our 
knowledge on issues that are central to development. Our aim is therefore threefold:  
(i) to analyse the impact of economic growth on poverty reduction, taking into account 
a set of conditioning factors that can affect the poverty-growth relationship;  
(ii) to explore the interrelationship between foreign direct investment in the primary 
sector, institutions and natural resource endowment in low and middle-income 
countries;  
(iii) to investigate the determinants of human capital, as proxied by educational scores, 
by first exploring cross-country variations, and then focusing on variations within 
Russia.  
 
This is an empirical thesis and therefore, to examine the aforementioned questions, it 
makes use of advanced econometric techniques. The econometric tools used were 
selected on the basis of the existing theoretical and empirical literature. In addition, the 
empirical estimations carried out were made possible by the availability of quality 
datasets containing information on poverty, institutions, FDI, natural resources and 
education. The thesis relies on data from a few commonly used sources: the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (WDI); the World Bank’s Adjusted 
Net Saving dataset; the UNCTAD FDI statistics; the International Country Risk Guide 
Dataset (ICRG); the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Programme for International Students Assessment (PISA); the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). 
 
The topics discussed in this thesis are not purely an object of academic interest but are 
also relevant for policy purposes. First, growth has been considered until now the major 
factor in alleviating poverty. However, my investigation of the growth elasticity of 
poverty argues that the proposition that countries simply need to follow a growth-
maximising strategy in order to reduce poverty is too simplistic. The impact of 
economic growth on the rate of poverty reduction is in fact dependent on a number of 
conditioning factors. Investigating the variation in the growth elasticity of poverty  can 
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help us to understand which policies governments should focus on when designing 
poverty reduction strategies.  
Second, as FDI has the potential to increase growth and productivity, policies to 
promote FDI are crucial parts of a country’s industrialisation strategy (UNIDO, 2003). 
However given the increasing number of instruments available, designing effective 
policies can be challenging, especially in developing countries that often have low 
institutional capacities. A better understanding of the determinants of FDI can support 
governments’ efforts to design policies that promote FDI effectively. Furthermore, 
analysing the effects of host countries’ characteristics on the different types of FDI 
(resource, market or efficiency-seeking) can offer lessons for governments that target 
specific types of investments. 
 
Finally, promoting human capital is central to any economic development strategy as it 
is key to a country’s competitive advantage in the globalised economy (Grek, 2009). 
Understanding the determinants of human capital, as measured by individual students’ 
performance, can help policy makers to design focused educational policies. Research 
based on complex educational surveys, containing detailed information about the social 
and institutional contexts in which education takes place, can provide guidance for 
those wishing to devise evidence-based policies, aimed directly at improving teaching 
and learning. 
 
The thesis is organised into three main parts. In the first part, we deal with the role of 
growth in poverty reduction. Before analysing the question empirically, we offer a 
detailed overview of the different approaches available for defining and measuring 
poverty. We critically review the two main conceptual approaches to poverty used in the 
economic discipline, namely the monetary approach and the capabilities approach, and 
we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each. After making the case for using 
the monetary approach, we discuss the practical issues related to the construction of a 
poverty index within that approach. Building on this, in the second chapter, we 
empirically investigate to what extent economic growth reduces poverty. In particular, 
we assess how initial conditions of poverty and inequality, as well as human capital, 
institutions and credit, impact the  growth elasticity of poverty. 
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In the second part of the thesis (Chapters 3), we review the theories on international 
production and we explore the determinants of FDI in resource-rich countries. The 
literature review in the first part of Chapter 3 provides guidance for choosing an 
adequate theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical analysis. In this chapter, 
we argue that the internalisation approach and the Ownership, Location and 
Internalisation  paradigm (OLI) offer a sound analytical framework to support the 
formulation of testable hypotheses on the operation of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and the pattern of FDI. In turn, the chapter empirically analyses how country-
level characteristics affect the inflow of foreign investment. Specifically, we focus on the 
interplay between natural resources and institutions. 
 
In the third and final part (Chapter 4), we focus on educational quality in Russia. The 
chapter first discusses how the educational system in Russia has changed since the 
beginning of the transition period. Then, we extensively analyse descriptive statistics on 
students’ educational performance in Russia and selected other countries. This allows us 
to examine Russia’s educational performance in a comparative light. Finally, making use 
of cross-country and within-Russia variations, we explore how student, parent and 
school variables impact on students’ scores. 
 
Each section of the thesis contributes to the existing economic knowledge in a distinct 
way. The second chapter brings new empirical evidence on the factors that affect the 
growth elasticity of poverty. Specifically, we find that increased health, schooling, credit 
and less conflict decrease the growth elasticity of poverty. The most important 
contextual features that affect the growth elasticity of poverty are initial conditions of 
inequality and poverty, and human capital, as measured by health and education. 
 
The third chapter responds to the call to investigate the role of FDI in resource-rich 
economies. The empirical analysis carried out in the chapter shows that natural 
resources significantly affect the impact of property rights and political stability on FDI. 
Namely, higher resource endowment mitigates the positive effect of the institutions 
analysed on FDI. We also contribute to the discussion on the impact of different types 
of natural resources on economic development. We show that only oil, and not minerals 
or agricultural products, plays a significant role in the FDI-institutions relationship. 
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Lastly, in the fourth chapter, we make use of the existing data on educational 
performance in a novel way. The chapter investigates the determinants of educational 
scores, by pooling the available survey data of PISA and TIMMS. In this way we are 
able to exploit cross-country and time variations, while existing studies only make use of 
individual surveys. The pooled cross-country estimations using PISA and TIMMS find a 
clear association between educational outcomes and a number of individual and family 
background variables. In particular, both the number of books at home and the parents’ 
educational level have a strong positive association with educational outcomes. The 
evidence regarding school-level variables highlights the importance of location. The 
results show that students in cities tend to perform consistently better than those in 
small towns and villages. We also use the same data sources to explore within-Russia 
variations in educational scores. There have to date been no quantitative studies on 
Russian educational performance. When exploring the Russian data we find some 
similarities with the cross-country evidence. However, in the Russian case we find that 
resources, as measured by the student-teacher ratio, and autonomy are robustly 
associated with students’ performance levels. 
 
Overall, this thesis contributes to the existing knowledge by analysing issues that are 
either novel or have already been discussed but to date remain unresolved. The 
emphasis is on empirical analysis, which is carried out using the most relevant 
econometric techniques. Saying that, any sound empirical analysis needs to be rooted in 
economic theory.  Hence, in each section I identify an adequate theory that supports the 
empirical work. 
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Chapter 1 – “Defining and Measuring Poverty” 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades poverty eradication has been at the top of the political agenda at 
both the national and international level. The political and economic importance of 
poverty is reflected in international development goals such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs’ main objective is to halve the global poverty 
level of the 1990s by 2015. Despite the World Bank’s claim that the world is on the 
right track to achieve this target (World Bank, 2011), there are still many areas of 
concern. In particular, low-income countries, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, and fragile states have showed slow progress in reducing poverty. For 
example in Sub-Saharan Africa, between 1981 and 2005, the number of people living in 
extreme poverty increased substantially (World Bank, 2011). Moreover, new estimates 
by the World Bank (2008c) show that the increase in food and energy prices between 
2007-2008 led to an increase in the global number of poor people by as many as 155 
million in 2008. The recent economic crisis is expected to further increase the number 
of poor people in developing countries by 60 million (World Bank, 2008c). This brief 
overview shows that, in today’s global economy, poverty is a central and controversial 
issue. Policy makers, academics, and non-governmental organisations have long 
discussed how to define and how to measure poverty, its causes and socio-economic 
implications, and finally policies for poverty reduction. The discussion has developed 
both at empirical and theoretical levels. Before we undertake any empirical analysis, a 
crucial preceding issue which merits discussion revolves around how to define and 
measure poverty. While there is broad agreement that poverty reduction is beneficial for 
society and is a goal that should be pursued by governments and policy makers, there is 
still debate over what poverty reduction actually is. Poverty reduction strategies are 
necessarily influenced by the definition and measurement of poverty. This matters 
because many countries seem to have multiple and diverging poverty estimates. For 
example, in the case of Bangladesh, the World Bank estimates that the poverty 
headcount, based on $1 a day in purchasing power parity (PPP), increased by 1.8% 
between 1990 and 2000 (McLeod, 2007). However, for the same period, the Bangladesh 
national statistics office, using a national poverty line of $1.19 a day, estimates that the 
poverty headcount decreased by 3.7% (McLeod, 2007). In light of the fact that the 
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overall number of poor is estimated to be at 1.4 billion and that scholars are still 
debating whether global poverty is increasing or not, it is clear that measurement issues 
are of crucial importance. Defining and measuring poverty is not only important for 
policy purposes; it should also precede any sound empirical work. In fact, as shown by 
the above example, different poverty measures can lead to diverging estimates, which in 
turn can influence policy makers. In empirical studies, it is therefore necessary to 
choose the most appropriate poverty measure depending on the goals of the analysis. In 
the context of this thesis, the review carried out here aims to provide guidance which is 
then used to choose the most appropriate poverty indicator for the cross-country 
analysis undertaken in the following chapter.  
 
In this chapter we review the main approaches used to define and measure poverty. 
Although a number of disciplines across the social sciences have contributed to these 
issues, in this chapter we focus on the approaches and methodologies commonly used 
in economics. In the second section, we focus on the monetary and capabilities 
approaches and discuss advantages and disadvantages of each framework. In the third 
part, we discuss issues related to the measurement of absolute monetary poverty. The 
chapter thus provides a rationale for using an absolute monetary poverty line in the 
empirical work carried out in the following chapter. 
 
2. Defining and measuring poverty 
 
In this section we review two core conceptual approaches adopted in the economics 
literature: the monetary approach and the capabilities approach 1 . Despite great 
differences between the two methodologies, they should both be considered within a 
                                                
1 We are aware that the recent literature has developed new approaches to analyse poverty. Two examples 
are the theories of social exclusion (SE) and the economics of happiness (EH). SE is a concept that aims 
to assess marginalisation and deprivation in developed countries. It is one of the main aspects of 
European Union (EU) social policy. There are disagreements on what SE is, but the main idea is that it is 
a dynamic concept and is socially determined. This is in contrast to the capabilities and monetary 
approaches that aim to identify an absolute condition of poverty. According to Stewart et al. (2007), the 
SE approach is more difficult to define and interpret than the capabilities and monetary approaches. EH 
aims to capture the idea that well-being depends on income and non-income factors. The approach is 
drawn from psychology and economics and relies, in large part, on surveys of self-reported well-being. 
The surveys typically ask individuals questions on a range of monetary and non-monetary issues. Key 
contributions to the EH are found in, among others, Easterlin (1974), Clark and Oswald (1994), Oswald 
(1997), and Frey and Stutzer (2002). Within the economics discipline, EH represents an important 
theoretical step towards recognising that individuals have different preferences over material and non-
material goods. Despite this, there are several challenges, especially regarding the definition and 
measurement of happiness. As Graham (2005) pointed out, EH should be seen as a complement rather 
than an alternative to standard monetary measures of welfare.  
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set of normative guidelines that define the adequacy or otherwise of conceptualising 
poverty. First, any poverty framework needs to define the space in which poverty is 
observed (monetary, cultural, social). Second, the concept of poverty may not be 
transferable across time and countries, in which case the comparability of studies across 
different periods and countries will be limited (Stewart et al., 2007). Third, a poverty 
definition needs to be empirically realisable. Fourth, any poverty measurement needs to 
choose a poverty line that enables us to distinguish the poor from the non-poor. Fifth, a 
poverty measure must specify clearly the unit of analysis. Finally, it must be able to 
provide us with aggregated information on the population of interest. These are the 
issues around which we structure this chapter. The following sections, 2.1 and 2.2, 
compare the capabilities and monetary approaches and argue that the latter approach is 
a more suitable framework for making comparisons across time and countries. Section 
2.3 analyses different types of poverty lines and distinguishes between relative and 
absolute lines, and between subjective and objective lines. We conclude by explaining 
why an absolute poverty line is suitable for cross-national comparisons over time. 
 
2.1 The monetary approach 
 
The monetary approach is the most well-known approach to defining poverty and is the 
most commonly used, especially among economists. In this framework, poverty is an 
analytical category where income or consumption falls below a certain threshold (e.g. 
the poverty line). Monetary poverty can be defined and measured in terms of income or 
consumption. In either case, the monetary approach sees poverty only as an indicator or 
proxy for material well-being2. In this section we review the origin of the approach and 
its theoretical foundation, and then we move on to discuss how this approach suggests 
building a measure of poverty. 
 
The first scholars to explore the monetary approach were Booth in 1887 and Joseph 
Rowntree in 1902 (Stewart et al., 2007). The focus of Booth and Rowntree was on 
statistical analysis, and their definition of poverty was mainly aimed at facilitating 
quantitative analysis rather than providing a conceptual framework in which to study 
poverty (Laderchi, 2007). These studies represent major contributions to the analysis of 
                                                
2 The difference between income and consumption poverty will be discussed in the third section of the 
chapter. 
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poverty; indeed, some of the main elements of Rowntree’s methodology are still 
followed today3. What characterised these early contributions on poverty is that poverty 
was measured in a standard way and poverty was viewed as a condition affecting the 
individual: these remain salient features of today’s version of monetary poverty. 
Monetary poverty, since its early incarnations, stresses that poverty is linked to 
individual circumstances and is an individual experience rather than a social outcome. 
The methodologies of Rowntree and Booth, although developed outside economics, 
were well-suited to economists because of their compatibility with microeconomic 
assumptions and their focus on measurements. Indeed, Rowntree’s work is often 
regarded as the first scientific contribution on poverty. The approach was soon adopted 
by economists, and was the main way to measure poverty until the 1970s, when Sen 
presented a strong critique of the traditional poverty framework and formulated the 
capabilities approach.  
 
Although monetary poverty is an analytical tool and there is little discussion on its 
theoretical foundation, there have been some attempts to ground it in economic 
theory4. The theoretical justification of monetary poverty is rooted in consumer theory. 
Ravallion (1998) argues that a poverty line is “the minimum utility needed to be not 
poor given a certain consumer expenditure function”, which in turn depends on price 
level, household characteristics and the utility function. This definition expresses 
poverty in terms of utility and not in terms of income or consumption. Therefore, for 
practical applications poverty needs to be converted from a function of utility to a 
function of money5. Another attempt to integrate the monetary definition of poverty 
with microeconomic theory is found in Lewis and Ulph (1988). They propose a model 
                                                
3 Rowntree (1902) defined a primary and a secondary monetary poverty line. The primary poverty line is 
defined by the monetary means needed to afford diet, clothing and rent. The secondary line is where 
basics needs (in terms of diet, clothing and rent) are met, but individuals live in “inadequate conditions”. 
The poverty lines set by Rowntree were used by many other scholars. However, Laderchi (2007) notes 
that Rowntree did not set the poverty lines with the intent to provide a normative device. 
4 According to Laderchi (2007), there have been two main attempts to give a theoretical economic 
foundation to the definition of monetary poverty. The first is the welfarist view. This defines poverty as a 
lack of economic welfare. The second is the rights-based approach, which assumes that households and 
individuals are entitled to a minimum income (Atkinson, 1989). In this chapter we focus on the welfarist 
view, as it is the most commonly used within the economic discipline. 
5 Ravallion (1998) describes two methods to convert poverty in terms of utility to poverty in terms of 
money: the welfare ratio method and the equivalent expenditure method. The first approach involves 
calculating the ratio of each person’s poverty line to a base poverty line. This gives an index that can be 
used to normalise income into comparable units. The latter approach uses a cost function to calculate a 
money metric utility measure. Ravallion (1998) notes that these two methods are only equivalent when 
consumer preferences are homothetic (in the sense that the budget devoted to a certain good is 
independent from its utility), an assumption that is not supported by empirical results.  
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in which a minimum amount of consumption is required to escape poverty and this 
minimum consumption also provides indirect benefits through participation in social 
activities. This model shows how poverty matters for the individual and for society 
(Laderchi, 2007). The model offers an interesting attempt to theoretically justify the 
notion of monetary poverty, although it is open to the reductionist critique, due to its 
extreme focus on the individual acting rationally (Laderchi, 2007). Sen (1997) has 
provided a thorough critique of this welfarist approach to poverty. Without going into 
details of Sen’s well-known arguments, we can summarise them in four main points. 
First, poverty is strictly linked to utility and utility itself may not be an adequate measure 
of welfare6. Sen points out that the human existence is not limited to achieving utility. 
While utility is important there are other factors that play a crucial role, such as freedom 
or rights. Second, microeconomics assumes that individuals have consistent 
preferences, an assumption that is far from necessarily satisfied. Third, the assumption 
of utility maximisation is clearly limited, both in the context of personal well-being and 
of market transactions. That is, market transactions and personal well-being are 
determined by factors other than utility maximisation. Fourth, poverty is a 
multidimensional concept and therefore the identification of poverty as a purely 
monetary phenomenon is a limited approach. 
 
Notwithstanding these theoretical critiques, it is the monetary approach that has 
dominated empirically. We now turn to the equally controversial issue of how the 
monetary definition of poverty is translated into a poverty measure that reliably 
identifies the poor.  A poverty measure is determined by four choices: the variable that 
measures the welfare, the unit of analysis, the poverty line and the aggregate indicator. 
In what follows, we discuss each point. First the variables used to measure monetary 
poverty are usually income and/or expenditure. It is often argued that expenditure is 
better than income as it is a better proxy for consumption (and hence utility) since, if 
well measured, it is more closely linked to actual welfare than income is7. Moreover, 
income data is less reliable, especially in developing countries. Second the identification 
of the poor is linked to the unit of analysis. Consistent with the welfarist logic, poverty 
is an individual phenomenon. However individuals typically exist within the household. 
                                                
6 The notion of utility is a contested domain and can have different meanings for different approaches—
an observation which lies at the heart of Sen’s (1997) critique. 
7 The multiple issues related to measuring and comparing income and expenditure in different countries 
will be discussed in the third part of the chapter. 
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Income is pooled within the household and most of the household’s consumption 
happens collectively (Laderchi, 2007), thus complicating the effort to measure individual 
poverty experiences. A solution to this problem is to take the household as the survey’s 
unit of observation (Deaton, 1997) and to develop empirical means of incorporating the 
fact that households are of different sizes and compositions. These empirical tools are 
‘equivalence scales’, which allow for household level information to be adjusted for 
individual level analysis (e.g. through taking into account the demographics of the 
household, the sizes and/or the location). Therefore, individuals are treated as the unit 
of analysis but taking into account, through equivalence scales, that they live in a shared 
budgetary environment. Although much technical progress has been made in measuring 
household welfare, translating this into an individual measure of poverty remains 
problematic. Currently, the procedures for the estimation of equivalence of scale remain 
controversial and there is no established consensus on how to correct for different 
household sizes and composition (Deaton and Grosh, 2000)8. This is mainly because 
the level of resources to which the individual has access is not observable.  
 
The third step in creating a monetary poverty measure is the choice of a poverty line. A 
poverty line is essential for defining monetary poverty as it allows us to distinguish the 
poor from the non-poor. A poverty line is usually defined in terms of some minimum 
amount of income, consumption or needs that have to be satisfied. The fact that 
poverty can be defined only after having assessed utility leads to what is known as a 
“referencing problem” (Sen, 1976; Ravallion, 1998). The referencing problem relates to 
the utility level that anchors the poverty line (Ravallion, 1998). As economic theory does 
not clearly indicate how to distinguish the poor from the non-poor, setting the poverty 
line remains an arbitrary decision. For example, a country’s poverty line may be set in 
relation to a common standard across countries (e.g. by defining a minimum income 
level, comparable across countries) or in relation to its own standard (e.g. by defining a 
national level of minimum needs) (Sen, 1979). This does not imply that one approach is 
correct while the other one is not. Rather, the two approaches are different, and should 
be used for different purposes. The fourth step in choosing a poverty indicator entails 
combining individual characteristics into an aggregate measure (Sen, 1976). Once an 
individual poverty line has been selected, aggregation is necessary to define poverty at 
the regional or country level. In the aggregation process, the difference between 
                                                
8 Citro and Michaele (1995) provide a good survey of the equivalence scale issue as it pertains to the 
economic literature. 
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individual incomes (if using an income-based poverty line) and the poverty line should 
be taken into account. However, one question is whether these differences should be 
weighted differently. The literature has come up with a variety of measures that take 
these issues into consideration9. 
 
The above discussion highlights that the monetary approach presents several theoretical 
and practical challenges related to the construction of poverty measures. From a 
theoretical point of view, the main criticisms are linked to the grounding of the 
approach within the utility maximisation framework. From a more practical point of 
view, the monetary approach requires four steps to build a meaningful poverty measure. 
Each step, as summarised above, presents some challenges. Despite the conceptual 
limitations and practical problems inherent in building a monetary poverty measure, 
however, there are two main arguments for using the monetary approach. First, from a 
practical point of view, a unidimensional approach is well suited to making comparisons 
over time and across countries. By focusing on one aspect of poverty, comparison is 
easier than when using multidimensional poverty measures. This is particularly 
important, especially in light of current international development targets such as the 
MDGs. The MDGs state that halving poverty, as defined in monetary terms, should be 
central to international economic policies. The focus on monetary poverty allows the 
setting of common goals across countries. Overall, this approach is typically used 
because monetary resources provide a convenient proxy for welfare and a ready 
measure of poverty (Stewart et al., 2008).  
 
Second, there is a large amount of data available on monetary poverty. Many efforts 
have been made to collect data to measure monetary poverty and the measuring 
techniques have improved greatly over the years. The increase in availability of data has 
been made possible because most governments and international organisations have 
focused on the measurement of monetary poverty. The monetary poverty indicators are 
thus now a sophisticated and popular way of analysing poverty. Overall, the theoretical 
foundations of the monetary approach remain subject to much criticisim, but its 
empirical implementation has much improved since the first contributions made at the 
beginning of the last century. Notwithstanding this, even the more sophisticated 
monetary measures of poverty developed by contemporary economists are, of course, 
                                                
9 A discussion of the methods used for aggregating individual data can be found in the following chapter. 
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not able to be capture multidimensional aspects of poverty, a topic to which we now 
briefly turn. 
 
2.2 The capabilities approach 
 
The capabilities approach was pioneered by Sen (1985, 1999) and was first introduced in 
Sen’s essay “Equality of What?”. The approach, originally designed to evaluate 
inequality, was soon applied in the context of poverty (Saith, 2007). Central to Sen’s 
theory is the criticism of the utility and commodities-based approach to defining 
poverty, part of which was reviewed in the previous section. Sen (1985, 1999) argued 
that the possession of income or commodities does not necessarily translate into 
welfare, as this depends on personal and social characteristics. According to Sen, well-
being depends on a person’s ability to achieve certain goals; these capabilities are what 
enable an individual to live a valuable life (Stewart et al., 2007). In this context, 
monetary conditions are just one of the factors needed to enhance well-being. Different 
people and societies have different abilities to convert income or commodities into 
certain aims. For example, an individual may eat some rice with the purpose of being 
nourished and he/she will achieve the goal of being nourished by eating; however, an 
unhealthy individual may not be nourished by only consuming rice. Sen calls the ability 
to achieve a personal goal using a commodity a “functioning”. Functioning is different 
from capability, which is the potential to achieve something. An individual has the 
capability to nourish him/herself, although he/she may choose not to do so. A 
“functioning” refers to the achievement of being nourished. Given the commodities 
available to an individual, he/she may achieve a certain functioning. If we consider all 
the commodities owned, an individual can achieve a number of functionings. The set of 
these functionings is called a functioning vector. The mode of utilisation of 
commodities can result in different functioning vectors. The capabilities set, defined as 
all the possible functionings that a person can achieve, is thought of as a set of 
alternative possibilities that a person can choose from (Saith, 2007). Sen thus 
emphasises that individual welfare relies on capabilities, which differ from utility 
maximisation and the possession of commodities. In sum, if we aim at comparing 
welfare across individuals, income and commodities do not provide sufficient 
information. Instead, according to Sen, we should consider the ability of people to 
achieve certain goals given the goods that they have available. 
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Sen’s contribution represents an important development in the theorisation of poverty. 
The capabilities approach changed the perspective on poverty and moved from a 
unidimensional approach, based on income, to a multidimensional. A multidimensional 
view of poverty considers that a person’s well-being depends on both market and non-
market variables. The approach suggests that income as a sole indicator of welfare is 
inadequate and other variables should be considered (Bourguigon and Chakravarty, 
2003). The main advantage of Sen’s framework lies in its flexibility, which allows 
researchers to apply it to different contexts (Alkire, 2002). The author does not 
prescribe a unique and fixed list of capabilities necessary to achieve well-being. Rather, 
he is aware that capabilities are context-specific, although some, such as health, 
education and freedom, have intrinsic value. 
  
Despite its popularity, the capabilities approach has not been exempt from criticism. We 
review here some of the main arguments against it. The most well-known is that of 
Townsend (1985). Sen (1983) argued that there is an absolute core to the concept of 
poverty, namely the satisfaction of food needs, which is independent from society. 
Townsend criticised this point. He argued that, in fact, social needs are crucial in 
defining poverty and even physical needs are socially determined. In a sense, 
Townsend’s argument is more a criticism of an absolute approach to poverty than of 
the capabilities theory itself. Sen (1985) later replied to Townsend’s critique, explaining 
that if, in order to be non-poor, an individual must reach some minimum level of 
capabilities, this does not imply that the minimum criteria cannot vary across space and 
time. Sen (1983, 1985) does therefore recognise the relative element to poverty. What 
Sen (1983, 1985) argues is not for a simple absolute concept of poverty but that 
individual well-being is assessed not just in comparison to others in society but also 
according to some absolute standard.  
 
Second, there are criticisms related to the practical application of the capability 
approach. There are four main problems related to using this approach empirically. 
First, it is difficult to identify the basic capabilities that are needed so as not to be in 
poverty. Some scholars have criticised Sen for failing to provide a list of capabilities 
essential to achieving well-being (e.g. Williams, 1987; Nussbaum, 1988). There have 
been various attempts to define basic capabilities. An important step in formulating a 
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set of capabilities that are applicable internationally can be found in Nussbaum (2000)10. 
The second issue relates to the measurement of these capabilities. As argued by Stewart 
et al. (2007), capabilities represent a potential set of outcomes and as such they are 
difficult to measure. Furthermore, measuring capabilities requires a substantial amount 
of information and, in many cases, the indicators are not available (Clark, 2006). In 
practice scholars tend to measure functionings (life expectancy and literacy for example) 
rather than capabilities. The third and fourth issues, also inherent in the monetary 
approach, relate to how to set a poverty line once the basic capabilities have been 
defined and how to aggregate the results into an overall indicator. Notwithstanding 
these practical challenges, several innovative attempts have been made to measure 
poverty using a multidimensional approach, although the amount of data available 
remains limited.  
 
Despite its practical limitations, the capabilities approach remains an important 
theoretical contribution to the study of poverty. Moreover, recent years have seen an 
increasing number of practical applications of Sen’s approach. The most well-known 
attempt at measuring poverty using the capabilities approach is the Human 
Development Index (HDI). This is a composite index that includes income, life 
expectancy and education. The HDI is an example of a measure based on functioning 
rather than capabilities.  
 
So far, we have reviewed the capabilities and the monetary approach as two 
conceptually distinct frameworks, although theoretical efforts have been made to unite 
them11. In the next section we turn to how to choose a poverty line, which, as discussed, 
is an issue in both approaches. 
 
2.3 Choosing a poverty line 
 
Once poverty is defined according to either the monetary or the capabilities approach, 
the next step should be to define a poverty line. Poverty lines are essential to measuring 
and studying poverty as they allow us to distinguish between the poor and the non-
                                                
10 Other attempts have been made by Alkire (2002), Qizilbash (1998), and Desai (1995). 
11 Stewart et al. (2007) note that the two approaches have similar features. Ravallion (1998) develops a 
formal model that links the capabilities function to the utility function. 
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poor12. There are different types of poverty line: objective and subjective, relative and 
absolute. These differences apply to both monetary and non-monetary poverty. In this 
section, we critically discuss the different approaches used to set the poverty line. We 
first discuss the difference between relative and absolute poverty lines, and then we turn 
to the difference between subjective and objective poverty lines.  
 
An absolute monetary poverty line defines a condition where people cannot attain a 
certain level of basic consumption13, or certain basic capabilities, consistent with some 
minimum level of “welfare”. Poverty in this case is seen as insufficient income or an 
inability to obtain a minimum amount of welfare, independent of the characteristics of 
the society. Several points have been put forward to support the use of absolute poverty 
lines. First, absolute poverty lines have been praised for facilitating comparison across 
time and countries. For example, absolute monetary poverty lines have constant value 
across time (although adjustments are made for inflation) and countries (by using PPP 
exchange rates). Second, from the point of view of anti-poverty policies, a measure of 
absolute poverty should be favoured because it guarantees that any two individuals are 
treated the same way (Ravallion, 1998). Third, the concept of poverty is associated with 
conditions of deprivation, malnutrition and visible hardship that are independent of 
relative conditions (Sen, 1981)14. Especially in poor countries, where individuals live 
with a minimum amount of goods, the use of absolute poverty seems more relevant 
(Coudouel et al., 2002). The criticisms of the absolute poverty line focus on the 
difficulty of identifying basic capabilities or a minimum amount of income 
independently from a society’s characteristics (Stewart et al., 2007). Atkinson (1975, p. 
186) explains the problem well: “It is misleading to suggest that poverty may be seen in 
terms of an absolute standard which may be applied to all countries and at all times, 
independent of the social structure and the level of development. A poverty line is 
necessarily defined in relation to social conventions and the contemporary living 
standards of a particular society”.  
                                                
12 We should acknowledge that much work has been carried out without the use of the poverty lines 
reviewed here. This type of analysis is usually referred to as poverty dominance analysis (PDA). PDA uses 
a range of poverty lines to verify certain statements about poverty. For example, it may be that rural 
populations are poorer than urban populations when looking at different poverty lines over a certain 
range. Other scholars have avoided using threshold-based analysis by using fuzzy poverty measures (Cheli 
and Lemmi, 1995; Qizilbash and Clark, 2005). These measures try to capture the idea that it is difficult to 
identify whether an individual is poor when they are very close to the poverty line. These are interesting 
developments; however, given the subject matter of the chapter, they will not be discussed here. 
13 Part 3.1 will analyse different types of absolute monetary poverty line. 
14 Sen (1985) later modified his definition of poverty, arguing that poverty varies with location. 
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A relative property line, to which we now turn, is used to try to address the issues 
identified by Atkinson (1975). A relative poverty line defines poverty as a condition 
determined in relation to others in society. In the case of a monetary approach, a 
relative poverty line would be defined in relation to the overall distribution of income 
(Coudouel et al., 2002)15. One way of calculating the relative poverty line would be to 
increase it in line with the mean income of the country (Ravallion, 2003). In terms of 
purchasing power, an absolute poverty line implies that the poverty line has a fixed 
purchasing power while relative poverty implies that the purchasing power should be 
higher in richer countries or in richer areas of the same country (Ravallion, 2003). More 
generally, a relative poverty line entails considering different norms across countries or 
groups. The acceptable norm in a richer country will require higher consumption, or a 
greater number of capabilities, depending on the approach adopted, than a poorer 
country (Deaton, 2003). While there is a consensus and evidence that relative 
deprivation matters—and therefore when analysing economic welfare relative income is 
important—there is an open debate over whether poverty per se should be considered in 
relative terms. Townsend, a supporter of the use of a relative poverty line, argued that 
the concept of poverty should relate to space and time, as the necessities of life are not 
fixed but continuously changing (Sen, 1984). Scholars have also argued that the use of a 
relative poverty line is appropriate when analysing richer countries, where people have 
fewer issues with accessing basic needs (Ravallion, 2003). 
 
We should mention that, despite the strong dichotomy between relative and absolute 
poverty, there are intermediate approaches. These methods consist of taking into 
account inequality, while acknowledging the importance of an absolute minimum 
(Coudouel et al., 2002). For example, Foster (1998) discusses a hybrid poverty line that 
is sensitive to changes in living standards, but not as much as purely relative approaches. 
  
Poverty lines can be distinguished not only on the basis of whether they define poverty 
in an absolute or relative way, but also on the basis of who chooses the poverty line. 
Objective poverty lines are externally determined. For example, a researcher or an 
institution can decide on the threshold under which a person should be considered poor 
                                                
15 In the EU, poverty targets are mainly defined in terms of relative poverty. Typically, individuals with an 
income below 60% of the median income in the EU are defined as being at risk of poverty (Eurostat, 
2011). 
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in absolute terms or in relation to others in society. Subjective poverty lines, meanwhile, 
are determined by the entity being analysed, and are based on individual perceptions of 
welfare, which may be income based or may include non-monetary dimensions16. In the 
case of the monetary approach, one way of calculating a subjective absolute poverty line 
has been to use surveys asking individuals “what is the minimum income or 
consumption needed to meet basic needs”17. Economists have often refrained from 
using subjective poverty lines, either in absolute or relative terms, although recently 
there have been an increasing number of attempts to include the information needed 
for interpersonal comparison (Ravallion, 1998). An obvious drawback of such methods 
is that the measure is affected by the individual characteristics of the people surveyed. 
This can create inconsistent measurements of poverty, and difficulties when trying to 
aggregate multiple individuals. A subjective poverty line also makes inter-temporal and 
cross-country comparisons complicated, as values and norms that drive individual 
responses are likely to change with time and space. Moreover, subjective measures 
could reproduce discrimination or exclusion patterns (for example, in the case of 
women or other particular groups), in which case these measures would fail to identify 
certain groups of the population (Coudouel et al., 2002). Although poverty measures 
have traditionally been dominated by objective methods, recently, academics and policy 
makers have taken an increasing interest in subjective methods. This is due to the 
recognition of the importance of understanding the views of the poor (Veenhoven, 
2002) and has been taken up by the EH approach discussed earlier. 
 
In this section we have discussed different approaches to constructing poverty lines. 
Poverty analysis and policy need to distinguish the poor from the non-poor. However, 
the choice of poverty threshold, no matter what aspect of poverty is being emphasised, 
is fraught with difficulties. This matters because, for example, the choice of a poverty 
line is crucial in economic policy, as different thresholds may change people’s eligibility 
for benefits. The choice of a poverty line remains to some extent arbitrary, although 
theoretical discussions and the existing empirical evidence can guide researchers in 
choosing the most appropriate method. In the following and final section, we explain 
                                                
17 A multidimensional approach to subjective poverty is found in participatory methods. The participatory 
approach was pioneered by Chambers (1994). The approach involves asking people what poverty means, 
across a number of dimensions (political, cultural, economic and so on). 
17 This approach has been adopted by Goedhart et al. (1977) and Hagenaars (1986). 
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why choosing an absolute poverty line based on the monetary approach is appropriate 
for the goals of this thesis. 
 
2.4 Choosing the approach and the poverty line 
 
Choosing a framework to define poverty is crucial, as poverty definitions have an 
impact on empirical studies and on the understanding of poverty determinants. The 
results of previous empirical studies on poverty have varied greatly, according to the 
definition and measurement of poverty adopted. For example, just looking at poverty 
trends over the last two decades, while some claim that poverty in the developing world 
has decreased substantially, other scholars argue that poverty has increased (Ravallion, 
2003). The choice of poverty measure is also important for policy making. Different 
poverty measures identify different areas of deprivation. The monetary approach can 
identify a lack of income or consumption, while the capabilities approach might 
measure a lack of public services (Stewart et al., 2007). Depending on the empirical 
findings, policy makers should design different ways of targeting poverty. It is therefore 
crucial to know whether different poverty indices identify the same people as poor and 
the same number of people. 
  
In the above sections we have reviewed two main approaches used to identify the poor. 
There are advantages and limitations to both approaches but, ultimately, if we are 
interested in finding out how macro and institutional variables affect aggregate well-
being then we seemingly have only one choice and that is to use a monetary approach 
to poverty. The data on monetary poverty is widely available across time and countries, 
making comparative analysis possible. 
 
Within the monetary approach, we choose an absolute poverty line for this study. As 
previously discussed, objective and absolute measures of poverty are more suited to 
making international comparisons between developing countries than are subjective and 
relative measures. International comparisons are important for international policy, and 
for analysing and monitoring global poverty trends and progress towards meeting the 
MDGs. An objective poverty line, like the World Bank’s (WB) dollar-a-day discussed 
below, provides a more transparent tool for inter-country comparisons (Deaton, 2003). 
Moreover, the use of an absolute rather then a relative poverty line seems to be more 
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relevant in the case of developing countries, where large parts of the population survive 
on low levels of consumption (Coudouel et al., 2002). 
 
3. Measuring absolute poverty within the monetary approach 
 
Having discussed the conceptual frameworks used to define poverty, we shall now turn 
to the issues related to the measurement of absolute poverty within the monetary 
approach. The absolute monetary poverty line can be calculated in different ways, and 
Section 3.1 reviews a number of available alternatives. A separate section (3.2) reviews 
whether monetary poverty should be measured using surveys or national income 
accounts, and we discuss some issues related to household surveys. The remaining 
section, 3.3, is dedicated to the WB bank dollar-a-day poverty line, which is the poverty 
line adopted in our econometric analysis of Chapter 2 but—as with all empirical 
proxies—is not without controversy.  
 
3.1 What is an absolute poverty line? 
 
Determining whether an individual (or a household) is poor requires setting a threshold 
under which he/she is considered poor. In the preceding section we discussed different 
methods that can be used to estimate this threshold, i.e. the poverty line, and made the 
case for using an absolute monetary poverty line. In this section we review how scholars 
can calculate a monetary poverty line in practice and how it is possible to estimate an 
individual’s economic resources, which in turn define whether he/she is below or above 
the set threshold. We discuss caloric intake, food energy intake and the cost of basic 
needs approach, all of which are popular ways of measuring monetary poverty lines. 
 
The calculation of an absolute poverty line has often been linked to nutritional 
requirements. The simplest way to do this is by calculating the caloric intake as a 
measure of welfare (Citro and Michael, 1995). So, for example, if the threshold is 2,000 
calories per day then any individual/household with an intake less than that will be 
classified as poor. One practical way of calculating this is to look at whether per capita 
consumption meets the minimum caloric requirement (Wodon, 1997). Another way of 
calculating a food-based poverty line is the “food energy intake” (FEI) method (Greer 
and Thorbecke, 1986; Paul, 1989). This method aims at identifying the consumption or 
 31 
income level at which food intake is just sufficient to carry out a basic array of activities 
(Ravallion, 1998) 18 . The poverty lines are computed at the level at which food 
consumption can satisfy a normative requirement (Wodon, 1997). Although both 
methods focus on nutrition, the FEI may be preferable to the caloric intake method as 
it does at least consider the ability of the household to control some of its actions, while 
the caloric intake method is purely based on nutrition (Wodon, 1997).  
 
Slightly more sophisticated than the two approaches reviewed above is the “cost of 
basic needs method” (CBN)19. This method involves setting a consumption bundle that 
defines basic needs, in terms of goods and services (food, housing, health). Then, it is 
necessary to calculate the income/consumption needed to achieve the basic needs, for 
each subgroup analysed. The CBN approach may be preferable to the FEI in light of 
the fact that there is some agreement that consumption of goods and service is a better 
indicator of welfare than consumption of food only (Wodon, 1997; Ravallion, 1998). 
For example, Laderchi (2007) observes that, while it is justifiable to be concerned with 
nutritional adequacy, there is no reason to confine the analysis to one kind of good. 
Despite this, the poverty line set with the CBN approach will always have an arbitrary 
element, as there is no agreement on what constitutes basic needs. Poverty lines such as 
the CBN are composed of food and non-food components. The food component of 
the CBN, as is the calculation of the FEI, is determined by requirements for “good” 
health. Although most scholars agree on this, in practice it is difficult to calculate as the 
demand for food is unknown. Another problem is that the relationship between food 
and income varies with time, location and tastes. What should be included in the non-
food component is also much debated. There is no fixed bundle of non-food goods 
that is widely accepted as necessary to qualify a person as non-poor, and that would stay 
relevant over time. One way to approach this problem is to set an upper and lower 
bound for the poverty line. Ravallion (1998) proposes a hierarchy of basic needs that 
includes survival food needs, basic non-food needs, and then basic food needs for 
economic and social activity. The upper bound of the non-food component of the 
poverty line is set by the non-food needs. The lower bound of the poverty line is when 
neither basic food nor non-food needs are met. Stewart et al. (2007) also argue that it is 
not possible to build a unique poverty line; it is better to set up a lower and upper 
                                                
18 This method has also been used by Dandekar and Rath (1971), Osmani (1982) and Paul (1989). 
19 This method has been used by Orshansky (1965) and Hagenaars and de Vos (1988). 
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bound. People below the lower bound are certainly in poverty, while those above the 
upper bound are not poor.  
 
The caloric intake, FEI and CBN approaches are popular ways of measuring monetary 
well-being and setting a poverty line; however, for the reasons discussed above, the 
CBN may be preferable to the nutrition-based approaches. The CBN approach has 
been used regularly to calculate domestic poverty lines. CBN poverty lines are 
meaningful and can be associated with the amount of resources needed to achieve basic 
human necessities (e.g. food, shelter…) (Reddy and Pogge, 2002). These poverty lines 
also offer ways to assess poverty across countries and time. 
  
To conclude, the approaches for calculating a poverty line reviewed above are not 
necessarily expressed in terms of income but define poverty using other proxies, such as 
food and satisfaction of needs. Nevertheless, within the monetary approach, income or 
consumption expenditures are necessary to estimate food intake or the ability to satisfy 
basic needs. In the section below, we discuss what data are available. 
 
3.2 Data availability: Survey vs. national accounts 
 
Once we have defined poverty and assessed which measure of poverty would be the 
best to adopt, the next issue concerns data availability. Monetary poverty may be 
measured using income or consumption. Which of these variables gives a better 
measure of poverty is itself subject to debate, as mentioned above20. The income and 
consumption information needed to estimate poverty is typically obtained from either 
household surveys or countries’ national accounts. National accounts and household 
surveys are both designed to measure the income and/or expenditure of households 
(Ravallion, 2003), although the methods of calculating consumption differ. Household 
surveys estimate consumption using household interviews, asking questions about 
expenditure on all commodities consumed, while also imputing expenditure values 
based on bartered goods and home production. National accounts calculate 
consumption as residuals of output in the national accounts, so that consumption is 
estimated by subtracting the domestic consumption of firms and government from the 
total output (Ruggles and Ruggles, 1986). In this section, we review the issues associated 
                                                
20 Deaton (1997) argues that consumption is a better measure of welfare, while Atkinson (1989) makes 
the case for using income.  
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with each source of data and assess which is the most appropriate for the measurement 
of poverty. 
 
Typically, both income and consumption estimates from surveys are lower than those 
from national accounts (Deaton, 2003)21. There are several possible explanations for this 
discrepancy. First, scholars have noted that there is a tendency for richer households 
not to respond (Deaton, 2003) and thus for there to be a selection bias, resulting in an 
overestimation of the poverty headcount by surveys. This could explain why 
consumption growth is lower according to household surveys compared to national 
accounts (Deaton, 2003). Moreover, individuals may forget, or may prefer not to report, 
some items consumed, and some sources of income, leading to a further overestimation 
of poverty (Ravallion, 2003). Second, there is a difference in coverage and definition 
(Ravallion, 2003). Surveys tend to capture more information on non-exchange 
production, which, especially in developing countries, represents a significant part of 
consumption. National accounts are based on production data and therefore have more 
difficulty capturing illegal and household-based transactions. Third, the two types of 
data are designed for different purposes; more precisely, national accounts are geared 
towards macroeconomic applications, while surveys are designed with microeconomic 
studies in mind (Ravallion, 2003). 
 
A problem common to both surveys and national accounts is the heterogeneity in 
practices, which may have some implications for the comparability of results across 
countries (and time). Surveys are more likely to vary year by year, due to changes in 
sampling methods and survey design. Moreover, surveys have different recall periods 
(e.g. the period over which individuals are interviewed). There is little understanding of 
the implications of different recall periods on consumption estimates (Deaton, 2003). In 
India, shorter recall periods have been associated with higher consumption, although 
the estimates may not be accurate (Deaton, 2003). Surveys also differ in the amount of 
items reported and in their treatment of seasonality. In this respect, national accounts 
present fewer issues as there are some international standards. Since 1993, national 
accounts have been compiled following a protocol that defines what is and what is not a 
                                                
21 We do not deal with measurement issues in developed countries here, as our study is more concerned 
with poverty in less developed countries. For a discussion of surveys and national accounts in the USA 
and the UK, see Deaton (2003). 
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part of consumption and GDP (Deaton, 2003). The general principle is that GDP 
includes goods and services exchanged, and non-exchanged goods (e.g. food produced 
for one’s own consumption) but excludes non-exchanged services (e.g. the home 
education of children). However, these international standards are not consistently 
implemented (Ravallion, 2003), therefore the comparability of national accounts 
estimates may be only marginally better.  
 
Finally, we should bear in mind that different surveys, countries and periods require 
different equivalence of scale and this complicates comparative analysis further. 
 
In sum, neither source of data is without its problems:  surveys present more challenges 
compared to national accounts in terms of comparability over time and across 
countries. This is mainly due to issues in coverage and procedures such as equivalence 
of scale. However, despite this disadvantage we argue that surveys are still better suited 
to measuring poverty in developing countries, for two main reasons. First surveys 
provide a direct measure of poverty while national accounts are design to provide 
information about macroeconomic aggregates (Deaton, 2003). Second, surveys provide 
better estimates of non-market transactions, which are especially important when 
analysing developing countries as we are. With these issues in mind, we now discuss 
how the WB estimates monetary poverty. 
 
3.3 The World Bank poverty line 
 
In the previous sections we argued in favour of using an absolute monetary measure of 
poverty. In this final section, we explain the rationale for using a specific monetary 
measure: that developed by the WB. The “dollar-a-day poverty line” is the most well-
known indicator calculated by the WB that is based on a monetary approach. Using 675 
household surveys, the WB provides estimates of the poverty line from 1981 to 2005 at 
three-year intervals for 116 developing countries. The approach consists of calculating a 
poverty line according to a common standard, set with reference to the poorest 
countries. In this way, individuals with the same purchasing power are treated in the 
same way regardless of whether they live in rich or poor countries (Chen and Ravallion, 
2008). The new WB poverty line has been calculated as the mean of the national 
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poverty line of the poorest 15 countries22. The method involves converting national 
poverty lines into a common currency in order to calculate the minimum standard, and 
then converting the common poverty line back into national currency. It is necessary to 
do the latter in order to calculate the number of poor in each country using household 
surveys (Deaton, 2001). These calculations are carried out using PPP exchange rates23, 
so as to reflect differences in the prices of goods and services across countries. PPP 
exchange rates are based on the local International Comparison Program (ICP). ICPs 
collect data on basic goods and services deemed to be comparable across countries. 
Several ICPs have been employed over the years to estimate PPP exchange rates. The 
most recent ICP dates back to 2005 and was used to estimate the poverty count for 
2005 and to update all poverty estimates as far back as 198124. Using the most recent 
data, the poverty line has been set at $1.25 per day. The WB also calculates an upper 
threshold of poverty. For example, the $2 per day poverty line is the median across all 
developing countries. The WB poverty lines are then used to calculate the number of 
poor in each country using household surveys. 
 
The WB poverty measure has the strength of defining poverty in a simple and accessible 
way that is suitable for international comparison (United Nations, 2010). Moreover, the 
household surveys used for the poverty calculation provide the greatest internationally 
comparable coverage in terms of time and countries. Ravallion (2003) notes that, 
despite their limitations, the surveys used by the WB are the only ones to meet certain 
quality criteria, namely to be nationally representative, to include comprehensive 
consumption or income aggregates and to allow for the construction of a weighted 
distribution of consumption or income per person. The WB researchers worked on the 
last of these requirements quite recently. In the WB’s surveys, poverty is assessed using 
per capita income or consumption, although, whenever possible, consumption is used 
rather than income. Chen and Ravallion (2008) explain that consumption is a better 
measure than income for both practical and theoretical reasons, as discussed above. 
                                                
22 In most cases the national poverty lines used by the WB are based on the CBN (Ravallion et al., 2008). 
23 “The number of currency units required to buy goods equivalent to what can be bought with one unit 
of the currency of the base country; or with one unit of the common currency of a group of countries” 
(United Nations, 1992). 
24 The first time that the dollar-a-day poverty line was calculated was in 1985. To do this, the bank 
calculated the poverty line in eight poor countries to determine a typical poverty line. The calculation 
converted the national currencies into 1985 PPP. In 2000, the WB revised its estimate and calculated the 
poverty line on the basis of 33 countries.  
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Indeed, income is harder to measure, especially in poorer countries, as it may be subject 
to fluctuation due to risks and seasonality, or simply because income is a looser concept. 
Out of 675 surveys, 417 estimate the distribution of consumption. This holds for all 
regions except South America, where income surveys are more common. The WB 
acknowledges that consumption is by no mean a perfect indicator of personal welfare, 
as it neglects many non-market components, such as sanitation and infrastructure, and 
therefore additional indicators should be used to assess living standards. 
  
The use of the poverty line as defined by the WB has attracted much criticism, both at 
conceptual and practical levels. Most of the conceptual arguments are related to the 
monetary approach itself and, as such, they were discussed in Section 2.1 of this 
chapter. We therefore now focus on the practical caveats. 
  
First, despite improvements, many issues remain in terms of comparability across 
surveys, as survey design tends to vary across time and countries (Deaton and Grosh, 
2000; Ravallion, 2003). The WB has tried to address the comparability problem. One 
attempt is the Standardized Files and Standardized Indicators (SFSI) that aims to 
improve comparability through the development of a framework for the 
implementation of household surveys. The SFSI recommend a common set of variables 
to ensure good quality and transparency of data (World Bank, 2011). 
 
Second, there are a number of issues related to PPP exchange rates. It has long been 
discussed that, for carrying out comparisons of macroeconomic aggregates across 
countries, market exchange rates are inadequate. Market exchange rates tend to equate 
purchasing power in terms of traded goods but not non-traded goods. It is now 
established that comparisons based on market exchange rates tend to underestimate 
developing countries’ real income (Summer and Heston, 1991). For this reason, 
international comparisons have been made using PPP exchange rates, which take into 
account traded and non-traded goods. A crucial problem with this is that PPP varies 
according to the weights assigned to various commodities25. Choosing a set of goods 
and services and assigning weights is challenging as the importance of goods and 
services varies across countries, due to different prices, income distributions and tastes. 
The Ryten Report (UN, 1998) strongly criticised the previous measure of PPP used by 
                                                
25 Rogoff (1996) provides a full review of the issues related to PPP. 
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the WB as it did not clearly identify a set of internationally comparable items. The 
report highlighted how non-traded goods are harder to compare than traded goods, and 
it stressed the need for a detailed list of comparable products. The ICP 2005, which was 
used to calculate current PPP rates, took on board many of the recommendations from 
the Reyten Report (UN, 1998). Ravallion et al. (2008) discuss the improvements made 
to the most recent ICP. They include better surveys, stricter criteria for comparing the 
quality of goods, new and more detailed product listings and pricing. For example, the 
number of countries participating in the price surveys grew from 117 in 1993 to 146 in 
2005 (Ravallion et al., 2008). In terms of price information, the ICP collected region-
specific prices of goods and services, which it grouped into 155 categories, comparable 
across countries (Ravallion et al., 2008). The 2005 ICP and the related PPP rates have 
therefore improved upon several weaknesses of the previous poverty calculations. 
Notwithstanding the improvements, some issues remain. For example, the current 
selection of goods and services used to calculate PPP is still open to discussion. An 
alternative solution would be to build a PPP that weights the consumption bundle of 
the poor (Deaton, 2001; Ravallion, 2002). However, this would be difficult, as there is 
currently no data available on the consumption bundles of different income groups.  
 
The new PPP rates led the WB to recalculate previous poverty estimates, which has 
caused some concerns. Different PPP exchange rates weight commodities in different 
ways, as they reflect changing patterns of consumption. This in turn can have a 
substantial effect on poverty estimates (Reddy and Pogge, 2002). One concern is that, 
while recent PPP measures are more appropriate for assessing recent poverty, they are 
less adequate to assess poverty in the past (Reddy and Pogge, 2002). Revising PPP has 
had a large effect on poverty estimates, both in terms of levels and changes, 
undermining confidence in the calculations (Deaton, 2001; Ravallion et al., 2008). The 
WB argues that the bias affects the old rather than the new estimates. In fact, the old 
poverty calculation underestimated the PPP of the poorest countries (Ravallion et al., 
2008). Recently, the bank’s new poverty estimates have found that the number of 
people living below the poverty line is much higher than previously thought (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2008).  
 
In this section, we have discussed how the WB calculates the widely used “dollar-a-day” 
line. The methodology has some clear advantages, such as providing a wide amount of 
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data, comparable across space and time. Moreover, both data and methods are highly 
transparent, and the WB has made public all the changes implemented. Over the years, 
the WB has made progress in several areas of the measurement of poverty, especially 
concerning the quality of the data. Nevertheless, there is still scope for improving both 
the data and the methodology. For instance, the ICP collects data on the price paid by 
consumers at a specific point of sale, which is often the price paid in the formal sector 
in urban centres. One issue is that the price paid by the poor may differ because of 
where they buy, the quantity they buy or their social status; this may result in some bias 
(Ravallion et al., 2008). In the future, the availability of better quality data should allow 
similar issues to be dealt with. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Poverty reduction is at the top of international and national political agendas, especially 
in developing countries, where poverty rates are undeniably high. Despite being a 
commonly accepted political goal (e.g. through the MDGs), the definition of poverty 
remains controversial. In this chapter, we first discussed the most common conceptual 
approaches to poverty and then we focused on measurement issues. As the choice of 
poverty measurement has significant implications for the quantification of poverty, the 
issues addressed in this chapter need to be discussed before undertaking any empirical 
analysis. The discussion on definition and measurement carried out here provides a 
sound foundation for the choice of indicator used in the following empirical chapter. 
Moreover, the definition and measurement of poverty are important not only for 
analytical purposes but also for policy making. Measurement is especially important in 
the policy context as it provide guidelines and targets to be achieved.  
 
In terms of the theories of poverty, we reviewed the monetary and capabilities 
approaches, that are often used by economists. Within the monetary approach, poverty 
is interpreted as deprivation of income. Traditional microeconomic theory underpins 
the monetary approach, with welfare seen as the outcome of actions taken by utility-
maximising individuals. Utility is achieved through consumption or income. 
Fundamental theoretical criticism of the monetary approach has led to the formulation 
of the capabilities approach (Sen, 1983, 1985). Within Sen’s framework, poverty is seen 
as a failure to achieve multiple objectives, which are not purely confined to the 
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monetary space. For example, Sen highlights that other dimensions of poverty, such as 
lack of education, health or human rights, are crucial to human well-being. The 
capabilities theory represents a major contribution to the theoretical and practical 
discussion on the meaning of poverty. The contributions of Sen’s work are not 
confined to the academic world but can also be seen in policy work. For example, 
especially in developed countries, there has been an increasing emphasis on targeting 
deprivation in housing, health and education (United Nations, 2010). Thus, the concern 
with poverty as a purely monetary phenomenon has expanded. Despite this, there are 
difficulties when measuring multiple aspects of poverty, and it is particularly challenging 
to create a multidimensional indicator that can be used for cross-country and temporal 
comparisons. In spite of the increasing consensus that poverty is a multidimensional 
phenomenon, empirically, the monetary approach remains dominant.  
 
In terms of the measurement of poverty within the chosen approach, we discussed the 
steps needed to build a poverty indicator. Once the space in which poverty is to be 
investigated has been defined, it is necessary to choose a welfare indicator and its 
associated poverty line. The monetary approach measures poverty as a shortfall from a 
set threshold known as the poverty line. The poverty line is usually defined in terms of 
consumption or income. Although there are different ways of defining a poverty line, 
the choice between alternatives is often driven by data availability. The WB’s “dollar-a-
day” is an established instrument for measuring poverty and is widely used in 
international comparative studies. It relies on a large amount of data and the 
methodologies it uses to construct the indicators are highly transparent. On this basis, 
the chapter makes a case for using the dollar-a-day poverty line in the empirical analysis 
of the following chapter, highlighting the difficulties over consistency in the other 
methods. The choice of poverty indicator is driven by a desire to investigate the drivers 
of poverty reduction across countries and time using the best data available. This is a 
meaningful objective as academics and policy makers are still debating the best ways of 
reducing poverty. Moreover, our empirical analysis relates to important policy debates. 
For instance, the reduction of monetary poverty, as defined by the WB, is a central 
target of the MDGs. 
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Chapter 2 – “Inequality, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: What Can 
We Learn from Macro Data?” 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we employ the system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator 
to investigate the responsiveness of poverty to growth in a balanced panel of 111 
countries observed at three-year intervals from 1981 to 2005. In particular, we assess the 
direct and indirect effects on poverty change, of initial poverty, initial inequality and 
other relevant factors that plausibly condition the impact of economic growth on 
poverty. To capture the role these variables play in shaping the growth-poverty relation, 
we consider the interaction between them and mean income change. Our results 
provide new empirical evidence, in support of Sen (2000), that the ability of the poor to 
benefit from the proceeds of economic growth is dependent on the presence of certain 
enabling conditions. In particular, our finding that initial disadvantage decreases the 
growth elasticity of poverty, confirms that poverty reduction is harder to achieve at 
higher initial poverty levels, and therefore poverty tends to perpetuate 
underdevelopment (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004).  
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1. Introduction 
 
The eradication of poverty is a central objective of global development policy (World 
Bank, 2001) and a key component of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Social scientists have long debated means to achieve poverty reduction. In particular, 
the discussion has centred on two main issues: the actual contribution of economic 
growth to poverty reduction (i.e. poverty elasticity to growth) and the role of equity 
(Bourguignon, 2003; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007). In fact, economic growth and 
income distribution are interconnected in numerous ways and the effectiveness with 
which growth translates into poverty reduction depends crucially on the initial 
distribution of income (Helberg, 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that the poverty 
elasticity to mean income is influenced by a number of factors that have been identified 
by the theoretical and empirical literature as sound policy tools for reducing poverty 
(Besley and Burgess, 2003; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000). 
In this chapter we empirically investigate the responsiveness of poverty to growth in a 
panel of 105 countries observed at three-year intervals from 1981 to 200526 . In 
particular, the reduced form we estimate encompasses different lessons that can be 
retrieved from the literature. First, poverty’s response to economic growth depends on 
both changes in mean income and inequality (Datt and Ravallion, 1992). Second, as 
suggested by Bourguignon (2003), we take the likely non-linear relation between 
poverty, growth and inequality into account. That is, following the formal 
demonstrations by Bourguignon (2003) and Kalwij and Verschoor (2006), we consider 
how the level of initial (under)development, as measured by initial poverty and 
inequality, affects the relationship between growth and poverty reduction27. Finally, we 
correct the growth elasticity of poverty for (some of) the factors that condition the 
impact of economic growth on poverty. These factors include human capital (i.e. 
schooling, mortality and life expectancy), credit constraints and the institutional 
environment. Specifically, we consider the interaction between the aforementioned 
variables and the mean income change. In doing so, we endeavour to unveil the link 
between economic growth and non-income measures of well-being28. In the spirit of 
                                                
26 As the motivation behind the chapter is to carry out an empirical analysis of poverty over time and 
across countries, the chosen measure of poverty is the absolute monetary poverty indicator provided 
by the World Bank (WB). The previous chapter discussed in detail the features of the indicator used.  
27 This aims at capturing recent discussions on the importance of inequality in poverty reduction. 
28 By doing so, we take into account the lessons from capability theory that were discussed in the previous 
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Sen (1999), in fact, these factors not only have a direct effect on poverty reduction but 
also an indirect one, in so far as they provide the poor with greater capabilities to 
benefit from aggregate economic growth (Foster and Szekely, 2008; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2000). 
Our exercise is implemented using the system generalised method of moments 
estimator (i.e. sys-GMM) of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
This technique has various advantages in the context of dynamic panel data. First, it 
allows us to control for endogeneity between left and right hand side variables (Foster 
and Szekely, 2008).29 Second, it has been proven to be the most efficient of the 
consistent estimators (Bond et al., 2001). Finally, it allows us to control for cross-
country heterogeneity, which is crucial in designing poverty reduction strategies 
(Bourguignon, 2003). 
The present work adds to the existing economic development literature in four distinct 
ways. First, we carry out an extensive empirical analysis of how the structural context 
within which growth happens affects growth’s capacity to reduce poverty. This provides 
new empirical evidence on the factors that affect the poverty elasticity to growth. 
Second, we take advantage of the most up-to-date panel data on poverty from the 
World Bank’s (WB) PovcalNet website. This dataset comprises reliable and comparable 
poverty estimates, which until now, as far as we know, have been employed only in the 
work of Lenagala and Ram (2010). Third, we use the dynamic sys-GMM estimator. To 
date, the majority of studies have employed either the mathematical definition of 
poverty elasticity, as Lenagala and Ram (2010) did, or ordinary least squares (Adams, 
2004; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000). Finally, in correcting the poverty elasticity to 
growth, in the sense explained above, we consider a broad spectrum of developing 
countries and do not limit our analysis to sub-national units or specific countries. The 
latter fact implies that the recommendations stemming from our study will be 
informative for developing countries in general.  
Turning to the results, first we show, in line with the existing literature (Bourguigon, 
2003; Ravallion 2001, 2009), that while changes in mean income and income 
distribution are significant and robust determinants of changes in poverty, the effect of 
growth on the poverty rate is attenuated by past levels of poverty and inequality; more 
precisely, higher initial poverty and inequality decrease the effect of growth on poverty 
                                                                                                                                     
chapter. 
29 See Caselli et al. (1996) for a detailed treatment of endogeneity issues in the context of dynamic panel 
data.  
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reduction. Second, we bring new empirical evidence on specific conditions that generate 
poverty-trap-like mechanisms. We find that increased health, schooling, credit and less 
conflict decrease the poverty elasticity to growth.  The findings suggest that poverty and 
conditions related to a lower level of development prevent the full realisation of the 
beneficial effects of growth. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
related literature. Section 3 presents the methodological approach, concentrating in turn 
on the decomposition proposed by Datt and Ravallion (1992), the reduced form of the 
estimated model and the sys-GMM estimator. In the fourth section we describe the 
results, together with some robustness checks. Final comments and possible lines for 
future research conclude. Details on the variables employed and the data sources are 
reported in the Data Appendix. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
In the 1990s, improvements in the quantity and quality of available data triggered new 
research on the relationship between growth and poverty. For example, national 
accounts were made internationally comparable and more national household surveys 
were implemented (Heltberg, 2004). 
The economic literature on poverty has investigated three key issues: the direct effects 
of growth on poverty; the interconnections between growth, inequality and poverty; and 
the relations between growth, poverty and other variables, such as human capital, 
institutional and financial development, macroeconomic stability and structural change. 
Obviously, given their objects of interest, these studies overlap to a large extent. 
Concerning the first stream of literature (i.e. the direct effects of growth on poverty), a 
number of researchers have argued that growth is good for the poor. This claim is 
supported by empirical research showing that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the number of 
poor people decreased substantially (Ravallion and Chen, 1996; Romer and Gugerty, 
1997; Ravallion, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2000; Bhalla, 2002; Bourguigon and Morrison, 
2002; Dollar and Kray, 2004). This type of work usually regresses growth in the income 
of the poor (defined as the lowest quintile of income distribution) on GDP per capita 
or average mean income. One of the key contributions to this literature is the study by 
Dollar and Kraay (2004). Their empirical analysis shows that the income of the poor 
increases equiproportionately with the average income. Dollar and Kraay’s result is 
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particularly important as it has been used to actively promote the idea that economic 
growth is the prime factor in reducing poverty. Notwithstanding its popularity and 
policy impact, the study has been criticised on both conceptual and technical grounds 
(Ravallion, 2001; Lubker et al., 2002; Mosley, 2004). Without going into detail about all 
these critiques, two points are particularly important. First, observing a one-to-one 
relationship between the lowest quintile and GDP per capita does not imply that 
growth affects all income quintiles in the same way.  Rather, as Ravallion (2001) points 
out, the finding simply shows that lower income groups gain less from growth when 
compared to other income groups. Second, empirical evidence shows that growth alone 
is not sufficient to reduce poverty and that a number of variables can have a detrimental 
effect on poverty30. The strands of literature discussed in the following section further 
investigate these issues. 
Turning to the inter-relations between poverty, mean income growth and inequality, the 
literature has analysed the direct and indirect effects of inequality and income growth on 
poverty reduction. Concerning inequality, the models formalising the income growth – 
inequality nexus argue that inequality tends to retard growth (Persson and Tabellini, 
1991; Alesina and Perotti, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Keefer and Knack, 2000). 
This might be due to credit market imperfections (Piketty, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; 
Aghion and Bolton, 1997;), taxation and redistribution (Perotti, 1993; Benabou, 1996; 
Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Aghion and Bolton, 1997), political instability (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; Glaeser et al., 2003) or downwardly flexible wages (Akerlof and Yellen, 
1990; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Hassler and Mora, 2000). In the context of poverty 
reduction, greater inequality negatively affects poverty through its effect on economic 
growth. One empirical study that explicitly links poverty, growth and inequality is that 
of Chen and Ravallion (1996). The authors regress the change in the poverty headcount 
against changes in income and distribution in a cross-section of countries, estimating 
the relationship using ordinary least squares (OLS). They find strong evidence that 
higher rates of growth are associated with poverty reduction. They also find that 
changes in income distribution do not have a significant impact on poverty. This, in 
turn, leads to the conclusion that the distributional changes linked to growth do not 
offset the positive effect of growth on poverty reduction. Dollar and Kraay (2004), 
                                                
30 For example, Mosley (2004) regresses the change in poverty headcount against GDP growth, pro-poor 
expenditure proxies, a social capital indicator, the Gini coefficient and a conflict indicator. The pro-
poor expenditures considered are primary health, agricultural research and extension, rural water and 
sanitation. He finds that when all variables except inequality are included, the only significant 
regressor is agricultural wage, while GDP growth is not significant. 
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meanwhile, use variance decomposition to assess the contributions of growth and 
inequality to poverty. Their findings reinforce Chen and Ravallion’s (1996) conclusion, 
showing in fact that, although poverty is largely accounted for by the sum of growth 
and distribution components, growth is relatively more important than inequality. 
However, the contribution of growth to poverty seems to be lower in the medium-run 
than in the long-run, and when poverty measures are bottom-sensitive. Voitchovsky 
(2005) analyses, instead, the effects of inequality on economic growth in a panel of 25 
industrialised countries, observed at 5-year intervals between 1970 and 1995. Her GMM 
estimates show that inequality at the bottom end of the income distribution is negatively 
related to subsequent growth. Thus, inequality undermines the “trickle-down” effects of 
growth. Other empirical studies showing that inequality hampers poverty reduction are 
those by Birdsall and Londono (1997) and Ghura et al. (2002). Concerns that 
distributional changes may offset growth changes have been raised by the results of 
White and Anderson (2001) and Bourguignon (2003).  
The literature on the inter-relation between growth, poverty and inequality has also 
analysed the role of initial inequality and income. It is usually assumed that a higher level 
of inequality at the beginning of a spell31 negatively affects the impact of growth on 
absolute poverty. This is because higher initial inequality means that the poor have a 
lower share of both total income and its growth (Ravallion, 1997). There is increasing 
empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that high inequality decreases the 
effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty (Fosu, 2009; Lopez and Serven, 2006; 
Bourguignon, 2003; Epaulard, 2003; Ravallion, 1997, 2001)32. Turning now to initial 
income, the rationale for analysing its effect on the poverty elasticity to growth can be 
regarded as an extension of convergence theory. Typically, convergence theory predicts 
that lower levels of GDP per capita are associated with faster growth and therefore with 
greater poverty reduction (Sala-I-Martin, 1996). This  is controversial though, as it may 
be that countries with higher growth have better economic institutions (e.g. labour 
markets) that enhance the beneficial effects of growth (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000). 
In the study of poverty reduction, scholars have also investigated how the level of 
development (Bourguigon, 2003; Kalwick and Verschoor, 2007) and initial poverty 
                                                
31 Heltberg (2004) defines spells as  “instances where two or more comparable household surveys are 
available from the same country at different points of time”. 
32 The role of initial inequality has also been analysed in the growth literature. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), Birdsall et al. (1995), Clarke (1995), Perotti (1996), Deininger and Squire 
(1998) and Knowles (2005) all find evidence that higher initial inequality retards growth. However, not all 
the evidence has been supportive of this argument; see for example Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000).  
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(Ravallion, 2009; Lopez and Serven, 2006) affect the growth-poverty relationship. 
Empirical evidence shows that higher initial poverty and low development reduce the 
poverty elasticity to growth (Ravallion, 2009; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Lopez and 
Serven, 2006; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000). This could be due either to numerical 
effects (Bourguignon, 2003) or to the higher “unequalising” effects of growth (de 
Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000). 
The last relevant strand of the literature is that investigating which variables, other than 
the initial level of income and inequality, might affect the poverty elasticity to growth. 
The majority of these studies have been carried out in the last decade, and most have an 
empirical focus. This literature places increasing research emphasis on the so-called pro-
poor growth factors. Paraphrasing Chen and Ravallion (2003), these can be defined as 
policy tools that allow growth to be pro-poor or, put differently, can help in reducing 
poverty. This in turns means that the growth elasticity of poverty might change in the 
presence of such factors. Typically, such pro-poor growth variables have been related to 
human capital, financial and institutional development, macroeconomic stability and 
greater openness. Good reviews of these topics can be found in Besley and Burgess 
(2003) and de Janvry and Sadoulet (2000). In what follows we review the available 
evidence on the relevant pro-poor factors that we have employed in our empirical 
exercise.  
Starting with human capital, this concept encompasses both education and health (i.e. 
nutrition, life expectancy, infant mortality and so on). Intuitively, improving human 
capital facilitates pro-poor growth through its impact on living standards, employment 
opportunities and entrepreneurial opportunities, as well as through positive externalities 
(Dreze and Sen, 2002). There is some empirical evidence that human capital affects the 
poverty elasticity to growth. For example, de Janvry and Sandoulet (2000) and Chibber 
and Nayyar (2007) find that higher levels of secondary schooling make income growth 
more effective at reducing poverty. However, education also has a direct effect on 
poverty. Psacharopoulos et al. (1995) discuss the idea that a higher enrolment ratio can 
increase the productivity of the poor. Empirically, Duflo (2001) finds that an increase in 
education leads to an increase in income, which is consistent with other evidence. This 
suggests that education can be used to reduce poverty both directly and indirectly (by 
encouraging growth and redistribution). Similar reasoning can be applied to health 
conditions. In this respect, the work of Sahn and Younger (2006) appears particularly 
interesting.  
 52 
Passing on to credit availability and financial development, despite economic growth, 
many poor individuals remain credit constrained due to their inability to secure assets 
(Binswanger et al., 1995; Carter, 2004). Chibber and Nayyar (2007) argue that increasing 
credit to the private sector can augment the effectiveness of growth as it allows more 
entrepreneurs to start businesses33. In particular, they find that the interaction between 
credit and income growth significantly increases poverty elasticity to growth. Financial 
development also has direct impacts on poverty by facilitating access to credit and 
improving risk sharing and resource allocation (Ghura et al, 2002). Moreover, Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) find that financial development disproportionately 
reduces poverty through its impact on income inequality.  
Institutions have also been discussed as factors that may affect the growth elasticity of 
poverty. However, the role that institutions play in the poverty-growth relationship has 
received less attention compared to the channels discussed above. Chibber and Nayyar 
(2007) find that a reduction in regulations enhances the poverty elasticity to growth. 
Employing instrumental variable estimators, Tebaldi and Mohan (2010) show that the 
control of corruption, together with governmental effectiveness and the stability of the 
political system, creates the conditions required to promote economic growth, minimise 
income distribution conflicts, and reduce poverty. 
Overall, the literature reviewed here highlights that growth is undeniably important to 
economic development. Despite this, there is a substantial debate on the effectiveness 
of economic growth in reducing poverty. In what follows, we explore this issue by 
analysing how the initial levels of poverty and inequality and selected pro-poor factors 
affect the poverty elasticity to growth. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Growth elasticity of poverty 
 
We follow the literature in assuming that poverty is measured through one of the family 
of Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) poverty measures 34 . This allows the 
researcher to fully characterise poverty as a function of the poverty line (z), the mean of 
the distribution (m), and the Lorenz curve (L) (Sahn and Younger, 2006). Slightly more 
formally, poverty in country i at time t is written as: 
                                                
33 Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide an extensive literature review on financial development and growth. 
34 The FGT poverty measures include the poverty headcount, the poverty gap and its square. A detailed 
discussion of these measures can be found in Deaton (2003). 
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                                                                                                    (1)
 
where  is the country- and time-specific mean income and Lt is a vector of 
parameters which define the Lorenz curve at time t. 
Thus, as discussed by Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Kakwani (1993), if poverty is 
defined as in equation (1), a change in poverty in country i between any two time 
periods can be decomposed into two distinct terms: the “growth effect”, which is a 
proportional change in individuals’ income that leaves the distribution of income 
unchanged; and the “distribution effect”, which is a change in the distribution of 
relative income that leaves mean income unchanged35. Formally, the so-called Datt and 
Ravallion decomposition is written as: 
 
                                               (2) 
 
On the right hand side, we have the growth effect, the distribution effect and the error 
term, in terms of first differences because we are interested in the poverty change.  
Taking equation (2) as the starting point and following Bourguignon (2003) it is possible 
to derive the growth elasticity of poverty as: 
 
                                                                                       (3) 
 
If income distribution is assumed to be lognormal, it can be shown that the 
income elasticity of poverty, defined as the percentage change in poverty given the 
percentage change in growth, for a constant level of relative inequality ( ),  is: 
 
                                                           (4) 
 
 
In equation (4), is the ratio of the density to the cumulative function of the normal 
distribution. Equation (4) implies that the poverty elasticity to growth is a decreasing 
function of the level of relative inequality and an increasing function of the level of 
development  at time t-1 (as defined by the ratio of the poverty line to mean income). 
                                                
35 More formal and detailed proofs of the poverty decomposition can be found in Datt and Ravallion 
(1992) and Bourguigon (2003).  
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An advantage of deriving the poverty elasticity to growth formally is that it makes it 
clear that poverty, mean income and inequality are inter-related as they are aspects of 
the same income distribution (Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007). 
 
3.2 Basic empirical specification 
 
The simplest way of identifying the income elasticity of poverty is by taking the 
logarithm of equation (2)36 and estimating the following: 
 
€ 
Δ logPit = α + β1Δ logµit + β2Δ loggit + Δε it                                                               (5) 
 
In equation (5) the changes in poverty  depend on changes in the distribution of 
income, as measured by Gini, and changes in mean income. Bourguignon (2003) calls 
this type of model, where the poverty elasticity to growth is taken as constant, the 
“standard model”. 
Equation (5) can be extended by allowing the poverty elasticity to growth to vary with 
the initial level of development and initial inequality, as shown in equation (4). 
Empirically, this is feasible by estimating the following: 
 
€ 
Δ logPit = α + β1Δ logµit * (1+ Pit−1 + git−1) + β2Δ loggit + Pit−1 + git−1 + Δε it                (6) 
 
In equation (6) we correct the growth elasticity of poverty for initial inequality and the 
initial level of development, here measured as the initial level of poverty. The effect of 
initial inequality has been estimated empirically using a similar specification, by Chen 
and Ravallion (1997), Bourguigon (2003), Ram (2006), Kalwij and Verschoor (2007) and 
Ravallion (2009). The literature that corrects the growth elasticity of poverty for the 
level of development has made less progress; however, examples can be found in 
Bourguigon (2003), Epaulard (2003) and Kalwij and Verschoor (2007). In this respect, it 
is worth underlining that we follow Ravallion (2009), and consider the poverty elasticity 
to growth corrected for initial poverty rather than for the level of development. Of 
course the two are highly correlated, but as we estimate our model using sys-GMM, it is 
arguably more appropriate to include the past poverty levels.  
                                                
36 As in Adams (2004). 
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Equation (6) cannot be consistently e s t i m a t e d  using OLS as the error terms and 
explanatory variables may be correlated for two reasons. First, ther e  i s  
simultaneity between left and right hand side variables (i.e. poverty and mean income 
change). Second, there may be some omitted variables that affect both the dependent 
and the independent variables. Third, the necessary non-orthogonality between 
unobserved he t e rogene i t y  and the lagged dependent variable is not satisfied. We 
follow Kalwij and Verschoor (2007) and estimate equation (6) using the generalised 
method of moments estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). This estimator is preferred to the first-differenced GMM ( d i f f -
G M M )  developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) b e c a u s e  t h e  l a t t e r  suffers from 
a downward finite sample bias due to weak instrumental variables. That is, when the 
number of time series observations is small, such as those based on three-year 
i n t e rva l s , lagged levels of the variables are only weak instruments for subsequent 
first differences. The sys-GMM improves on the performance of diff-GMM in small 
samples by adding further valid instruments. Spec i f i ca l l y , a system of equations, in 
both first differences and levels, is estimated, where the instruments used in the first-
differenced equations are the lagged levels of the series, as in diff-GMM, and the 
instruments used in the level equations are the lagged first differences. Technically, the 
identification assumptions, from which the necessary moment restrictions are 
derived, are as follows: no τ order of serial correlation of the idiosyncratic errors, 
where τ is the time interval considered (i.e. three years); predeterminacy of the 
initial conditions; mean stationarity restrictions on the initial conditions process. The 
first two hypotheses are employed to derive the first-differenced GMM estimator. 
Adding the last one allows the use of lagged first differences of the series instruments 
for the level equations, so as to obtain the sys-GMM. In particular, such a condition 
requires t h a t  the f i r s t  moments of the d ependen t  variable series are constant. 
That is, in this specific case, the means of the dependent autoregressive series, whilst 
differing across individuals, are constant through time periods for each individual.  
The validity of the previous assumption is formally tested through the Arellano-Bond 
test, which is designed to assess the absence of τ order autocorrelation, and the Hansen 
test, which is employed to validate the choice of instruments. Nevertheless, there are 
some caveats to keep in mind. In sys-GMM, the number of instruments tends to 
increase rapidly with the endogenous variables. This weakens Hansen’s test for over-
identification and increases the finite-sample bias. To this end, we adopt a specification 
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that limits the number of instruments. We achieve this, following Roodman (2006), 
both by limiting the number of lags we use and by collapsing the instrument matrix. 
The estimates were performed using the “collapse” option that is available in Stata 10 
which implies that one instrument is created for each variable and lag distance, instead 
of for each time period, variable and lag distance. Further, we confirm that our results 
are consistent with pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates and are robust to plausible 
specification changes. 
 
3.3 Extensions 
 
We next ask whether the variation in the relationship between growth and poverty is 
still significant when extending equation (5) by including the effect of a number of pro-
poor factors that may condition the poverty elasticity. We consider some of the 
explanatory variables that have been employed in the most recent literature for shaping 
the relation between poverty reduction and income growth. We build upon the work of 
de Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) in considering the direct and indirect roles of human 
capital, credit constraints and institutions in poverty reduction. The direct effects of the 
aforementioned factors are measured by the estimated coefficients of the relevant 
variables. The indirect effects are retrieved from the interaction term between the 
variable of interest and the mean income change. The latter allows us to present a set of 
corrected poverty elasticities to growth.  
Specifically, we estimate:  
 
€ 
Δ logPit = α + β1Δ logµit + β2Δ loggit + Pit−1 + git−1 + βkXikt−1 + βk (Xikt−1 *Δ logµit ) + Δε it
 
(7) 
 indicates the mean income change and the k variables are life expectancy, 
infant mortality, primary and secondary school enrolments, corruption, internal conflict 
and credit constraints. The values of all these variables are taken at the beginning of the 
spell so as to minimise the risk of endogeneity. Hence, the sys-GMM specification 
assumes that the lagged values of these conditioning factors are exogenous, and as such 
these are included in the instrumental variables set of instruments.  
Computationally, the “corrected” poverty elasticities of growth are calculated as the sum 
of the estimated coefficient of the mean income change (i.e. ) and that of the 
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interacted term (i.e. ), conditional on the mean value of the variable involved in the 
interaction. For example, then, the growth elasticity of poverty, corrected for life 
expectancy, is calculated as , where  stands for the mean life 
expectancy in the countries included in the estimated regression. Moreover, to analyse 
the effects of distinct policy manoeuvres in a comparative light, we calculate the 
corrected growth elasticity of poverty, adding a standard deviation to the base-reference 
mean value. In this way, we are able to assess how changes in the pro-poor factors 
analysed may affect the poverty elasticity to growth. 
 
4. Data and Measurement 
 
The data on inequality, income and poverty is taken from the WB’s Poverty Monitoring 
Data Base, developed by Ravallion and Chen (1997). The data set is based on nationally 
representative household surveys that are used to estimate mean income, inequality and 
poverty at the country level. The latest estimates are available from 1981 to 2005 at 
three-year intervals and are based on 675 household surveys in more than 105 low and 
middle-income countries. The WB has developed an online tool, PovcalNet, that allows 
users to calculate aggregate poverty at different levels of the poverty line. We used 
PovcalNet to calculate the poverty headcount, the gap and its square at $38 per month 
and $60 per month. The $38 per month poverty line is the threshold for extreme 
poverty37. This poverty line, equivalent to consumption of $1.25 a day at 2005 prices, 
replaces the old “dollar a day”. The change in the extreme poverty threshold was the 
result of the implementation of new price comparison surveys38. The $2 a day threshold 
represents the median poverty line (measured in 2005 PPP terms) of all developing 
countries. 
The poverty headcount, the gap and its square are part of the FGT (1984) class of 
poverty measures, which includes the indicators most widely used in empirical work39. 
The measures are given by the general expression: 
                                                
37 A detailed discussion of the methodology used to set the WB’s poverty line can be found in the 
previous chapter. 
38 The WB converts national poverty lines into a common currency, and then converts the international 
poverty line back into local currency to calculate the various poverty indices. The calculations are 
based on “purchasing power parity” (PPP) exchange rates, which reflect differences in the prices of 
goods and services across countries. The latest version of PovcalNet uses the PPPs obtained from the 
2005 International Comparison Program (ICP).  
39 These measures provide a solution to the aggregation issues mentioned in the previous chapter. 
(8)
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where α∈{0,1,2} is a parameter of inequality aversion, z is the poverty line, x is income, 
and f(x) is the density function of income. When α=0, equation (8) gives the headcount 
ratio, the most frequently used poverty indicator, which measures the share of the 
population that is below the poverty line, z. In principle the headcount ratio should fall 
if resources are transferred from the very poor to the less poor. However, this may have 
a worsening effect on inequality, raising some individuals above the poverty line while 
pushing others below it. When α=1, we get the poverty gap, which weights each poor 
individual by his/her distance from the poverty line. The poverty gap provides a 
measure of the depth of poverty. Deaton (2003) comments that this index gives a direct 
measure of the cost of taking the poor out of poverty. A weakness of both the poverty 
headcount and the poverty gap, however, is that they are insensitive to income 
distribution, especially the headcount ratio, as just discussed. Finally, when α=2, we 
have the squared poverty gap, which weights each individual by the square of his/her 
income shortfall; thus, larger shortfalls are weighted more, proportionately (Lopez, 
2006). The squared poverty gap is sensitive to inequality but it is difficult to interpret, 
therefore few policy makers rely on it. 
In our calculation, we focus principally on the headcount index, calculated at two 
different levels of the poverty line, $1.25 per day and $2.00 per day at 2005 PPP. 
However, to check for robustness, we also use the poverty gap and its square. The 
poverty headcount is not only easier to interpret than the poverty gap; it is also the most 
commonly cited poverty statistic (Collier and Dollar, 2001). 
Growth is measured by changes in mean income. We are aware of the debate on 
whether it is better to use consumption data from surveys or from national accounts 
(Deaton, 2003), but as there is no consensus, we follow previous studies on poverty 
(Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007) and use the estimates from household surveys, as 
provided by the WB.  
Inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is derived from 
the Lorenz curve, which plots the percentage of the population on the x axis, against 
the cumulative percentage of income on the y axis. A 45 degree line indicates a situation 
of perfect equality, with 20% of the population receiving 20% of the income and so on. 
The Gini coefficient is the ratio between the Lorenz curve and the 45 degree line. It is 
important to note that there are aspects of inequality which are not captured by 
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common measures such as the Gini coefficient. For example, it may not capture 
changes in the middle of the distribution. Despite its limitations, the Gini coefficient 
does have some advantages. Chen and Ravallion (1996) argue that conventional 
measures of inequality should satisfy the transfer principle, which states that inequality 
falls if the new distribution can be obtained from the old one through a set of transfers 
in which the poorer are the gainers. Of the numerous measures of inequality, the Gini 
coefficient is the most commonly used one that satisfies the transfer principle.  
The sources of the other variables employed in our analysis and the list of usable 
observations by country are included in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. Table A3 
contains the summary statistics. 
 
5. Results 
 
In this section we estimate equation (7) in stages so that we can clearly identify the 
direct and indirect effects of the variables of interest on poverty reduction. In section 
5.1 we estimate how the initial distribution of income, as defined by initial poverty and 
inequality, affects the poverty growth rate and the growth elasticity of poverty. In 
section 5.2 we analyse how factors, other than initial poverty and inequality, might 
complement economic growth in reducing poverty. In both parts we focus on the 
poverty elasticity to growth. Our calculations allow us to analyse how changes in the 
distribution of income and structural factors (such as education, health and credit) at the 
beginning of the spell affect the growth elasticity of poverty.  
 
5.1 The effect of initial inequality and poverty 
 
Tables B1and B2, included in the appendix, present four models that analyse the effects 
of economic growth and the distribution of income on poverty growth, as measured by 
the poverty headcount at $1.25 a day and $2 a day. In the first model, we only control 
for inequality and income growth, and the initial levels of poverty and inequality. The 
second and the third model correct the growth elasticity of poverty, respectively, for 
initial poverty and inequality. The fourth model corrects the growth elasticity of poverty 
for both initial poverty and initial inequality. All models include year and regional 
dummies, which are always jointly significant. The diagnostic tests reported in the tables 
show that, in all specifications, we can reject the hypothesis that there is second order 
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auto correlation and the Hansen J statistic is not significant. These statistics support the 
choice of instruments and therefore indicate that our estimates are reliable.   
In all the estimated models, in line with the literature, income changes are negatively 
related to the poverty rate, while distributional changes have a negative effect. The 
coefficients of income and inequality are both highly significant. These results hold for 
both poverty lines analysed ($1.25 and $2 per day). As expected, higher levels of 
inequality at the beginning of spells increase the poverty rate, while higher levels of 
initial poverty are negatively correlated with the poverty rate. The latter result on the 
effect of initial poverty indicates convergence, and contrasts with Ravallion (2009), who 
does not find evidence of convergence. The poverty elasticity to inequality, as estimated 
in the fourth model, is 4.6 % for the poverty headcount at $38 per month and 2.4 % for 
the poverty headcount at $60 per month40. The results indicate that the impact of 
inequality is higher when poverty is more severe. Our estimates of the poverty elasticity 
of inequality seem slightly higher than other recent studies. For example, Besley and 
Burgess (2003), using OLS, estimate the poverty elasticity to inequality for the poverty 
line at $1 dollar a day to be 2.7%. 
In determining the growth elasticity of poverty, we need to distinguish model 1 from 
the others. In the first model, the coefficient of the mean income change gives the 
unconditional growth elasticity of poverty. In models 2 to 4, because we add the 
interactions between initial poverty and inequality and changes in mean income, the 
income growth coefficient gives an estimate of the growth elasticity of poverty 
conditional on the value of the variable involved in the interaction. The coefficients of 
the interactive terms are significant, at least when entered in the regression individually. 
This indicates that both initial inequality and poverty significantly affect the growth 
elasticity of poverty. In Table 1, we compare the growth elasticity of poverty predicted 
by the four models (from Tables B1 and B2). We do so for two values of the variables 
interacted with mean income growth: their mean value and one standard deviation 
above the mean value. 
 
 
Table 1 
Predicted Income Elasticity of Poverty 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                                                
40 As a robustness check we carried out the same calculation for the poverty gap and its square. We found 
that the poverty elasticity of inequality was higher when we measured poverty by the poverty gap or 
its square. In this instance, our calculations show that the elasticity of inequality, calculated for model 
4, is 5.5 for the poverty gap and 6.2 for the squared poverty gap. 
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Poverty Headcount at $38 per month 
 -1.2    
At mean value of the interaction  -1.05 -1.12 -2.6 
     
+ one standard deviation  -.18 0.39 -1.76* 
     
% change  82% 65% 36% 
Poverty Headcount at $60 per month 
 -0.76    
At mean value of the interaction  -0.72 -0.71 -0.8 
     
+ one standard deviation  -0.1 -0.1 -.09* 
     
% change  86% 85% 88% 
 
In column 1, when we control for initial conditions but the mean income changes are 
taken as constant with respect to the initial conditions, the growth elasticity of poverty 
is 1.2% and the distributional changes are significant41. Our estimate of the poverty 
elasticity is in line with other studies that do not take into account the effect of initial 
conditions on the growth elasticity of poverty. Epaulard (2003), using OLS, estimates 
the growth elasticity of poverty to be -1.36%. Adams (2004), again using OLS, finds 
that the growth elasticity of poverty for a poverty line of $1.08 per day, calculated using 
mean income from a survey, is -5.2%, but obtains a noticeably lower result when using 
GDP per capita in PPP, of -1.7%. Ram (2006, 2010) instead takes a “direct” approach 
to estimating the growth elasticity, calculating it as the percentage change in the poverty 
rate over the percentage change in income. He finds that the elasticity of poverty at a 
poverty line of $1.25 a day is 1.5 for the 1990s, and 1.6% for the period 1999-2005. In 
our case, the non-corrected poverty elasticity to growth, as estimated using OLS, is -
1.64$. To sum up, Table 1 shows that our GMM estimates of the “non-corrected” 
growth elasticity of poverty are somewhat lower than estimates obtained with simpler 
econometric techniques. This indicates that, by not taking into account the endogeneity 
issues discussed above, empirical studies risk overestimating the effect of economic 
growth on poverty reduction. 
The figures in column 2 show that an increase of one standard deviation in the poverty 
level from its mean value, which is roughly from the poverty level of Sri Lanka to that 
of Rwanda or Tanzania, would reduce the poverty elasticity to growth by as much as 
82%. In column 3, we show that an increase of one standard deviation in the Gini 
coefficient from its mean value, which is roughly from the poverty level of Cambodia to 
that of Guatemala or Angola, would decrease the growth elasticity of poverty by 65%. 
                                                
41 In models 1 to 4 all variables are endogenous except the year and region dummies.  
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Finally, as shown in column 4, an increase in both poverty and inequality would reduce 
the poverty elasticity by 36%. These calculations, in line with recent literature (Chen and 
Ravallion, 1997; Bourguigon, 2003; Ram, 2006; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Ravallion, 
2009), confirm that higher poverty and inequality at the beginning of the spell decrease 
the growth elasticity of poverty. For example, Kalwij and Verschoor (2007), using 
GMM, calculate a poverty elasticity corrected for initial inequality and level of 
development, and obtain values of -1.5% and -1.43% for the 1980s and 1990s, 
respectively. Table 1 also shows that the estimates of the growth elasticity of poverty 
calculated for the poverty headcount at $2 a day are considerably lower than those at 
the poverty line of $1.25 a day. This result is in line with recent estimates that find lower 
elasticity at higher poverty lines (Lenagal and Ram, 2010).  
Overall, our calculations show that worsening conditions of poverty and inequality 
substantially decrease the effect of income growth on poverty. While the poverty 
elasticity estimates are mostly between 1% and 2%, increasing poverty and inequality 
can render the growth elasticity of poverty extremely low.  
 
5.2 The effect of health, education, credit and institutions on the growth 
elasticity of poverty 
 
The “Washington consensus” that emerged in the 1980s as the dominant approach to 
poverty reduction placed great emphasis on the role of economic growth (Besley and 
Burgess, 2003). However, today there is a growing consensus, supported by theoretical 
developments and empirical evidence, that growth in income or consumption is not 
sufficient to reduce poverty. Other conditions are necessary to enable the poor to 
participate in the growth process (Sen, 1999). As discussed in our literature review, 
several variables can affect the growth elasticity of poverty. In Tables C1 to C4 in the 
appendix we show the results of testing the effects of health, education, credit 
constraints and institutions on the poverty rate and the growth elasticity of poverty. We 
do this by introducing one term at a time in separate regressions and by interacting each 
term with the mean income change. In each table, we control for the core variables 
discussed in section 5.1 above: inequality, income growth and the initial levels of 
poverty and inequality. The interactive terms between these variables and income 
growth are highly significant. Again, all estimates include year and region dummies. The 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of the residuals and the Hansen test are also 
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reported. These diagnostic tests mostly show acceptable results, indicating that our 
estimates are reliable. There are some exceptions, however, for instance when we 
estimate the effect of corruption and internal conflict, where the Arellano-Bond test 
rejects the first-order autocorrelation in the residual when it should be accepted. In this 
instance, the estimates should be interpreted with caution. 
Table 2 shows how the introduction of the aforementioned variables affects the growth 
elasticity of poverty42. We calculate the predicted income elasticity of poverty and we do 
so for two values of the variable interacted with mean income: its mean value and one 
standard deviation higher than its mean. The effect of an increase in these variables on 
the growth elasticity of poverty is striking. For instance, an increase of one standard 
deviation above the mean level of infant mortality, which is equivalent to an increase in 
mortality from the level of Mongolia to the level of Zambia, decreases the growth 
elasticity of poverty by 46%, from -1.31% to -0.7%. Similarly, increases in life 
expectancy, schooling and credit substantially increase the growth elasticity of poverty. 
For instance, an increase in life expectancy from the level of Bangladesh to the level of 
Albania would increase the poverty elasticity by 33%. Although the role human capital 
plays in development is well known (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008), in the empirical 
literature its effect on the poverty elasticity to growth seems ambiguous. While Janvry 
and Sandoulet (2000) and Chibber and Nayyar (2007) find that health and schooling 
have a significant impact on the growth elasticity of poverty, Epaulard (2003), using a 
combined indicator of adult literacy, primary schooling and mortality, does not find any 
significant effects. We provide clear evidence that human capital, as measured by health 
or schooling, plays a crucial role in enabling economic growth to reduce poverty. 
As regards the institutional environment, the effect of corruption is not significant, but 
internal conflict, as measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
indicators, has a significant effect on the growth elasticity of poverty. Our calculations 
show that if the risk related to internal conflict decreases (i.e. the ICRG score increases) 
                                                
42 We have also looked at how the structural composition of GDP affects poverty reduction. The labour 
intensity of growth has been mentioned as one of the factors that may affect the income elasticity of 
poverty (World Bank, 1990). In Table 3e in the appendix we include in our model three measures of the 
composition of GDP: employment in agriculture, in industry and in services as a share of GDP. In line 
with Janvry and Sandoulet (2000), we find that agricultural employment does not significantly affect the 
poverty rate or the elasticity of poverty to growth. The estimates show that employment in services and in 
industry increase the poverty elasticity of growth. However, these effects are not robust across the two 
poverty lines used. The results are not surprising given that existing studies show that the impact of 
sector-specific employment is likely to vary across countries..For instance, agriculture has played a 
particularly effective role in reducing poverty in China (Ravallion and Chen, 2007), while in India and 
Brazil the service sector has played a bigger role (Datt and Ravallion, 1998, 2002). 
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then the growth elasticity of poverty can increase by as much as 30% if measured using 
the poverty headcount at $38 per month. 
Our results also support recent evidence that credit can improve the effectiveness of 
growth in reducing poverty. In line with Chibber and Nayyar (2007), we find that the 
interaction between credit and income growth significantly increases the growth 
elasticity of poverty. Our calculations indicate that an increase of one standard deviation 
in credit from its mean, which roughly equates to an increase from the credit level of 
Senegal to that of Panama, would increase the poverty elasticity to growth by as much 
as 30%. 
 
Table 2 
 
Predicted Income Elasticity of Poverty 
 (1) (2) 
Interaction Rate of change 
of PH ($38 per 
month) 
Rate of change 
of PH ($60 per 
month) 
Health 
   
Income * mortality 
(mean) 
-1.31 -0.93 
Income * mortality 
(mean + 1sd) 
-0.7 -0.35 
% change 46% 62% 
   
Income * life 
expect(mean) 
-1.14 -1.05 
Income * life 
expec(mean + 1sd) 
-1.64 -1.65 
% change 43% 57% 
Schooling 
Income * primary 
enroll (mean) 
-1.8 -1.8 
Income * primary 
enrol(mean + 1sd) 
-2.4 -2.4 
% change 33% 33% 
Income * secondary 
enroll (mean) 
-1.38 -1.4 
Income * secondary  
enrol(mean + 1sd) 
-1.7 -1.75 
% change 23% 25% 
Institutions 
Income * 
corruption(mean) 
-1.3 -1.2 
Income * 
corruption(mean + 
1sd ) 
-1.49 -1.4 
% change 14% 16% 
Income * conflict 
(mean) 
-1.38 -1.4 
Income * conflict 
(mean + 1sd) 
-1.7 -1.75 
% change 30% 25% 
Credit 
Income * credit 
(mean ) 
-1.5 -1.1 
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Income * 
credit(mean + 1sd ) 
-1.89 -1.48 
% change 26% 34% 
 
6. Robustness checks 
 
Econometric analysis is notably sensitive to the methodology employed and the 
specification estimated. Moreover, results based on sys-GMM should be interpreted 
with considerable caution. In fact, the Arellano-Bond and Hansen J tests are sensitive to 
the choice and number of instruments. Therefore, in order to increase the credibility of 
our results, we explore the robustness of our main findings using two checks.  
 
6.1 Alternative estimators 
 
Tables D1 and D2 report the core results using the pooled OLS and fixed effects 
estimators43. The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable estimated using 
OLS (Table D1) is likely to be upwardly biased. This is because it is positively correlated 
with the unobserved country-specific effects (Hoeffler, 2002). In contrast, the fixed 
effects estimator (D2) is likely to produce downwardly biased estimates (Nickell, 1981). 
Therefore, the GMM estimates for the lagged dependent variable should fall between 
these upper (OLS) and lower (fixed effects) bounds. If this is not the case, the GMM 
estimates are biased. In most of our estimates, the coefficients on the lagged dependent 
variable lie in the expected range or are very close to it. Moreover, the reported results 
show that the interactive terms analysed remain significant and have the expected sign. 
Hence, this check confirms the appropriateness of the sys-GMM approach. 
 
 
6.2 Different specification 
 
We also test whether the interactive terms analysed in this section are robust to the 
inclusion of additional variables. These results are reported in Tables E1 and E2 in the 
appendix. For each level of poverty line analysed ($38 per month and $60 per month), 
we estimate five equations. Each specification includes life expectancy, mortality, 
schooling, credit and internal conflict, the variables we have identified as having a 
                                                
43 We report this check only for the poverty line at $38 a month.  
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significant effect on the growth elasticity of poverty. As additional controls, we also add 
inflation and trade as a share of GDP. Finally, we control for macroeconomic stability 
(using the inflation rate) and trade openness. High inflation rates can affect the poor 
both directly, through the inflation in tax and oscillations in real income (Carduso, 1993; 
Agenor, 2004), and indirectly through the effect on income distribution (Datt and 
Ravallion, 1998). The effects of trade openness on poverty have been effectively 
reviewed by Winter et al. (2004). The identified channels are related to static and 
dynamic comparative advantages, changes in relative prices and wage increases. The 
interactive terms between the variable of interest and income growth are introduced 
individually. Our robustness checks reveal that the interactive terms between growth, 
and health, schooling, conflict and credit, are robust to the inclusion of additional 
variables. These terms retain the expected sign and are significant for both levels of the 
poverty line. 
Overall, our empirical analysis stresses that, because of the complexity of the growth-
poverty relationship, the pattern of growth is crucial to poverty reduction. We have 
identified several channels that influence the effectiveness of economic growth in 
reducing poverty. Our calculations clearly show that, while in some instances growth 
can have large proportional effects on poverty reduction, an increase in inequality can 
more than offset this. Moreover, the absence of education, credit and health, and the 
presence of conflict, can affect the extent to which economic growth trickles down to 
the poor. Our calculations show that improvements in health and human capital have 
the largest effects on poverty elasticity, although the relative importance of the various 
factors analysed is likely to be country and time-specific.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The importance of understanding the impact of economic growth on poverty reduction 
has long been discussed. Despite it now being widely recognised that increases in 
income and consumption are necessary to reduce poverty, the extent to which the poor 
benefit from economic growth is still debated. There are two opposing views on the 
relationship between growth and poverty (Heltberg, 2002). The first is the “trickle-
down” theory, according to which the benefits of economic growth automatically enrich 
the poor. Within this line of thought, growth is the main tool for poverty reduction. 
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The second view places emphasis on the role of income inequality, and argues that 
inequality affects the ability of growth to reach the poor. Highlighting the role of 
inequality does not imply that the importance of economic growth is overlooked. 
Rather, within this view, growth and inequality are interconnected, and the literature has 
discussed how inequality can influence the effectiveness with which growth benefits the 
poor. Although the debate has centred mainly on developing countries, this is a 
question that is also relevant to developed economies, as shown by a recent debate on 
the relationship between poverty, inequality and civil unrest, between John Redwood 
and John Harris, published in the Guardian44 in the wake of the London riots in August 
2011. The debate shows that, while the goal of poverty reduction is commonly shared 
among political parties, how to achieve it is a more controversial subject. While 
conservative parties typically support the “trickle-down” view, leftist movements tend 
to place more emphasis on the importance of income redistribution.  
Our paper addresses this question using up-to-date data on developing countries. We 
make three central claims: 
i. Economic growth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for effectively reducing 
global poverty.  
ii. At the country level, poverty is self-perpetuating. Those countries that start off at low 
levels of development benefit least from economic growth. The development trap is 
real.  
iii. Institutions matter, not only for economic growth per se, but also for conditioning the 
impact that economic growth has on poverty alleviation. Where systems of health, 
education and good governance are in place, the growth elasticity of poverty is highest. 
We join an emerging empirical literature analysing the poverty elasticity to growth. We 
contribute to this literature with a detailed econometric analysis exploring the factors 
that affect the elasticity, based on the most recent data from the WB database 
PovcalNet. Following Chen and Ravallion (1997) and Bourguignon (2003), we first 
estimate the poverty elasticity to growth, corrected for the initial levels of poverty and 
inequality. In line with the existing literature, we find that higher initial levels of poverty 
and inequality decrease the effect of economic growth on poverty. In addition to this, 
we reach out to the broader development studies literature, by testing whether and to 
what extent the growth elasticity of poverty is influenced by a number of other factors, 
                                                
44 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/17/rightwingers-care-about-inequality  
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such as health, education, conflict and credit. The study uncovers a large variation in the 
growth elasticity of poverty, which depends on the initial levels of poverty and 
inequality and the aforementioned relevant factors: human capital, and financial and 
institutional development. Our detailed calculations show that the context within which 
growth happens conditions the beneficial effect of growth on poverty reduction. The 
most important contextual features that affect the poverty elasticity to growth are the 
initial conditions in terms of inequality and poverty, and human capital, as measured by 
health and education. An increase in inequality by one standard deviation can reduce the 
impact of economic growth on poverty reduction by as much as 86%. When analysing 
the role of human capital, our calculations show that an increase of one standard 
deviation in mortality can decrease the poverty elasticity to growth by 46%. Overall, our 
results provide new empirical evidence that the ability of the poor to participate in 
economic growth depends on the presence of some enabling conditions (Sen, 1999). In 
this instance, economic growth and boosting consumption alone are unlikely to address 
poverty reduction. By showing that an initial disadvantage, due to greater poverty and 
inequality, decreases the growth elasticity of poverty, we are confirming that, the higher 
the poverty level, the harder it is to achieve poverty reduction, and therefore poverty 
may tend to perpetuate underdevelopment (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2006).  
The present study could be extended with a detailed analysis on the responsiveness of 
poverty to inequality changes. The effect of inequality on poverty is still relatively 
unexplored. In the spirit of Kalwij and Verschoor (2007), it would be possible to assess 
how initial conditions of poverty and inequality affect the poverty elasticity of 
inequality.  
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Data  Appendix 
 
Table A1 
 
                                Country |      Freq.      
 
                                Albania |          8              
                                Algeria |          8              
                                 Angola |          8              
                                Armenia |          8            
                             Azerbaijan |          8            
                             Bangladesh |          8         
                                Belarus |          3         
                                  Benin |          8         
                                 Bhutan |          8         
                                Bolivia |          8         
                               Botswana |          8         
                                 Brazil |          8         
                               Bulgaria |          2         
                           Burkina Faso |          8         
                                Burundi |          8         
                               Cambodia |          8         
                               Cameroon |          8         
                             Cape Verde |          8         
               Central African Republic |          8         
                                   Chad |          8         
                                  Chile |          8         
                               Colombia |          4         
                                Comoros |          8         
                       Congo, Dem. Rep. |          8         
                            Congo, Rep. |          8         
                             Costa Rica |          8         
                          Cote d'Ivoire |          8         
                               Djibouti |          8         
                     Dominican Republic |          8         
                                Ecuador |          8         
                       Egypt, Arab Rep. |          8         
                            El Salvador |          8         
                                Estonia |          3         
                               Ethiopia |          8         
                                  Gabon |          8         
                            Gambia, The |          8         
                                Georgia |          8         
                                  Ghana |          8         
                              Guatemala |          7         
                                 Guinea |          8         
                          Guinea-Bissau |          8         
                                 Guyana |          8         
                                  Haiti |          8         
                               Honduras |          6         
                     Iran, Islamic Rep. |          8         
                                Jamaica |          8         
                                 Jordan |          5         
                             Kazakhstan |          5         
                                  Kenya |          8         
                        Kyrgyz Republic |          5         
                                Lao PDR |          8         
                                 Latvia |          1         
                                Lesotho |          8         
                                Liberia |          8         
                              Lithuania |          2         
                         Macedonia, FYR |          2         
                             Madagascar |          8         
                                 Malawi |          8         
                               Malaysia |          8         
                                   Mali |          8         
                             Mauritania |          8         
                                 Mexico |          8         
                                Moldova |          8         
                               Mongolia |          8         
                                Morocco |          8         
                             Mozambique |          8         
                                Namibia |          8         
                                  Nepal |          6         
                              Nicaragua |          8         
                                  Niger |          8         
                                Nigeria |          8         
                               Pakistan |          8         
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                                 Panama |          8         
                       Papua New Guinea |          8         
                               Paraguay |          8         
                                   Peru |          8         
                            Philippines |          8         
                                 Poland |          5         
                                Romania |          4         
                     Russian Federation |          8         
                                 Rwanda |          8         
                                Senegal |          8         
                           Sierra Leone |          2         
                        Slovak Republic |          1         
                           South Africa |          8         
                              Sri Lanka |          8         
                              St. Lucia |          8         
                               Suriname |          8         
                              Swaziland |          8         
                             Tajikistan |          8         
                               Tanzania |          8         
                               Thailand |          8         
                            Timor-Leste |          8         
                                   Togo |          8         
                    Trinidad and Tobago |          6         
                                Tunisia |          8         
                                 Turkey |          8         
                           Turkmenistan |          8         
                                 Uganda |          8         
                                Ukraine |          8         
                             Uzbekistan |          5         
                          Venezuela, RB |          8         
                                Vietnam |          8         
                            Yemen, Rep. |          8         
                                 Zambia |          8         
 
                                  Total |        762       
 
 
Table A2- Definition & Source of Variables 
 
Variable Name  Variable Definition Variable Source 
Povchange Logarithmic change of poverty 
headcount at $38 per month 
PovcalNet, WB 
Pov2change Logarithmic change of poverty 
headcount at $60 per month 
PovcalNet, WB 
Incchange Logarithmic change of mean income PovcalNet, WB 
Ginichange Logarithmic change of gini 
coefficient 
PovcalNet, WB 
Lhpl38 Logarithm poverty headcount at $38 
per month 
PovcalNet, WB 
Lhpl60 Logarithm poverty headcount at $38 
per month 
PovcalNet, WB 
Lgini Logarithm Gini coefficient PovcalNet, WB 
Lmortality Log infant mortality World Development 
indicator, WB 
Llife Log life expectancy World Development 
indicator, WB 
Lschenrol1/2 Log school enrolment primary (1)& 
secondary (2) 
World Development 
indicator, WB 
Lcredit Log credit to private Sector as 
share of GDP 
World Development 
indicator, WB 
Ltrade Log trade as share of GDP World Development 
indicator, WB 
inflation Consumer price index World Development 
indicator, WB 
Internal conflict  Internal conflict Risk International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Corruption Corruption risk International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
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Table A3- Summary Statistics 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   povchange |       766   -.0497443    .5194534   -4.65396    4.60517 
  pov2change |       800   -.0173445    .4717279  -4.287167   4.727388 
   incchange |       800    .0242525     .195313  -1.024522   1.168869 
  ginichange |       794     .008597    .1896828  -.7741492   4.987849 
      Lhpl38 |       775     2.79677    1.561316  -3.912023   4.527749 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Lginipl38 |       795    3.744231    .2860483  -1.237874   4.308515 
Lmortality   |       613    3.877283    .7388069   1.740466    5.11259 
      Llife  |       794    4.091211    .1693642   3.273747   4.363576 
 Lschenrol1  |       579    4.514629    .2968048   3.127194   5.048485 
 Lschenrol2  |       550    3.714124    .7754926   1.569242   4.695886 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Lcredit   |       690    3.382933     .928007  -2.379193   7.067512 
       Laid  |       725   -3.406966    1.761346  -10.11568   .0799655 
internalco~t |       555    7.854907    2.519575          0         12 
      corrup |       555    2.575225     1.03775          0          6 
     Ltrade  |       749    4.181312    .5203407   2.208899   5.539717 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  inflation  |       652    54.92416    383.5607  -11.44946   7481.664 
 
Table A4- Correlation 
 
             | povcha~e pov2ch~e inccha~e ginich~e   Lhpl38 Lgini~38 Lmort~12 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
   povchange |   1.0000  
  pov2change |   0.8835   1.0000  
   incchange |  -0.6051  -0.5864   1.0000  
  ginichange |   0.0996   0.1126   0.0370   1.0000  
      Lhpl38 |   0.2473   0.1261  -0.0605   0.0205   1.0000  
   Lginipl38 |   0.0411   0.0277   0.0198   0.0183   0.2167   1.0000  
  Lmortality |   0.1483   0.1165  -0.0827   0.0246   0.7538   0.0722   1.0000  
      Llife  |  -0.0816  -0.0454   0.0496  -0.0461  -0.6497  -0.0504  -0.8238  
 Lschenrol1  |  -0.0572  -0.0560   0.0460   0.0434  -0.2959   0.1094  -0.4901  
 Lschenrol2  |  -0.0521  -0.0122  -0.0200   0.0629  -0.6495  -0.1692  -0.7662  
    Lcredit  |  -0.0197  -0.0108  -0.0874   0.0145  -0.3024   0.0614  -0.3751  
       Laid  |   0.0333   0.0233  -0.0016   0.0304   0.5286  -0.0331   0.5962  
internalco~t |  -0.1059  -0.1301   0.0948   0.0154  -0.3073  -0.0473  -0.4050  
      corrup |   0.0070   0.0189   0.0664   0.0257  -0.0985   0.0819  -0.1698  
     Ltrade  |  -0.0713  -0.0411   0.0370  -0.0216  -0.2107   0.0355  -0.3787  
  Inflation  |   0.0807   0.0386  -0.0500   0.0155  -0.0529   0.0547   0.0551  
 
             |   Llife  Lsche~12 Lsche~22 Lcred~12    Laid3 intern~t   corrup 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Lschenrol1  |   0.5506   1.0000  
 Lschenrol2  |   0.8212   0.6724   1.0000  
    Lcredit  |   0.3895   0.2544   0.4007   1.0000  
       Laid  |  -0.5385  -0.3706  -0.5822  -0.2957   1.0000  
internalco~t |   0.3193   0.2067   0.3105   0.0506  -0.1688   1.0000  
      corrup |   0.1812   0.0544   0.0442   0.1508  -0.0668   0.2109   1.0000  
      Ltrade |   0.2949   0.2421   0.3883   0.0863   0.0700   0.3646   0.0080  
   Inflation |  -0.0272   0.0648  -0.0059  -0.0231  -0.0763  -0.1228   0.0310  
 
             |  Ltrade2 inflat~2 
-------------+------------------ 
   inflation |  -0.0769   1.0000  
 
Table B1 
Rate of Change of Poverty Headcount ($38 per month) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GMM GMM GMM GMM 
     
Income change -1.207*** -2.699*** -10.46*** -2.355 
 (0.212) (0.377) (2.839) (2.950) 
Gini change  5.001*** 5.475*** 4.271*** 4.642*** 
 (1.121) (0.984) (1.039) (0.991) 
Lagged poverty -0.281** -0.288*** -0.277*** -0.256*** 
 (0.113) (0.0739) (0.0969) (0.0739) 
Lagged gini 4.856*** 5.323*** 3.964*** 4.477*** 
 (1.097) (0.957) (1.045) (0.991) 
Lagged poverty *income change  0.574***  0.610*** 
  (0.0951)  (0.0974) 
Lagged gini *income change   2.488*** -0.126 
   (0.731) (0.800) 
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Constant -16.57*** -18.23*** -13.36*** -15.31*** 
 (4.055) (3.471) (3.712) (3.539) 
     
Observations 762 762 762 762 
Number of Countries 105 105 105 105 
N. Instruments 37 40 40 43 
AR (1) Pr > z 0.025 0.107 0.039 0.073 
AR (2) Pr > z 0.365 0.185 0.140 0.154 
Hansen Prob > chi2 0.093 0.224 0.075 0.101 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option  
 
Table B2  
Rate of Change of Poverty Headcount ($60 per month) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GMM GMM GMM GMM 
     
Income change -0.766*** -3.088*** -8.553*** -3.744** 
 (0.186) (0.484) (2.294) (1.700) 
Gini change  3.506*** 3.567*** 2.706** 2.434** 
 (1.052) (0.973) (1.059) (1.020) 
Lagged poverty -0.565*** -0.460*** -0.543*** -0.362*** 
 (0.120) (0.106) (0.116) (0.115) 
Lagged gini 3.418*** 3.498*** 2.483** 2.317** 
 (1.039) (0.963) (1.068) (1.033) 
Lagged poverty *income change  0.685***  0.715*** 
  (0.114)  (0.109) 
Lagged gini *income change   2.094*** 0.127 
   (0.585) (0.441) 
Constant -10.05*** -10.78*** -6.761* -6.944* 
 (3.874) (3.477) (3.830) (3.715) 
     
Observations 794 794 794 794 
Number of Countries 108 108 108 108 
N. Instrument 37 40 40 43 
AR (1) Pr > z 0.309 0.578 0.273 0.260 
AR (2) Pr > z 0.157 0.810 0.665 0.765 
Hansen Prob > chi2 0.472 0.734 0.553 0.399 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option 
 
Table C1- Health: Mortality & life expectancy 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Rate of change 
of PH ($38 per 
month) 
Rate of change 
of PH ($60 per 
month) 
Rate of change 
of PH ($38 per 
month) 
Rate of change 
of PH ($60 per 
month) 
     
Income change -4.542*** -3.850*** 10.87*** 10.45*** 
 (0.780) (0.768) (2.976) (2.531) 
Gini change  5.012*** 3.192*** 4.349*** 2.714*** 
 (1.078) (1.009) (1.027) (0.978) 
Lagged poverty -0.483*** -0.600*** -0.360*** -0.543*** 
 (0.0958) (0.145) (0.0956) (0.120) 
Lagged gini 4.992*** 3.197*** 4.281*** 2.685*** 
 (1.062) (1.020) (1.031) (0.998) 
Lag life expectancy   -2.092*** -1.632*** 
   (0.693) (0.557) 
Income * life exp   -2.948*** -2.752*** 
   (0.759) (0.643) 
Lag infant 
mortality 
0.881*** 0.697***   
 (0.218) (0.191)   
Income * mortality 0.840*** 0.766***   
 (0.185) (0.165)   
Constant -19.93*** -11.92*** -5.593 -0.778 
 (4.019) (3.751) (4.546) (3.487) 
     
Observations 498 515 754 782 
Number of Countries 105 107 105 108 
N. Instruments 38 38 41 41 
AR(1)- p value 0.0633 0.494 0.0385 0.432 
AR(2)-p value 0.409 0.305 0.237 0.501 
Hansen- p value 0.410 0.188 0.129 0.0585 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option. 
 
 
Table C2- Primary and Secondary enrollment School enrollment 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Rate of 
change of PH 
($38 per 
month) 
Rate of 
change of PH 
($60 per 
month) 
Rate of 
change of PH 
($38 per 
month) 
Rate of 
change of PH 
($60 per 
month) 
     
Income change 6.484*** 6.934*** 1.742** 2.001*** 
 (1.629) (1.999) (0.725) (0.692) 
Gini change  3.201*** 3.193*** 3.737*** 3.611*** 
 (0.968) (0.933) (0.860) (0.862) 
Lag poverty -0.165 -0.0945 -0.102 -0.0404 
 (0.106) (0.165) (0.102) (0.143) 
Lag gini 0.0882 0.205 0.556 0.592 
 (0.669) (0.640) (0.665) (0.680) 
Lag sch enrol1 -0.131 -0.0999   
 (0.126) (0.111)   
income* sch enroll1  -1.854*** -1.945***   
 (0.383) (0.464)   
Lag sch enrol2   -0.117 -0.0756 
   (0.0827) (0.0610) 
Income change* sch enrol2   -0.935*** -0.976*** 
   (0.205) (0.199) 
Constant 0.786 0.0340 -1.332 -1.818 
 (2.167) (2.327) (2.335) (2.636) 
     
Observations 483 482 462 461 
Number of Countries 103 103 102 102 
N. instruments 41 41 41 41 
AR(1)- p value 0.000382 0.00339 0.000287 0.00271 
AR(2)-p value 0.585 0.455 0.908 0.870 
Hansen- p value 0.381 0.105 0.518 0.151 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option. 
 
 
Table C3-Institutions 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Rate of change 
of PH ($38 per 
month) 
Rate of change 
of PH ($60 per 
month) 
Rate of change 
of PH ($38 per 
month) 
Rate of change 
of PH ($60 per 
month) 
     
Income change -0.878** -0.972** -0.349 -0.431 
 (0.412) (0.412) (0.526) (0.545) 
Gini change  3.871*** 3.188*** 4.155*** 4.274*** 
 (1.203) (0.884) (1.195) (1.086) 
Lag poverty -0.120 -0.351*** -0.0881 -0.0741 
 (0.0942) (0.133) (0.0987) (0.165) 
Lag gini 3.786*** 3.096*** 4.069*** 4.193*** 
 (1.193) (0.876) (1.179) (1.074) 
Corruption -0.103** -0.108**   
 (0.0514) (0.0454)   
Corrup * income -0.165 -0.117   
 (0.164) (0.148)   
Internal conflict   0.0131 0.0178 
   (0.0282) (0.0285) 
Internal conflict* 
income 
  -0.135* -0.129** 
   (0.0732) (0.0640) 
Constant -12.76*** -9.313*** -14.07*** -14.52*** 
 (4.171) (3.062) (4.235) (3.745) 
     
Observations 462 462 462 462 
Number of 
Countries 
77 77 77 77 
N. Instruments 40 46 40 40 
AR(1)- pvalue 0.116 0.146 0.135 0.172 
AR(2)-p value 0.586 0.506 0.606 0.598 
Hansen- p value 0.436 0.294 0.275 0.266 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
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region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option. Corruption and 
Internal conflict are ICRG indicator where lower scores indicates greater risks. 
 
Table C4 – Credit Constraints  
GMM 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Rate of 
change of PH 
($38 per 
month) 
Rate of 
change of PH 
($60 per 
month) 
   
Income change -0.0271 0.347 
 (0.581) (0.441) 
Gini change  5.154*** 3.223*** 
 (1.051) (0.991) 
Lag poverty -0.219** -0.304*** 
 (0.104) (0.110) 
Lag gini 5.021*** 3.147*** 
 (1.026) (0.981) 
Credit -0.154 -0.0898 
 (0.102) (0.0665) 
Credit* income -0.433** -0.423*** 
 (0.170) (0.148) 
Constant -16.65*** -9.698*** 
 (3.694) (3.505) 
   
Observations 636 657 
Number of Countries 103 105 
N. Instruments 41 41 
AR(1)- pvalue 0.194 0.906 
AR(2)-p value 0.422 0.138 
Hansen- p value 0.520 0.559 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option. 
 
Table C5 – Structural Change 
GMM 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Rate of change of PH ($38 
per month) 
Rate of change of PH ($60 
per month) 
   
Income change 6.667** 0.835 
 (3.223) (2.272) 
Gini change  5.196*** 3.792*** 
 (0.813) (0.619) 
Lag poverty -0.0441 -0.0615 
 (0.0731) (0.0726) 
Lag gini 1.085 1.029*** 
 (1.003) (0.372) 
Agricul. Emp. -0.00122 -0.0204 
 (0.0726) (0.0369) 
Income * Agricul. Emp. -0.397 0.227 
 (0.377) (0.195) 
Industry Emp. 0.0551 -0.0555 
 (0.141) (0.105) 
Income * Industry Emp. -1.478 -1.505*** 
 (0.922) (0.495) 
Sevice Emp. -0.122 -0.113 
 (0.124) (0.131) 
Income * Service Emp -0.820*** 0.342 
 (0.317) (0.391) 
Constant -3.511 -2.864** 
 (3.626) (1.142) 
   
Observations 283 293 
Number of Countries 65 66 
N. Instruments 37 37 
AR(1)- p value 0.0971 0.0467 
AR(2)- p value 0.182 0.546 
Hansen- p value 0.769 0.753 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option 
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Table D1 
 
OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Rate of change of PH ($38 per month) 
 
        
Income change -
3.361*** 
-
12.87*** 
-
5.175*** 
13.55*** 6.052*** -0.707* -0.618** 
 (0.330) (3.107) (1.086) (2.437) (1.159) (0.388) (0.294) 
Gini change  0.671* 0.714* 0.893** 0.455 3.483*** 0.591 0.676* 
 (0.397) (0.377) (0.435) (0.312) (0.628) (0.401) (0.377) 
Lag poverty -
0.0449** 
-0.0458* -
0.157*** 
-0.0121 -0.0458 -0.0553 -0.0492 
 (0.0213) (0.0272) (0.0461) (0.0264) (0.0364) (0.0362) (0.0359) 
Lag gini 0.287* 0.165 0.597** 0.201 0.139 0.386 0.370* 
 (0.146) (0.151) (0.260) (0.136) (0.163) (0.269) (0.190) 
Lag poverty *incchange 0.657***       
 (0.0937)       
Lag gini*incchane  3.018***      
  (0.814)      
Mortality   0.294***     
   (0.0705)     
Mortality *incchange   0.886***     
   (0.255)     
Life Expc.    -0.0254    
    (0.0877)    
Life Expc. *incchange    -
3.619*** 
   
    (0.617)    
sch enrol1     -0.0796   
     (0.0571)   
sch enrol2* incchange     -
1.802*** 
  
     (0.285)   
L.internalconflict      0.00582  
      (0.00748)  
Internalconflict 
incchange 
     -0.0994*  
      (0.0554)  
credit       -0.0325* 
       (0.0185) 
Credit* incchange       -
0.322*** 
       (0.0993) 
Constant -0.863* -0.402 -
2.733*** 
-0.544 0.168 -1.167 -1.008 
 (0.522) (0.562) (0.969) (0.691) (0.641) (0.949) (0.690) 
        
Observations 762 762 498 758 483 462 636 
R-squared 0.552 0.458 0.486 0.506 0.549 0.376 0.401 
 
 
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. 
 
Table D2 
 
FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Rate of change of PH ($38 per month) 
 
        
Income change -
3.088*** 
-
11.43*** 
-
5.132*** 
13.56*** 5.993*** -0.342 -0.492 
 (0.319) (2.559) (0.778) (2.563) (1.025) (0.329) (0.299) 
Gini change  1.520*** 1.556*** 2.672*** 1.108** 3.499*** 1.289*** 1.638*** 
 (0.544) (0.559) (0.866) (0.503) (0.900) (0.488) (0.550) 
Lag poverty -
0.195*** 
-
0.233*** 
-
0.481*** 
-
0.0802** 
-
0.388*** 
-0.293*** -
0.282*** 
 (0.0473) (0.0577) (0.0836) (0.0403) (0.0974) (0.0782) (0.0782) 
Lag gini 1.047** 0.976** 2.426*** 0.771** 1.026** 1.153*** 1.341*** 
 (0.417) (0.423) (0.815) (0.389) (0.476) (0.445) (0.465) 
Lag poverty *incchange 0.600***       
 (0.0877)       
Lag gini*incchane  2.678***      
  (0.672)      
Mortality   0.288     
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   (0.307)     
Mortality *incchange   0.969***     
   (0.182)     
Life Expc.    0.284*    
    (0.157)    
Life Expc. *incchange    -
3.609*** 
   
    (0.649)    
sch enrol1     0.240*   
     (0.128)   
sch enrol2* incchange     -
1.705*** 
  
     (0.252)   
L.internalconflict      0.0149*  
      (0.00760)  
Internalconflict 
incchange 
     -0.118**  
      (0.0480)  
credit       -0.0270 
       (0.0272) 
Credit* incchange       -
0.299*** 
       (0.0966) 
Constant -3.376** -2.972* -8.917** -3.822** -3.689* -3.702** -4.165** 
 (1.592) (1.610) (3.965) (1.771) (1.962) (1.724) (1.748) 
        
Observations 762 762 498 758 483 462 636 
R-squared 0.603 0.527 0.644 0.521 0.644 0.456 0.496 
Number of ID 105 105 105 105 103 77 103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. 
 
 
TABLE E1 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Rate of 
change of 
PH ($38 
per month) 
Rate of 
change of 
PH ($38 
per month) 
Rate of 
change of 
PH ($38 
per month) 
Rate of 
change of 
PH ($38 per 
month) 
Rate of 
change of 
PH ($38 per 
month) 
      
Income change -4.829*** 13.82*** 5.035** -0.290 0.0903 
 (0.583) (4.064) (2.546) (0.607) (0.778) 
Gini change  4.132*** 4.140*** 4.106*** 4.118*** 4.062*** 
 (0.993) (0.953) (0.952) (0.966) (0.944) 
Lag poverty -0.299** -0.227 -0.226 -0.225 -0.247 
 (0.151) (0.176) (0.167) (0.149) (0.172) 
Lag gini 2.166*** 1.967** 1.847** 1.968** 1.781* 
 (0.786) (0.916) (0.772) (0.855) (0.917) 
Mortality 0.327* 0.306* 0.307* 0.318** 0.335* 
 (0.171) (0.177) (0.172) (0.157) (0.175) 
Life Expectancy 0.914 1.016* 0.879 1.015* 0.907 
 (0.631) (0.600) (0.565) (0.588) (0.601) 
Primary Enrol -0.168 -0.171 -0.132 -0.190 -0.152 
 (0.132) (0.128) (0.126) (0.125) (0.129) 
Credit -0.0466 -0.0334 -0.0381 -0.0524 0.00328 
 (0.0529) (0.0519) (0.0496) (0.0476) (0.0581) 
Aid 0.106*** 0.0942** 0.0908** 0.0912** 0.0972** 
 (0.0407) (0.0445) (0.0400) (0.0409) (0.0445) 
Internal conflict 0.0124 0.0127 0.00912 0.0219 0.00774 
 (0.0160) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0148) 
Trade -0.0642 -0.0443 -0.0428 -0.0520 -0.0580 
 (0.0945) (0.0910) (0.0864) (0.0840) (0.0874) 
Inflation 4.48e-05 4.59e-05 4.02e-05 8.12e-05* 4.54e-05 
 (4.07e-05) (4.26e-05) (4.14e-05) (4.68e-05) (4.02e-05) 
Mortality* income 0.851***     
 (0.158)     
Life Ex * income  -3.772***    
  (0.983)    
Primary enroll* income   -1.508***   
   (0.580)   
Internal Conflict* 
income 
   -0.171**  
    (0.0701)  
Credit * Income     -0.580** 
     (0.225) 
Constant -10.26** -10.29** -9.477** -10.27** -9.345** 
 (4.101) (4.310) (3.853) (4.165) (4.373) 
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Observations 290 290 290 290 290 
Number of Countries 70 70 70 70 70 
N. Instrument 45 45 45 45 45 
AR(1)- p value 0.00355 0.00946 0.0113 0.00395 0.00961 
AR(2)-p value 0.606 0.272 0.255 0.392 0.165 
Hansen- p value 0.535 0.504 0.465 0.385 0.468 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option. Mortality, Life 
expectancy, Primary Enrolment, Credit, Aid, Conflict, Inflation are used as lag and 
in logarithm excluding internal conflict and inflation. 
 
TABLE E2 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Rate of 
change of 
PH ($60 
per month) 
Rate of 
change of 
PH ($60 
per month) 
Rate of 
change of 
PH ($60 
per month) 
Rate of 
change of PH 
($60 per 
month) 
Rate of 
change of 
PH ($60 
per 
month) 
      
Income change -5.475*** 16.59*** 6.527*** 0.892 0.584 
 (0.582) (4.489) (2.431) (0.812) (0.577) 
Gini change  3.484*** 3.492*** 3.486*** 3.431*** 3.362*** 
 (0.970) (0.970) (0.961) (0.990) (0.964) 
Lag poverty -0.192* -0.148 -0.171* -0.134 -0.177* 
 (0.108) (0.0934) (0.0987) (0.108) (0.105) 
Lag gini 1.863** 1.707** 1.693** 1.596** 1.449** 
 (0.730) (0.775) (0.735) (0.752) (0.721) 
Mortality 0.108 0.139 0.167 0.139 0.182 
 (0.133) (0.114) (0.125) (0.116) (0.123) 
Life Expectancy 0.796 0.908* 0.838* 0.860* 0.830* 
 (0.529) (0.491) (0.489) (0.467) (0.481) 
Primary Enrol -0.192 -0.194 -0.157 -0.218* -0.168 
 (0.121) (0.120) (0.124) (0.114) (0.114) 
Credit -0.00271 0.00415 -0.00246 -0.0172 0.0476 
 (0.0370) (0.0343) (0.0329) (0.0304) (0.0399) 
Aid 0.0697** 0.0619** 0.0628** 0.0553** 0.0653** 
 (0.0284) (0.0272) (0.0261) (0.0267) (0.0258) 
Internal conflict 0.0119 0.0113 0.00757 0.0256** 0.00564 
 (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0116) (0.0120) 
Trade -0.0393 -0.0250 -0.0307 -0.0348 -0.0462 
 (0.0772) (0.0726) (0.0690) (0.0657) (0.0630) 
Inflation 7.45e-05** 6.34e-05** 5.47e-05** 0.000118*** 6.17e-
05** 
 (3.29e-05) (2.74e-05) (2.69e-05) (4.07e-05) (2.57e-
05) 
Mortality* income 1.090***     
 (0.152)     
Life Ex * income  -4.381***    
  (1.102)    
Primary enroll* income   -1.770***   
   (0.560)   
Internal Conflict* 
income 
   -0.280***  
    (0.101)  
Credit * Income     -0.645*** 
     (0.197) 
Constant -8.335** -8.640** -8.420** -8.042** -7.590** 
 (3.561) (3.600) (3.445) (3.420) (3.395) 
      
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 
Number of Countries 73 73 73 73 73 
N. instrument 45 45 45 45 45 
AR(1)- p value 0.00158 0.00618 0.0234 0.00558 0.0180 
AR(2)-p value 0.963 0.667 0.541 0.557 0.227 
Hansen- p value 0.511 0.431 0.511 0.419 0.559 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
region dummies included. Endogenous variables: income and gini change, lagged poverty 
and gini, interactive terms. Gmm instrument uses collapse option. Mortality, Life 
expectancy, Primary Enrolment, Credit, Aid, Conflict, Inflation are used as lag and 
in logarithm excluding internal conflict and inflation. 
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Chapter 3- FDI, Political Stability and property Rights in Resource-Rich 
Countries  
 
 
Abstract 
The literature on the drivers of the internationalization of multinational companies 
(MNC) that operate in the primary sector remains poorly developed. In particular, little 
is known about the relationship between host country institutions and FDI in natural 
resources. Addressing this gap in knowledge, we focus on low- and middle-income 
countries, and investigate the relationship between political stability, property rights and 
foreign investment in resource-rich economies. We employ the system GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments) estimator to analyse the interplay between natural 
resource endowments and institutions. The results provide broad support for the 
argument developed in the paper that the presence of natural resource affects the 
institutions-FDI relationship. Our findings indicate that the sensitivity of foreign 
investors to local institutions varies across countries and types of investments. Namely, 
in resource-rich countries, where FDI is concentrated principally in the primary sector, 
institutions may be less important for attracting FDI.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent wave of liberalization in developing and emerging economies has prompted 
a significant growth of multinational companies (MNC) and foreign direct investment 
(FDI), a phenomenon that has generated much interest within academia, international 
organizations and governments. Many academics and policy makers have been 
optimistic about the economic consequences of FDI. This has led them to consider 
foreign investment a necessary instrument for economic development. The theoretical 
literature in support of this view argues that FDI can promote growth and development 
by generating knowledge and technological spillovers. However, the empirical evidence 
on this is rather mixed (Alfaro et al., 2009). Scholars have shown that positive effects 
arising from FDI are likely to depend on the host country characteristics, such as the 
level of human capital, financial markets and the institutional frameworks (De Mello, 
1999; Blömstrom and Kokko, 2003). Moreover, the activities of MNCs have aroused 
controversy and concern, especially in the case of international companies in extractive 
industry and natural commodities, where resources are often located in conflict-prone 
regions. Recent research has highlighted that in some cases foreign companies in 
extractive industry have aggravated violence and conflict, for example, by providing 
arms or finance (Ballentine, 2004). In such cases, the beneficial effect of FDI is likely to 
be limited due to the potential effects on real exchange rate and loss of competitiveness 
(Sachs and Warner, 2001; Le Billon, 2005), worsening social inequality (Ross, 1999; 
Renner, 2002) and instability (Collier, 2004). In addition, recent research highlights that 
the role played by host country characteristics in attracting investors differs compared 
to other types of investments. Novel empirical studies, for example, have shown that 
the relationship between democracy and FDI in the primary sector may be atypical 
(Aisedu and Lien, 2011; Shultz, 2007). In this instance, there is no evidence of the 
expected positive relation between foreign investment and democracy. Until now, the 
literature on resource-rich economies has only investigated the relationship between 
democracy and FDI, while the link between FDI and other aspects of the institutional 
environment remains unexplored. In light of the issues and concerns related to 
investments in natural resources, understanding the interplay between institutions and 
foreign investor in resource-rich countries seems particularly important. Addressing this 
gap in knowledge, we focus on low- and middle-income countries, and investigate the 
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relationship between political stability, property rights and foreign investment in 
resource-rich economies. We extend the literature by examining the effect of political 
stability and property rights on FDI using a dataset of up to 92 developing and 
emerging countries over a fourteen years period. We estimate a model of FDI 
determinants using the Blundell-Bond system GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) 
estimator (Blundell and Bond, 2000). This allows us to attenuate the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity, the endogeneity of regressors, while also capturing the 
dynamic aspects of observed interrelations – issues often overlooked by existing studies. 
In our analysis we investigate the interaction between natural resource endowments and 
institutions. We must point that our analysis uses aggregate FDI data and therefore 
implicitly assumes that that resource rich economies attract mainly resource-seeking 
investment. The assumption is in line with current research (Asiedu and Line, 2011). 
Moreover it seems a reasonable assumption since recent empirical findings confirm that 
natural resource production significantly decreases non-resource FDI (Poelhekke and 
van der Ploeg, 2010). Hence resource production is significantly correlated with a 
concentration of investment in the resource sector. The results provide broad support 
for the argument developed in the paper that the presence of natural resource affects 
the institutions–FDI relationship. Our results are important as they indicate that the 
sensitivity of foreign investors to local institutions varies across countries and types of 
investments. More precisely, in resource-rich countries, where FDI is concentrated 
principally in the primary sector, institutions may be less important for attracting FDI. 
Existing research stresses that institutional weakness are negatively correlated with FDI. 
However, our discussion indicates that the risk posed by frail institutions can be offset 
by the investment potential and by the MNC’s ability to negotiate favourable entry 
conditions with the host government. 
We proceed as follows. Section two reviews the main theories of firm 
internationalization. Section three discusses the relationship between the institutions, 
FDI and natural resources. The fourth and fifth sections present the econometric model 
and the data used in our estimations. Finally, we discuss the results and draw 
conclusions.  
2. Theories on International Production 
As the aim of the chapter is to investigate empirically what drives foreign entry, the 
section intends to provide a theoretical foundation for the subsequent empirical 
analysis. We review the existing theories of international production in chronological 
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order and we select a theoretical framework relevant to our analysis. 
2.1 Early Theories of International Production 
 
Globalization and international businesses are not unique to today’s society. Indeed, 
many scholars (Cox, 1997; Bordo, 2004) have observed that the period from 1800 to 
the First World War was characterized by a high level of interdependence in the markets 
for goods, services and the factors of production. During this time trade was 
progressively liberalized and foreign investments by western companies grew to a 
considerable amount. However in the nineteenth and early twentieth century no theory 
had evolved that attempted to explain international production; instead, scholars were 
concerned with exploring the motivation behind the perceived imperialism of western 
nations.  
In the first half of the twentieth century, neoclassical economics developed a theory of 
foreign investments. The neoclassical explanation of foreign investments views foreign 
direct investment as a special case of capital movement, driven by interest rate 
differentials. Despite its popularity, the neoclassical theory on foreign investment has a 
very poor explanatory power and indeed was cogently criticized by Hymer (1960)45. 
Hymers’ theory identifies three main drivers of foreign investments. The first 
determinant is the firm’s specific advantages, which are the competitive advantages of a 
firm over its rivals. The second factor relates to the firm’s behaviour in the foreign 
country. Because one of the main goals of the firm, according to Hymer, is to gain 
monopoly power, firms tend to collude with rivals. Hence, collusion is a main driver of 
the firm’s international expansion. That is, the explanation for the internationalization 
process lies in the pursuit of direct control over operations. The firm’s behaviour grants 
the MNE a monopolistic advantage that allows some superiority over foreign firms. 
According to Hymer (1976), a crucial advantage of MNEs is their superior knowledge 
of the various stages of production (manufacturing, processing, branding and 
marketing, human resources, etc.). The third factor is that firms aim to expand 
internationally to diversify risk. Hymer’s key insight probably lies in the idea that follows 
from his logic: FDI should be analysed in terms of industrial organization and not as 
part of international economics (Graham, 2002). Recent developments of Hymer’s 
theory are therefore associated with literature on industrial organization, 
 
                                                
45 See Ietto-Gillies (2005) for a criticism of the neoclassical theory of foreign investments. 
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Parallel to Hymer, in the 60s Vernon developed the Product life cycle theory (Vernon, 
1966). The theory states that a firm’s location, and therefore its foreign expansion, is 
determined by the stage of the product life cycle that it is in. Vernon identifies three 
stages of product development. In the first stage (the introduction), the firm (in 
Vernon’s case it is a US entrepreneur) introduces a new product into the market. At this 
point, the firm’s location and targeted market coincide. Moreover, the firm faces low 
price elasticity of demand and it is mainly concerned with maintaining the freedom to 
adjust inputs and the ability for prompt and effective communication. In the second 
stage (growth), the product demand expands and the market becomes more 
standardized. In the third and final stage (standardization), the product becomes 
completely standardized and requires processes with high capital intensity and unskilled 
labour. Because of this, firms will tend to relocate abroad mainly on the basis of cost 
considerations. Hence, the product life cycle theory stresses that firms make direct 
foreign investments only after products mature and competition becomes cost-based. 
Like all theories, Vernon’s was a product of his time and his ideas were based on the 
experience of American firms relocating abroad. Vernon mainly analysed products that 
once in the maturity stage are characterized by a high level of standardization, such as 
textile products, steel, electronic items and so on. The changes in economic 
environment from the 1950s to the 1970s and 1980s (for example, the narrowing of 
macroeconomic differences between the US and Europe) made his theory less 
applicable. Despite the limited applicability of Vernon’s theory, Ietto-Gillies (2005) 
argues that it may still be useful for analysing the innovation of small firms and the 
spread of innovation from developed to developing countries. 
 
2.2 Williamson and the Transaction Cost Approach 
 
During the 1970s an important contribution to the literature on firm 
internationalization is found in the transaction cost approach, also known as 
internalization theory. Scholars of internalization theory (McManus, 1972; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Teece, 1977; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982 and 2000; Caves, 1971 and 
1982) mainly draw on the approach of Coase46 and Chandler. The main contribution is 
                                                
46  Coase’s main contribution is found in his seminal paper ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937). In this, he 
argues that the traditional economic theory explanation that the market mechanism is regulated by 
prices is inadequate to explain the functioning of firms in which we observe planning by individuals. 
The price mechanism works outside the firm, but inside the firm transactions are co-ordinated by 
entrepreneurs. Therefore the question that Coase aimed to answer is ‘Why do firms exist?’  Coase’s 
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found in Williamson (1973; 1985). One of the main questions in Williamson’s research, 
as in Coase’s, is precisely why firms exist. Williamson draws upon Coase by using the 
concept of transaction costs, but supplements the existing discussion by introducing 
three additional conditions that generate transaction costs and justify both the existence 
of the firm and the specific governance structures adopted. Williamson (1973) discusses 
three key transaction costs that favour the creation of firms over markets. These are the 
costs of informing traders (information costs), the costs of reducing bargaining as to the 
terms of trade (bargaining costs) and the costs of enforcing the terms of trade 
(enforcement costs) (Rugman, 1986). In turn, these contractual costs are generated by 
three conditions (Rugman, 1986). First, the ability of the individual to take rational 
decisions is constrained by cognitive imperfections and a limitation in the availability of 
information, a condition that Williamson calls ‘bounded rationality’. The problem of 
bounded rationality refers to the inability to make rational decisions due to limitations in 
the amount of information and the ability to process it. Organizations such as firms, 
that pool together resources, may facilitate the decision-making process by either 
increasing the amount of information available or limiting informational requirements 
by appropriating governance structures. Second, the internalization of transactions can 
help firms to control the opportunistic behaviour of external parties. Third, firms 
develop skills and assets that, if used in conjunction with others within the firm, lead to 
higher return than if they were used in their second-best alternative. Moreover, if they 
were used in such a way, the lack of integration would typically lead to hold-up 
problems and underinvestment; this is the concept of asset specificity. Firms have 
specific assets that are inherent to the transaction being carried out. Williamson (1983) 
argues that asset specificity may be related to the following: sites, human or physical 
specificity or dedicated asset.47 One of the conclusions of Williamson’s discussion is 
that, because of the transaction costs stemming from bounded rationality, opportunistic 
behaviour and asset specificity, it may be desirable (from an efficiency perspective) for 
organizations to grow larger. Thus, Williamson offers a counter-argument to the 
traditional neoclassical aversion towards large firms, which that tradition views as 
                                                                                                                                     
main argument is that firms exist to reduce transaction costs that are inherent to any co-ordination 
mechanism. He argues that the size of the firm can be ascertained by weighing up the cost of 
organising economic activity in the market against the benefit of organising the activity internally to 
the firm.  
47  ‘Site specificity’ relates to the decision of buyers and sellers on where to locate their operations. 
‘Physical asset specificity’ arises from the equipment used in the transactions. ‘Human asset specificity’ 
arises from the specialization of skills and learning by doing. ‘Dedicated asset’ refers to general 
investment by the seller. Joskow (1987) provides some practical evidence on asset specificity. 
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having a harmful effect on society. However, he is aware of trade-offs between larger 
size and greater ‘bureaucratic costs’ (Williamson, 1985). Williamson (1983) has shown 
that bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity are necessary conditions for 
transactions to take place within organizations rather than in the market (Rugman, 
1986).   
The transaction cost approach has proved to be a very successful concept for the 
development of international business theory; indeed, today it is still a dominant theory 
in the field of international business. In line with this, then, the transaction cost 
approach has generated a considerable amount of research over the last four decades. 
Partly as a consequence of its breadth over time as well as scope, the theory is difficult 
to present as one coherent body of work.    
Drawing upon Williamson, a number of scholars48 have tried to explain the production 
of the firm as a market replacing activity (Dunning, 2003). This literature has departed 
from previous discussions on international firms, as scholars have really started to 
question why international transactions occur within the firm, which is perceived as a 
co-ordinating institution, rather than in the market (Dunning, 2003). Transaction costs 
are what drives firms to establish foreign subsidiaries, controlled by a central 
organization, and therefore to internalize transactions and operations, instead of 
operating through the market. However, the internalization of transactions presents 
benefits and costs, and it is the balance between the two that determines the extent of 
internalization. Transaction costs vary according to whether economic activity is 
undertaken within the market or within a hierarchical relationship, such as the firm. If 
transaction costs from operating within the firm are lower than operations within the 
market, then the former is more efficient.  
Scholars have identified different sources of transaction costs that can shape entry and 
entry mode decisions. Overall, internalization theory has focused on two main sets of 
factors, one at micro level and the other at macro level. The first set of forces includes 
firm and industry characteristics (R&D and advertising intensity; profitability; parent 
firm size and experience; and the size of the subsidiary firm), while the second consists 
of regional- and country-level variables (macroeconomic policy and outcome variables 
such as exchange rates, labour market conditions, taxes, trade protection and inflation, 
market size, culture and fundamental institutional setup).  
                                                
48 Important contributions are found in McManus (1972); Buckley and Casson (1976); Rugman (1981); 
Hennart (1982); and Caves (1982).  
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Over time the internalization theory has identified how a large number of factors can 
affect the evolution of MNEs. In some cases, the theoretical prediction on the effect of 
these variables is ambiguous, as in the case of trade openness or firm size. Despite this, 
it is now largely recognized that firm and country characteristics are important 
determinants of firm entry and entry mode, and this phenomenon is explained in terms 
of transaction costs. Nevertheless, despite its popularity, the transaction cost approach 
is not immune to criticism, which we review in the section below.  
First, Kogut and Zander (1993) have argued that the main driver of internalization is 
not market failures related to transaction costs, but knowledge. The knowledge-based 
view is a slight modification of the transaction cost approach. According to Kogut and 
Zander (1993), the firm’s expansion is driven by its ability to exploit competitive 
advantage (transferring knowledge). In turn, the characteristics of knowledge affect the 
way the firm can transfer it, for example, by licensing or subsidiaries. What distinguishes 
Kogut and Zander (1993) from the traditional internalization approach is that they do 
not see knowledge as a public good that can be easily transferred at no cost. Differences 
in knowledge and in firm capabilities determine the boundary of the firm. Using a 
survey of manufacturing firms, Kogut and Zander find support for the theory that the 
choice of entry is influenced by how complex the knowledge involved in production is, 
and to what degree it can be taught.  
Second, some scholars have criticized the theory of transaction cost for being 
tautological (Rugman, 1986). For example, Kay states that ‘internalization does not 
satisfy the conditions of refutability that is required of a theory’ (Kay 1983, page 305). 
Similarly, Casson (1982, page 26) argues: ‘Internalization is in fact a general theory of 
why firms exist, and without additional assumptions it is almost tautological. To make 
the theory operational it is necessary to specify assumptions about transaction costs for 
particular products and for trade between particular locations.’ Rugman (1986) and 
Buckley and Casson (1985) note that internalization can be seen as an approach rather 
than a theory, as the latter requires additional conditions to predict exactly when one 
entry mode prevails over another one. However, this does not invalidate the predictive 
power of this conceptual framework, which (as summarized above) has been able to 
identify the various factors that shape the process of internationalization. 
Third, the theory works in a similar fashion to the neoclassical model, according to 
which the firm’s decisions are efficiency-driven and market imperfections are purely 
exogenous (Ietto-Gilles, 2005). In this framework, firms are analysed as profit-
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maximising economic agents, without taking into consideration that firms may engage 
in foreign production for other reasons, such as to gain political power or because they 
are unable to conceive alternative solutions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983). Moreover, 
the alternative between firms and market is at time limited as firms have abilities (for 
example, learning) that cannot be replaced by the market (Dunning, 2000). Building on 
the previous points, the New Institutionalism approach provides a more fundamental 
critique of the transaction cost approach (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983). For example, 
Powell (1990) argues that the dichotomy between market and institutions is simply too 
restrictive. For instance, he notes that firms are more and more involved in multiple 
collaborative ventures, which leads to the creation of business networks. Networks can 
be classified neither as market nor as internal transaction. More generally, the New 
Institutionalists, in contrast to the internalization theory, tend to emphasize that 
economic exchange is embedded in the social context in which it takes place. 
Despite the criticisms, transaction costs theories provide a useful and widely used 
framework within which to analyse firms’ foreign expansion. The factors identified by 
this literature have proved to be important predictors of entry mode decisions. As 
Dunning (2000) has pointed out, the criticisms of the internalization theory do not 
invalidate the theory but suggest that it should be extended so as to incorporate new 
aspects of corporate activities. 
 
2.3 Dunning and the OLI Paradigm 
 
In the early 1980s Dunning merged previous theories on internationalization and 
created the ‘Eclectic Paradigm’, also known as the OLI paradigm, a model designed to 
explain MNE activities. Cantewell (2000) observes that the theory emerged as an 
attempt to summarize the two main existing theories on international production, of 
transaction costs and of market power. However, the eclectic paradigm differs from the 
earlier theories as it aims more at providing a general framework to facilitate the analysis 
of international economic activity.  
 
At the core of the eclectic paradigm lies the idea that the firm’s internationalization 
process is driven by three sets of factors. The first group of factors relates to ‘ownership 
advantages’, which are also called competitive and monopolistic advantages; these are 
the advantages of the investing firm over other foreign firms. Assets and skills needed 
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to effectively compete with foreign companies form the ‘ownership advantage’. 
According to Dunning, one can distinguish two types. The first are intangible assets, 
which might include, for example, the ownership of a specific technology. The second 
is the ownership of complementary assets, which could include, for example, the ability 
to create new technology (Cantwell, 2000). Ownership advantages have been the subject 
of much research, usually centred around firm capabilities, experience and technology.  
The second set of forces relates to ‘location advantages’. The main location advantages 
are given by the size of the market, opportunities for lower costs and the availability of 
natural resources. Political and economic institutions are also important, as weak 
governance and instability increase the risk of expropriation. Overall, this part of 
Dunning’s paradigm predicts that firms favour entry in more attractive markets.  
The third sets of forces are ‘internalization advantages’. These are given by the 
governance structure used by firms to exploit competitive and location advantages 
through the internationalization process. This section of the OLI paradigm explains 
what drives the firm’s entry mode. More precisely, the decision is determined by the 
benefits and costs of internalizing production compared to exporting or licensing.49 
This ‘paradigmatic’ approach allows for the significance of the three sets of forces 
described above to vary across industries, regions, countries and firm.  
 
Dunning’s theory implies that firms’ decisions, such as those relating to entry and 
ownership choices, are determined by ownership advantages, location advantages and 
internalization advantages. With regard to ownership advantages, which are firm and 
industry variables, Dunning’s OLI theory makes the same prediction as the transaction 
cost approach. However, Dunning’s theory adds a focus on country characteristics. 
Given that the transaction cost approach has been criticized for not taking into account 
country characteristics (Asiedu and Estefani, 2001), the OLI paradigm is a useful 
complement to the original transaction cost theory as it integrates a focus on the firm 
with a broader macro prospective. It is this that largely defines Dunning’s main 
contribution, namely, the ability to integrate a micro-level analysis (typical of 
internalization theories) with a macro perspective (typical of trade theory) (Ietto-Gillies, 
2005). Dunning’s paradigm has been extremely successful and many scholars have used 
                                                
49  Cantewell (2000) argues that there is an overlap between ownership and internalization advantages. 
However, the distinction is that ownership advantages refer to the advantages due to a particular 
technology while internalization advantages are those due to retaining control over its use. 
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it to analyse FDI and international business activities. Despite its popularity, the OLI 
paradigm has also been subject to several criticisms, to which we now turn.  
 
First, the number of variables identified by the paradigm is very large, making it 
empirically and theoretically difficult to identify its unique predictive value. Second, the 
paradigm treats these variables as independent from one another. However, the forces 
that shape a firm’s decisions are likely to influence each other.50 Third, it has been 
argued that that the theory does not take into account the role of the firm’s strategy as a 
response to different sets of, and developments in, ownership, location or 
internalization advantages and that therefore the theory is only suitable for static 
analysis. Dunning (1988) explains that differences between firms’ behaviour may be 
incorporated so long as they correspond to identifiable actions forming a systematic 
pattern of behaviour. Fourth, Kojima (1978, 1982) has criticized Dunning for 
overlooking the role of government policies. Dunning has responded to these 
criticisms,51 and some of these problems have been rectified in his later development of 
the eclectic paradigm.52  
 
Dunning (2001) has recently extended the original theory and reconfigured it in what he 
called ‘The Investment Development Path’ (IDP). IDP discusses how, for firms 
investing inside and outside a certain country, the OLI advantages change over time, as 
the country develops. This theory analyses the conditions that allow for the changes and 
how this affects firms’ choices; IDP also considers the relationship between foreign and 
domestic firms. The theory explains that MNC activities are linked to a country 
development path, which affect all three set of advantages described in the earlier 
eclectic paradigm. As countries develop, the structural conditions of their economies 
change and this affects inflows and outflows of FDI, which in turn modify the 
countries’ economic structure. IDP it is a useful complement to the earlier paradigm as 
it adds a dynamic element to Dunning’s theory. However, the essence of IDP is still 
linked to the OLI paradigm. 
 
                                                
50  This point will be discussed further in the second chapter 
51 A response to the above criticism can be found in Dunning, J.H, ‘The eclectic paradigm of 
international production: a personal perspective’, in Pitelis, C.N. and Sugden, R. The Nature of the 
Transnational Firm, Routledge 2000. 
52 See Dunning (1988) for a discussion of the various criticisms of the OLI paradigm. 
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Despite being formulated over 30 years ago, the eclectic paradigm is widely recognized 
to be still of relevance today. Overall, the essence of both the transaction costs and the 
OLI paradigms is that the probability of a firm entering a foreign market and choosing 
greater ownership over lower forms of controls are a decreasing function of the risk and 
costs represented by firm, industry and country variables and the available governance 
modes. As noted by Zaho et al. (2004), the transaction cost approach has some 
limitations,53 but, if integrated with an evaluation of the country characteristics, it 
becomes a sound framework within which one can analyse both entry and entry mode. 
While internalization theory is mainly concerned with firm-level variables, Dunning’s 
theory focuses on international production at the country level and this is perhaps why 
the two approaches act as good complements to each other.  
 
2.4 Dynamic Theories of FDI and Recent Developments 
 
The Scandinavian school emerged parallel to the development of the transaction cost 
theory and the eclectic paradigm in the 1970s–80s. The main scholars of this school are 
Valne, Johanson and Loustarinen. These scholars were mainly interested in 
understanding the process that firms follow when expanding internationally (Dunning, 
2000). Vahlne and Johnason (1977) develop a model according to which the firm 
engages in a gradual process of international activities. The internationalization process 
is seen as a sequential series of events, during which the firm gradually increases its 
commitment as it increases its knowledge of the host country. The Scandinavian school 
represents valuable contribution in its attempt to analyse firms’ decisions dynamically, 
an approach lacking in most theories on international production. However the main 
drawback of the theory is that it predicts that the internationalization process will 
follow a linear pattern, leaving little scope for strategic decision-making (Ietto-Gillies, 
2005). Moreover the theory seems to overlook the role of the external environment, 
which, as discussed in the previous section, plays an important role in shaping firms’ 
decisions. 
Another dynamic approach to explain firms’ international expansion can be found in 
Cantwell (1989, 1995). Technology and innovation allow firms to gain a competitive 
advantage, but this is not confined to a single firm. Successful innovation spreads to 
other firms, encouraging additional innovations. Through this mechanism, ownership 
                                                
53 A critique of the application of the transaction cost approach to explain strategic and organizational 
business issues can be found in Ghoshal and Moran (1996). 
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advantages affect location advantages through the process of innovation. Individual 
firms’ innovation and technology spill-over increases the attractiveness of a location, 
which in turn induces other firms to invest. 
Dunning (2000) notes that recent developments in theories of international production 
aim at explaining different aspects of FDI and MNC, either at firm, country or industry 
level. First, there are scholars who explain firm internationalization as an attempt to 
gain competitive advantages or strengthen existing ones (Doz et al., 1997; Wesson, 
1994; Makino, 1998; Lecraw, 1993; Chen and Chen, 1998; Makino and Delios, 1996; 
Kumar, 1998; Frost, 2001). Second, scholars have integrated the studies of MNC and 
FDI into mainstream economics, for example, into new trade theories. These 
developments of trade theories use general equilibrium models to explain why a firm 
may choose to expand internationally using direct production instead of exporting. 
There are a number of exogenous factors used to explain this, which can be classified 
into three main categories: technology-related factors and economies of scale, country-
level characteristics, and the cost of international business. These factors are then used 
to explain horizontal or vertical multinationals (Markusen, 2002). The literature 
presents interesting attempts at modelling MNE within sophisticated general 
equilibrium models (Rugman, 1986). However, the approach advances in formal 
models have not been matched by progress in empirical work. 
 
2.5 Selecting an Appropriate Theoretical Framework 
 
Economic exchange between countries has existed for several centuries, and the reasons 
why it takes place have long interested economists and social scientists. Trade between 
countries is one of the factors that has shaped the globalized economic world as we 
know it today. In the last few decades, another important driver of globalization has 
been the increasing importance of international production. In attempting to explain 
international production, economics and business scholars have formulated a wide 
range of theories. In this section we have reviewed the main theories on international 
production and in doing so we have given an overview of the mechanisms and 
processes of MNCs. We have chosen to review the theories in chronological order, 
which should highlight that all the explanations are a product of the time at which they 
were written.  
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As the various explanations are context-specific, we should not expect paradigms to 
remain unchallenged over time. Nevertheless, some explanations have proved to remain 
relevant over time, provided necessary modifications are added. Namely, the 
internalization approach and the OLI paradigm have remained the main analytical 
frameworks capable of supporting the formulation of testable hypotheses on the 
operation of MNC and the pattern of FDI. We believe that the eclectic paradigm and 
the theory of internalization offer a sound analytical framework for the empirical 
analysis that will be carried out in this chapter. Baring this in mind, we now move on to 
analyze how institutions affect foreign entry and, in particular, we do this with reference 
to resource rich economies. 
 
3 Property rights, Political Stability and FDI: a literature review 
3.1 Property rights and political stability 
Both Dunning’s OLI paradigm and the internalisation theories highlight that country 
level variables, such as institutions, play an important role in shaping foreign investment 
decisions. Dunning would interpret institutions as a main determinant of the ‘location 
advantages’, while in Williamson’s approach institutions are seen as a sources of 
transaction costs. Despite the different interpretation, both theories would predict that 
better institutions should attract more foreign investments. In turn the literature has 
analysed the impact of different types of formal and informal institutions on FDI. The 
theoretical literature argues that both political stability and the characteristics of the legal 
system, in particular property rights, are vital components of a country’s institutional 
set-up and they matter for FDI. In the section below we review the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on the relationship between the institutions analysed and FDI. 
We then assess what role natural resources play in this relationship. 
North (1990) defines property rights as “the rights individuals appropriate over their 
own labor and the goods and services they possess. Appropriation is a function of legal 
rules, organizational forms, enforcement, and norms of behavior – that is, the 
institutional framework.” In Demsetz’s (1967) argument, property rights allow the 
internalization of externalities and the reduction of costs. In Libecap (1989), property 
rights provide the basic economic incentives that shape resource allocation; they are the 
social institutions that define or delimit the range of privilege granted to an individual. 
North (1981) argues that property rights and contract enforcement are crucial to create 
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incentives to invest, principally because rules and regulations define the terms of 
exchange between economic actors. Property rights and state laws are all formal rules 
which constrain the range of behaviour open to people, but at the same time enhance 
economic opportunities by making mutual expectations consistent with each other 
(Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). Academics have then analysed the importance of 
property rights to foreign investments. Gray and Jarosz (1995), for example, argue that 
the legal system affects the incentives of foreign investors because it modifies ex-ante 
transaction costs associated with setting up the venture and ex-post-transaction costs 
associated with monitoring the original agreement and settling disputes. The theoretical 
proposition that better property rights facilitate foreign and domestic investment has 
been tested empirically in a growing body of cross-country studies. Gani (2007) 
estimates the relationship between FDI inflows and the six dimensions of Kaufmann’s 
institutional indicators using data from 1996 to 2000 for a sample of 17 Asian and 
Central American countries. He finds, using OLS estimates, that the rule of law and 
political stability are both significant. Biglaiser and Staats (2010) use a panel of 
developing countries from 1976 to 2004 and find that property rights protection is 
highly significant in determining the decision to invest abroad. The data are estimated 
using OLS augmented with panel corrected standard errors. Ali et al. (2010) use data on 
69 developing countries between 1981 and 2000 and measure institutions with the 
International Country Risk Guide indicators. The authors, using a random effect 
estimator, find that that, once property rights security is controlled for, other 
institutional aspects have no significant impact on FDI. Yet the contribution that these 
studies bring to our knowledge on the relation between the legal system and foreign 
investments is somewhat limited. The studies mentioned above make use of simple 
econometric techniques, fail to address endogeneity issues and overlook the fact that 
the FDI process may be dynamic. Studies that take into account these issues tend to 
find weaker evidence on the link between foreign investment and legal system. For 
instance, Daude and Stein (2007), using an instrumental variable estimator, find that the 
quality of the legal environment is a not robust predictor of FDI. 
We shall now discuss how political stability may affect FDI. There are at least four 
channels through which stability affects foreign investments. First, political instability 
imposes additional costs by increasing uncertainty. It affects FDI because of the close 
linkage between political stability and the stability of an existing framework of property 
rights within that economy. In fact, property rights are determined by political 
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processes, involving negotiation or lobbying activities (Libecap, 1989). Second, 
distributional conflict and disruption of the political process that is any aspect of 
political instability, can stop or alter the institutional set-up. Third, political instability 
and political change are likely to have an impact not only on formal institutions such as 
property rights but also on informal rules. In societies characterized by a strong reliance 
on personal ties and loyalties, a change in government and administration can lead to 
uncertainty in local business practices (Comptom et al., 2010). Finally, political 
instability affects investments through its effect on inflation and economic policy 
stability, which in turn are important determinants of investments (Satyanath and 
Subramanian, 2004; Rowthorn, 1977; Hirschman, 1985; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991; 
Sachs 1989).  
The effect of political stability on economic outcomes has been the subject of much 
empirical research. An issue which has received much attention, especially during the 
1990s, is the relationship between stability and economic growth,54 although several 
scholars have also analysed the relationship between stability and foreign investment. 
Most empirical studies on FDI and political instability find that political instability 
negatively affects FDI.55 Lucas (1990) argues that many multinationals do not go to 
developing countries because of the political risk associated with these countries, 
though a stable political environment itself is not sufficient to attract FDI. Busse and 
Hafeker (2006) identify types of political risk that matter most for multinationals. In 
their study political stability loosely refers to government stability, and lack of internal 
and external conflicts. Henisz (2000) shows that multinationals face an increasing threat 
of expropriation if political hazard in the host country increases. Stevens (2000) argues 
that political instability (defined somewhat ambiguously as capital control, costly 
regulation, threat of expropriation, and international disruption) increases uncertainty 
and therefore affects the investor’s expected profit function. Brada and others (2004) 
argue that political instability, as proxy by war with a neighbouring country, foreign 
embargo or economic sanctions, affects FDI because of its disruptive effect on sales, 
demand and production facilities. Moreover, political instability affects the exchange 
rate, reducing the value of the asset invested in the host country. While the majority of 
studies indicate a negative relationship between political instability and foreign 
                                                
54 Examples of this literature can be found in: Mankiw (1995), Barro (1991), Ross and Levine (1992), 
Campos (1999), Kaufman (2002). 
55 In addition to the studies reviewed here we should also mention Schneider and Frey (1985) and 
Edwards (1990) as studies that find a negative relation between political instability and FDI. 
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investment, some studies do not find a significant relationship (Bennet and Green, 
1972; Fatehi-Sedeth and Safizadeh, 1989; Olibe and Crumbley, 1997; Lorre and 
Gruisinger, 1995; Jaspersen et al., 2000; Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2000).  
On the basis of the above discussion we posit:  
H1) The effect of political stability on FDI inflows is expected to be positive and 
significant. 
H2) The effect of property rights on FDI inflows is expected to be positive and 
significant. 
 
3.2 Adding natural resources 
 
Conflicting findings on the effects of political stability and the efficiency of the legal 
system may be due to differences in time and country coverage, which in turn may 
reflect differences in the composition of FDI flows. In fact, FDI can be market-, 
efficiency- or resource-seeking (Caves, 1996) and this may affect the interactions 
between host countries’ characteristics and FDI. For example, labour costs are 
particularly important for efficiency-seeking FDI, market size is crucial for market-
seeking investments, and the presence of natural resources is the main driver of 
resources-seeking investment. Building on this approach and with reference to the 
existing literature, we discuss below the effect of political stability and property rights 
on FDI in natural resources.  
The first discussion on the interaction between host countries and MNC in natural 
resources stems from Vernon’s (1971) obsolescing bargain model (OBM). This 
framework aimed at explaining the wave of expropriation of natural resources-based 
FDI that occurred in the 1970s in developing countries by analysing the relationship 
between the MNC and the host country’s bargaining power. Vernon and his followers 
(Moran, 1974 and Tugwell, 1975) argue that the bargaining power of MNC in extractive 
industries is weaker than that of other industries because these firms commit to high 
fixed costs, which transfer bargaining power to the host country’s government (Vernon 
1971). A new take on the OBS argues that the risk of expropriation, as represented by 
weak property rights or low political stability, is particularly important to MNC in 
natural resources because of the high asset specificity of locations with large sunk cost 
and long gestation period associated with these types of ventures (Asiedu and Lie, 2011; 
WRI 2007; Nunnenkanp and Spatz, 2003). This view can be criticized on several 
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grounds. First, it is only partly correct to assume that the government has a stronger 
position than the MNC, as the withdrawal of FDI and technical expertise may lead to 
disruption of income for the host government. Therefore, what we see is a mutual 
dependence where, using Williamson’s (1987) terminology, the cost of breaking a 
transaction is high for both sides. Second, the OBS has overestimated the power of the 
local government, and MNC can put pressures on the host countries to protect their 
interests (Jenkings, 1986). Several case studies have shown that MNCs have been able to 
retain some bargaining power and prevent government expropriation (Eden et al., 
2005).56 The critics of Vernon’s predictions have also noted that in recent times the 
MNC-host countries relationship is more co-operative than conflictual and therefore 
today the OBS framework is less relevant (Dunning, 1993; Luo, 2001).  
Concerning the interplay between investment in the primary sector and institutions, 
scholars have discussed the finding that foreign investors in the primary sectors have 
preferences for types of political regime that are different from those preferred by 
investors in other sectors. Typically, resources-based investments may display an 
inclination towards autocratic regimes. Asiedu and Lie (2011) argue that the stability 
that characterizes autocratic regimes facilitates the development of close relationships 
between investors and the host government. The development of close ties is a 
necessary condition to access natural resources, which are usually tightly controlled by 
the local government. There is some empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
Schults (2007) finds some evidence that the relationship between formal institutions 
(democracy vs. autocracy) is sector dependent, and resource-seeking FDI is less 
sensitive to democracy. In a similar fashion, Asiedu and Lien (2011) find that 
democracy is positively correlated with FDI only if the share of minerals and oil in total 
exports is less than some critical value. While these authors focus on democracy, their 
discussion can be easily rephrased in terms of property rights, as constitutional 
democracy and security of property rights are closely related concepts (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005; Aidis et al., 2010). Thus, developing their argument would lead us to the 
conclusion that the general security of property rights may be less important for FDI in 
the resources sector, as it can be substituted with a specific protection by an autocratic 
and otherwise arbitrary government. In support of this conclusion we also note that 
                                                
56  For example, Kramer and von Tulder (2009) mentioned the agreement between the Libyan 
government and Mittal Steel as an example of a foreign investor having been able to negotiate 
favourable conditions. The agreement includes tax incentives, facilitation of corporates’ rights over 
those of local communities, and forbids the application of new law to the company. 
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FDI in natural resources tend to have few linkages to the local product and labour 
markets (Nunnenkanp and Spatz, 2003). This feature of natural resource-based FDI has 
been proposed as an explanation for the limited spillover from this type of investment. 
However, a lack of linkages to other sectors of economic activity may also imply that 
FDI in the natural resource sector may be less sensitive to the general institutional 
framework shaping economic interactions in most of the economy. 
 
A different argument comes from Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992). They have 
suggested that some transaction costs induced by weak institutions may be balanced out 
by expected returns. The institutional framework is not a precondition to attract 
investment: if the comparative advantage of the host country is high (e.g.. large amount 
of natural resources or large market), investors may be willing to accept the risks 
associated with a weak legal system and institutions. This could be illustrated by the 
presence of resource-seeking FDI in fragile states characterized by weak governance 
and institutions. 
 
The above discussion highlights that property rights and political instability may pose 
different constraints on different types of investment. Nevertheless, there is still little 
evidence on the interaction between the type of FDI and host countries’ characteristics.  
Yet, based on the discussion above, we expect that institutional weakness should have 
less impact on MNC in natural resources because (i) the latter can be isolated from 
most of the other sectors in the economy and institutional risk may be decreased by 
colluding with a local government; and (ii) high transaction costs can be compensated 
for by higher returns results from participating in the resource rents. The first of these 
arguments suggest H3a below, and the second leads us to formulate H3b: 
 
H3a) When FDI are concentrated in the primary sector this is expected to attenuate the 
effect of property rights on FDI. 
H3b) When FDI are concentrated in the primary sector this is expected to attenuate the 
effect of political stability on FDI. 
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4. Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our empirical analysis uses a panel data of 92 low- and middle-income countries over 
the period 1996-2009.57 As the aforementioned hypotheses require some proxies of 
institutions and natural resources and measuring both have proved controversial, in this 
section we discuss our choice of indicators. We also make a first attempt at exploring 
the interrelationship between FDI, natural resources and institutions by presenting 
some descriptive statistics and correlations. We conclude the section by briefly 
discussing the control variables included in the econometrics specifications. Table 1 in 
the appendix summarizes the source of the data and measurements used for each 
variable. Full descriptive statistics and the correlation table for the variables described in 
table 1 are found in tables 2 and 3 in the appendix. 
 
4.1 Measurements: Institutions and Natural Resources 
 
For the period analysed (1996-2009), a number of institutional indicators are available 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The dataset has been widely used 
in the economics literature and it provides de facto indicators intended to measure the 
actual institutional outcome. The data are obtained through surveys of knowledgeable 
individuals who are asked about their perceptions of institutions.58 Amongst other 
institutional measures, the dataset supplies measures of the effectiveness of the legal 
system and political stability.  
Concerning political stability, the ICRG dataset provides four indicators that are related 
to political risk: government stability, ethnic tension, internal and external conflict. In 
order to capture the multidimensional nature of stability we aggregate the four variables 
by principal component analysis and we analyse the effect of this composite index on 
foreign investments.59 Our measure of property rights is the ICRG’s “law and order” 
that measures both the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the extent to 
which the law is observed.  
                                                
57 We defined low- and middle-income countries using the distribution of GDP per capita in PPP. Low-
income countries are those in the lower 20% of the income distribution; lower-middle-income 
countries are between the 20% and 50% of the income distribution; and symmetrically, upper-middle-
income countries are between the 50% and the 80% of the income distribution. 
58 Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) provide an in-depth discussion of de-jure vs de facto indicators. 
59 We have also tried to aggregate these variables into one scale, using the Alpha Cronbach coefficient 
that was confirmed justified. As the results using this aggregation methods are the same as those obtained 
with the principal component analysis, in the following discussion the former estimates are not reported. 
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Moving to natural resources, the economics literature has traditionally measured 
resource endowment using the amount of natural resources produced or exported 
(Hodler, 2005). We are aware of the difficulties in defining and measuring natural 
resource endowment, but in this instance we follow the literature and we measure 
natural resources with the share of three primary commodities in merchandise export; 
namely, we take the share of ores and metal, fuel and agricultural goods in total export 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995; Asiedu and Lien, 2011).  
 
Turning now to the analysis of some descriptive statistics, we first look at the trend of 
FDI over time. As shown in figure 1, over the period analysed, FDI has increased 
substantially across all income groups, although there are large fluctuations, especially in 
low-income countries. We then look at the change of FDI over time in resource-rich 
and non-resource-rich countries. We divide countries according to their export intensity 
of two types of natural resources: oil and metal; and agricultural raw materials. 
Following UNCTAD (2011), countries are defined as major natural-resource exporters 
if the share of natural resource export to total export is greater than 50%. In our 
sample, this corresponds roughly to the 80 percentile of the distribution of the export 
intensity variables (e.g. oil and metal to total export; agricultural raw material to total 
export). Figures 2 and 3 show that FDI has increased in both resource and non-
resource-exporting countries. However, in the case of resource-exporting countries the 
trend of FDI over time shows greater variability. Regarding the relationship between 
FDI and institutions, as shown in the correlation table in the appendix, FDI flows are, 
as expected, positively correlated with the chosen measures of political stability and legal 
system. As we are interested in the interplay between institutions and FDI, we first plot 
FDI as a percentage of GDP against political stability and law and order by income 
groups, and we repeat the same exercise by geographic region. The figures show a clear 
positive correlation between the foreign investment and the institutions analysed, 
however, we cannot identify any discernable difference across regions or income groups 
(figures 4 to 7). We then restrict our attention to low- and middle-income countries, and 
we investigate whether the level of resource endowment, as measured by natural 
resource export intensity, affects the relationship between FDI and institutions. Figures 
8 to 11 indicate that here is a significant difference in the correlation between FDI and 
both political stability and “law and order” depending on the degree of export intensity. 
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For major natural-resource exporters, the correlation between FDI and institution 
seems much weaker compared to other countries. 
In this section we made a first attempt at analysing the interplay between natural 
resources, FDI and institutions. Our descriptive statistics and correlations highlight that 
there is a clear positive relationship between the institutions analysed and FDI flow. 
However, there seems to be some difference in the relationship between FDI and 
institutions across countries, and in particular it seems to differ according to the level of 
resource endowment, as proxies by resource export intensity. This will be further 
investigated in the following econometric analysis. 
 
4.2 Controls 
 
To test our hypotheses on the interaction between natural resources and institutions, we 
should include adequate controls. In selecting our control variables we follow the 
existing empirical literature. The empirical literature on FDI inflows determinants is 
large and the evidence on the effects of many variables is mixed. Where consensus has 
emerged it is around the finding that high GDP should attract FDI. Moreover, there is 
an agreement that country-level variables such as institutions, GDP, inflation and trade 
are important determinants of FDI inflows. We therefore include in our specification 
the aforementioned variables. Below we briefly review how these variables should 
influence FDI.  
Most empirical studies include GDP, a measure of the size of the market, as an 
explanatory variable for FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001; Globerman and Shapiro,2003; Lipsey, 
1999; Brewer, 1993; Crenshaw, 1991; Grosse, 1997). GDP has been shown to positively 
affect FDI. This is because larger markets imply lower distribution costs if production 
facilities are located in the same countries. More generally, larger markets may increase 
economies of scale. GDP and population should be of particular interest for “market-
seeking” FDI that aims to sell and distribute their products/services in the host country. 
A variable related to GDP, often used in FDI studies, is GDP per capita. In the 
literature on FDI, GDP per capita has been used as a measure of how well-off 
consumers are or as a proxy for return on investments. If GDP per capita is taken as a 
measure of the population’s wealth, its effect varies according to the type of 
investments analysed. When investments are market-seeking, we should expect a 
positive relation between GDP per capita and FDI. However, when foreign 
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investments are resource-seeking, the effect of GDP per capita on FDIs is less clear and 
could potentially be negative. This is because GDP per capita can also be a proxy for 
labour costs, and higher cost of factors of production should discourage resource-
seeking FDI. Schneider and Frey (1985) and Tsai (1994) find a positive relationship 
between GDP per capita and FDI, and they explain this by pointing out that higher 
GDP per capita implies better investment prospects. As mentioned above, scholars 
have also used GDP per capita as a measure of returns on investments. The traditional 
argument is that GDP per capita is inversely related to FDI because the returns to 
investment are higher in poorer countries and therefore FDI should be attracted to 
countries with lower GDP per capita. Edwards (1990) and Jaspersen et al. (2000) find 
some evidence of a negative effect of GDP per capita on FDI. Asiedu (2002) also finds 
evidence of this negative relationship except in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, other 
studies find that the variable is not a significant determinant of FDI (Loree and 
Guisinger, 1995; Wei. 2000; Hausman and Fernandez-Arias, 2000).  
Aside from wealth measures, proxies for macroeconomic stability are often included in 
the empirical analysis of FDI. Theoretical discussions stress that macroeconomic 
instability is an important source of uncertainty which can discourage investment.60 
Indeed, the “Washington consensus” which guided policy-making in developing 
countries during the 1980s and 1990s was focused on controlling inflation, the budget 
and current account deficit (Muqtada, 2003). The literature has mainly focused on the 
relationship between FDI and common measures of macroeconomic instability such as 
inflation and exchange rate. The reason for using inflation as the proxy for 
macroeconomic instability is that prices are the main means of signalling information in 
a market economy (Satyanath and Subramanian, 2004).61 Agenor (2004) explains that 
macroeconomic instability affects investments both through the direct effect of 
inflation and through inflation volatility. On a related theme, in principle, a fixed 
exchange rate should be preferred over floating currency because it ensures more 
stability and therefore it should encourage trade and investments (Campa, 1993; 
Goldberg and Kolstad, 1995). The existing evidence on the relationship between FDI 
and exchange rate is rather inconclusive, making it difficult to formulate sound 
                                                
60 The impact of uncertainty on investments has been discussed in section 2. 
61 However, Gerry et al. (2008) have criticized this approach, as inflation is only an output measure of 
instability in the sense that it is an outcome of economic policies which are related to country institutions. 
In addition, when using inflation as a proxy for macroeconomic instability in empirical work, it should be 
considered that inflation is potentially endogenous and may suffer from reverse causation with the 
outcome analysed. 
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hypotheses.62 Aside from inflation, another macroeconomic variable closely related to 
FDI is trade openness, most commonly measured as the share of import and export to 
GDP. The impact of openness on FDI depends on the type of investments taken into 
consideration. When investments are market-seeking, trade restrictions (and therefore 
less openness) can have a positive impact on FDI. Higher import tariffs can lead to 
tariff-jumping, meaning that when tariffs increase, firms are likely to prefer local 
affiliates to exports so that they can reduce the tariff paid (Blonigen, 2005). This 
assumption indicates that higher tariffs could lead to an increase of FDI. The empirical 
support for the tariff-jumping activity of FDIs is typically mixed (Grubert and Mutti, 
1991; Kogut and Chang, 1996; and Blonigen, 1997). Interestingly, Belderbos (1997) and 
Blonigen (2002) find that tariff jumping is carried out mainly by large organizations that 
can afford to set up local affiliates. This suggests that the impact of trade policy’s 
outcomes varies with firm sizes, and, if this is the case, it may be difficult to capture its 
effect in aggregate cross-country analyses. The studies mentioned above assume that 
FDI and trade are substitutes and that there is therefore a negative relationship between 
the two variables. The literature has also analysed cases in which FDI and trade are 
complements and therefore greater trade openness stimulates FDI. Stone and Jeon 
(2000) use a dataset on Asia Pacific countries and find that FDI and trade are 
complements, although they do not test for causality. Leu, Wang and Wei (2001) analyse 
bilateral trade and FDI between China and 19 other countries and also find evidence of 
complementarity. Interestingly, the authors identify a two-stage process. First, the 
growth of Chinese imports from a country increases that country’s FDI into China, and 
afterwards the increases in FDI affect China’s exports to that country positively. 
Cuadros, Orts and Alguacil (2004) give a more nuanced view on the FDI-trade 
relationship as they argue that there are important country effects. Their empirical 
analysis shows that, while in Mexico FDI and trade are complements, they are 
substitutes in Brazil, while there is no significant relationship in Argentina. Bende-
Nabede (2000), using a sample on sub-Saharan countries, also argues that the impact of 
trade on FDI varies across regions of the world.  
The above discussion shows that, while economic theory can explain the existence of 
both a positive and a negative relationship between trade and FDI, most empirical 
                                                
62 Cushman (1985 & 1988) finds a positive relationship between US FDI and exchange rate uncertainty, 
and Benass y-Quere et al. (2001) find a negative relationship between FDI investment by OECD 
countries and exchange rates in transition economies. Swenson (1994), and Kogut and Chang (1996) find 
that short-run exchange rate movements have an impact on FDI. 
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studies do not support the idea that trade and FDI are substitutes. Despite this, we 
should beware of oversimplifications as the relationship varies across types of FDI, 
region and sectors.  
Finally, the literature has stressed the importance of institutions as determinants of FDI. 
As we focus our analysis on property rights and political stability, it is important to 
control for democracy. Stability, legal system and democracy are closely interrelated, so 
not taking the latter into account may cause an omitted variable problem. It could be 
argued that democracy is associated with stronger institutions, in particular, rule of law. 
The existing evidence on the impact of democracy on FDI is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the most common view argues that democracy should have a positive impact on 
FDI as it is associated with independent judiciary and electoral system, which guarantee 
property rights and therefore decrease the risk of expropriation (Olson, 1993; Li and 
Resnick, 2003). On the other hand, democracy may have a negative effect on FDI 
through competition policy, industrial policy or fiscal incentives (Li and Resnik, 2003). 
Moreover, foreign investors may favour autocratic regimes if they can grant protection 
from social pressures (e.g. high wages, labour regulation) and or if collusion with such 
governments can lead to privilege, such as access to natural resources or preferential 
treatment (O’Donnell, 1978; Asiedu and Lien, 2011).  
Having discussed the variables included in our econometric model, we now turn to the 
empirical strategy used to test the aforementioned hypotheses. 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
 
5.1 Model Estimated 
The main question we aim at answering is whether the presence of natural resources 
play a moderating role in the institutions-FDI relationship. However we need to take 
into account the role of a number of variables that have been shown to typically affect 
FDI. Hence the model chosen to test our hypotheses is the following: 
 
€ 
LFDIit = β0 + β1l.LFDIit−1 + β2LGDPit + β3LGDPpercapitait + β4Democracyit + β5propertyrightsit
+β6politicalstabilityit + β7 inf lationit + β8Ltradeit + β9propertyrightsit * naturaresourcesit + β10naturalresources+ε it
 
where  
€ 
LFDIit  is the logarithm of FDI inflow as share of GDP, in country i at time t.  
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Equation (1) models the inflow of FDI as a dynamic process where the dependent 
variable in year t depends in part on its value in year t-1. The specification principally 
follows Cheng and Kwan (2000),63 and Noorbakhsh et al. (2001). FDI often involves 
high initial costs and therefore tends to be persistent over time. At the aggregate level, 
this can be captured by a positive feedback effect of past FDI onto current FDI. 
Additionally, foreign investors tend to prefer to operate in familiar environments, 
therefore, the existing foreign investments serve to encourage the operations of new 
and existing companies by creating a more familiar environment and increasing 
investors’ confidence. 
 
For our purposes, we use the flows of FDI, rather than the stock, as our dependent 
variable. This is because FDI stocks may not reflect recent changes in investments 
where FDI has been present for a long time (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). In terms 
of the functional form, whenever possible, we use our variables in logarithmic form. 
This garners two advantages: first, it normalizes the variable’s distribution; and second, 
the coefficient estimated has the direct economic interpretation representing elasticity.  
 
5.2 Estimator 
 
The empirical estimation of the model presented above is problematic as the lagged 
dependent variable as well as some regressors are endogenous. While the lagged 
dependent variable is endogenous by construction, the relationship between inflation 
and GDP per capita is likely to suffer from reverse causality. High GDP and low 
inflation may attract FDI; however, FDI inflows raise GDP and possibly inflation. In 
addition, there are likely to be some omitted variables correlated to our dependent and 
independent variables. 
 
We therefore estimate the model with System GMM, a method designed for fixed 
effects-idiosyncratic errors that are heteroskedastic and correlated within but not across 
individuals. System GMM estimates a system of level and difference equations, where 
the level equation is instrumented with the contemporaneous first difference and the 
difference equation is instrumented with levels dated t-1 or earlier. System GMM allows 
us to attenuate the bias and inconsistencies stemming from the two issues mentioned 
                                                
63 Cheng and Kwan (2000) apply a similar model to FDI stock. Dynamic model in the context of FDI 
inflow has been applied empirically by Carsternsen and Toubal (2005). 
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above. First, by first differencing the equation, the unobserved individual level fixed 
effect is eliminated and this removes a source of omitted variables. Second, and most 
importantly, GMM is a way of dealing with endogenous variables by creating 
instruments with exiting data. We can distinguish between the lagged dependent 
variable and other endogenous covariates. The OLS and fixed effect estimates of 
dynamic model present well-known difficulties. With OLS, the lagged dependent 
variable is endogenous to the fixed effect of the error term. The lagged dependent 
variable is positively correlated with the error term and OLS overestimate the 
coefficients. In the fixed effect estimator the lagged dependent variable is negatively 
correlated with the error term and the fixed effect estimator underestimates the 
coefficients (Roodman, 2006). Good estimates of the true parameter should therefore 
lie in the range between the OLS and fixed effect estimate, or at least near it (Roodman, 
2006). There are alternative transformations that can eliminate the panel bias such as 
differentiation or orthogonal deviations, but these methods have drawbacks.64  
When implementing GMM estimates particular attention should be given to two 
diagnostic tests. First, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in the differenced 
residuals: while AR(1) is expected, higher order autocorrelation indicates that lags of any 
variable used as instruments are endogenous. Second, the Sargan and Hansen tests for 
over-identifying restrictions report whether the instruments are exogenous. 
Before turning to the discussion of our results, we conclude this section with some 
details on our estimation strategy. In our estimates reported below we used two sets of 
instruments: ‘GMM’ style instruments, which can be predetermined variables (i.e. 
correlated with the past but not the present values of the error term), and ‘iv’ style 
instruments, which should be strictly exogenous variables. In all specifications we do 
not make use of external instruments.  
We estimate two models. In the first model, all variables except the lag dependent 
variable are assumed to be exogenous and used as IV instruments. In the second model, 
we relax the assumption of exogeneity, and we allow all the regressors, except the year 
dummies, to be endogenous. In this instance, all endogenous variables are included as 
                                                
64 Difference GMM, for example, takes the first difference and by doing so eliminates the fixed effect but 
leaves a problem with the potential endogeneity of all predetermined variables. A drawback of this 
transformation is that in unbalanced panels it amplifies gaps. Also, it tends to make successive errors 
correlated even if they are uncorrelated. Orthogonal deviations instead of subtracting previous 
observations form the contemporaneous, subtract all the future available observations of a variable. 
However, in unbalanced panel with heteroscedasticity both transformations tend to give similar results, 
holding the set of instrument fixed.  
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GMM instruments. This is clearly a realistic assumption, as all independent variables 
(GDP, inflation, trade, resource export and institutions) suffer from reverse causality. It 
is well-known that foreign investors are not passive agents but they can affect the 
economic and institutional characteristics of the host countries. However, introducing 
many variables as GMM instruments has the drawback of creating a large number of 
instruments, which can cause concerns (Roodman, 2009). In order to limit the number 
of instruments, the estimates have been performed using the “collapse” option available 
in STATA 10. With this option, one instrument is created for each variable and lag 
distance, instead of for each time period, variable and lag distance. Although the 
number of instruments may remain high even using the collapse option, Hayakawa 
(2007) showed that, in small samples, System GMM remains less biased than Difference 
GMM. For consistency, we limit the number of instruments also when we assume the 
variables to be exogenous. Finally, we control for heteroscedasticity between individuals 
using the robust option in Stata 10.  
 
6. Results 
 
We now turn to our empirical findings. In our analysis we aim to shed some light on 
how natural resources endowment – here, proxies by natural resources export intensity 
– affect the FDI-institutions relationship. We distinguish between export intensity in oil, 
metal and agricultural raw material. In tables 1a and 1b in the appendix, we analyse the 
effect of oil and metal export, in order to capture the effect of natural resources in 
extractive industry. In table 1a we assume that all variables except the lag dependent 
variables are exogenous. In all columns the lagged values of FDI and trade openness are 
positive and highly significant. The results confirm previous findings that FDI and trade 
are very much complements rather than substitutes, and also that FDI is a dynamic 
process, characterized by persistence. GDP and GDP per capita are positive, while 
inflation, as expected, is consistently negative, although these variables are not 
significant. The variable “nat”, which stands for oil and metal export intensity, has a 
positive and at times significant effect on FDI flows. The estimates reported show that 
property rights, as measured by the law and order indicator, political stability (ICRG), 
and democracy (polity2) are positively correlated with FDI. Law and Order and 
democracy have a robust and significant effect, while political stability is significant in 
only one instance.  
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In columns two to four of table 1a we explore whether the relationship between FDI 
and institutions is affected by the natural resources endowment by introducing some 
interactive terms. Columns two and three indicate that the interaction between political 
stability and natural resources, and the interaction between natural resource and “law 
and order”, are negative and significant. The sign of the coefficient indicates that for 
increasing level of oil and metal exports the impact of the legal system and of political 
stability on FDI is decreasing. In column four, when we include both interactive terms 
they turn insignificant. However, “law and order” and its interaction with natural 
resources are jointly significant at 5% level (p-0.027). We are now interested in 
exploring in greater depth how different levels of export intensity affect the 
interrelationship between the institutions analysed and natural resources. Table A 
reports the effect of law and order and political stability on FDI inflow for meaningful 
levels of oil and metal export intensity.65 Our calculations show that an increasing level 
of natural resource export has a substantial effect on the impact of both political 
stability and property rights on FDI. For instance, an increase in oil and metal export 
intensity from 4%, the level of Thailand, to 36%, the level of South Africa, decreases 
the impact of “law and order” from 0.84 to 0.16. In the case of political stability the 
effect is less sizeable, as an increase in export intensity from 1.6% to 11% decreases the 
effect of political stability on FDI from 0.07 to 0.04. Our calculations also show that at 
certain levels of natural resource export the relationship between institutions and 
natural resource is reversed.  
 
Table A 
€ 
δLfdi /δinstitutions = ˆ α + ˆ β oil& metalexport    evaluated at various levels of oil 
and metal export 
 
Value of Oil 
and Metal 
Export 
Intensity 
Quartile Corresponding 
Country 
Political 
Stability 
Law & Order 
1.651257 10th Paraguay 0.070108972 0.906357065 
4.441002 25th Thailand 0.061635401 0.847055176 
11.29105 50th Honduras 0.040829065 0.701443021 
36.67997 75th South Africa -0.036287241 0.16174821 
74.38813 90th Russia -0.150822006 -0.639817918 
 
Moving now to table 1b, we estimate the same model, but we allow all independent 
variables, except the year dummies, to be endogenous. The lag dependent variable is 
                                                
65 For law and order, we used the coefficient reported in colum three of table one. For political stability, 
we used the coefficient reported in column two of table one. 
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positive and highly significant, indicating that our choice of dynamic model is 
appropriate. As far as our control variables are concerned, trade and GDP are positive 
although on GDP is significant. GDP per capita is now negatively signed, while the 
effect of natural resource is ambiguous, as it appears to be positive and significant only 
in the second and fourth column. Turning now to the effect of institutions, only “law 
and order” is positive and significant in the four columns. The interactive effect 
between law and order and natural resource is again negative and significant, confirming 
our hypothesis that an increasing level of natural resources decreases the positive effect 
of property rights on FDI.  
In tables 2a and 2b and 3a and 3b we analyse whether the impact of political stability 
and property rights on FDI is conditional on the type of resources exported. Recent 
discussion has shown that the impact of resources on economic development depends 
on the type of resources produced (Boschini et al., 2007). Namely, resources that are 
highly appropriable (due, for example, to ease of transportation) may have a negative 
impact on economic growth, while this may not be the case for other types of 
resources. As such, minerals and oil tend to be more problematic than agricultural 
products, as the former are more lootable.66 In what follows, we therefore test whether 
the type of natural resources determines the effect of the institutions analysed on FDI.   
In tables 2a and 2b, we analyse the effect of metal and oil export intensity 
independently. We estimate the same regressions reported in table one, but we include 
two measures of export intensity, one for oil and one for metal. In columns two and 
three of table 2a and 2b we interact these two variables with political stability and “law 
and order” in order to capture the effect of institutions conditional on natural resources 
endowment. Starting with table 2a we discuss our findings on the variables of interest. 
In column two of table 2a we interact “law and order” with metal export and oil export 
separately. The interaction between the property rights indicator and fuel export is 
negative and significant, pointing that an increasing intensity in fuel export decreases the 
positive effect of property rights on FDI. However the interaction between “law and 
order” and metal export is not significant. The variable is jointly significant with the 
property rights indicator, although does not have the expected sign. In column three of 
table 2a we explore whether the two measures of natural resources, metal and oil export 
                                                
66 Several theories can explain the negative impact of extractive industry on development. The main 
explanations are centred on the negative impact of oils and metal on the following: conflict (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004), state institutions (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005) and trade 
shocks (Humphreys, 2005). 
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intensity, affect the impact of political stability on FDI. Again the interaction between 
political stability and fuel export is negative and highly significant. The interaction with 
metal export is not significant, although is jointly significant with political stability at 5% 
level (p.0.02). Looking at table 2b, where we allow the regressors to be endogenous, the 
results seem to broadly confirm the findings summarized in table 2a. “Law and order” is 
positive and highly significant across the three specifications, while we do not find 
political stability to be significant. In column two of table 2b, the interaction between 
fuel export intensity and “law and order” is negative and significant, while the 
interaction with metal export intensity is negative but only jointly significant with “law 
and order”. In column three we do not find any evidence that metal and oil export 
intensity moderates the impact of political stability on FDI.  
In tables 3a and 3b finally, we explore the role of agricultural export intensity. As shown 
in columns two to four we find that agricultural exports do not moderate the impact of 
political stability and property rights on FDI. 
Overall, our results highlight that high resources endowments undermine the positive 
effect of institutions on FDI. When we measure natural resource as the share of metal 
and oil export to total export, we find robust evidence that the effect of both property 
rights and political stability on FDI is affected by natural resources. This is likely to be 
due to the ability of MNC to negotiate preferential treatments and to collude with 
governments. However, as shown by our calculations in table A, changes in resources 
export intensity seem to have a greater effect on the impact of property rights on FDI 
compared to the impact of political stability on FDI. Moreover, by analysing the 
interaction terms between different types of natural resources export intensity and 
institutions, we are also able to explore whether the effect of institutions on FDI is 
conditional on the type of resources produced. We find strong evidence that in oil-rich 
countries the effects of efficient property rights, and to some extent the effects of 
political stability, are undermined. Our results also show that the effects of metal export 
intensity, on its own, is less robust than the impact of oil export intensity. This seems to 
be in contrast to the discussion that stresses the similarities between oil and metal 
industry. Recent empirical evidence has shown that both oil and metal have a negative 
impact on economic outcomes (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Asiedu and Lien, 
2011). However, scholars have pointed out that the measure “ores and metal export” 
may be a poor proxy for the importance of extractive industry. The measure includes 
items such as crude fertilizer and scrap metal that are not part of extractive industry (de 
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Soysa and Neumayer, 2007), and it fails to include diamonds and other precious gem 
which can notably have a deleterious effect on economic outcome (Fearon, 2005). 
Interestingly, we find that agricultural export does not significantly affect the 
institutions-FDI relationship, confirming recent discussion that agricultural sector, 
compared to extractive industries, have a lees detrimental effect on economic 
development (Isham et al., 2005). 
 
6.1 Robustness 
 
In order to give some credibility to our results, we carry out a number of robustness 
checks. 
First, we use alternative measures of natural resources. In the economics literature, 
common measures of natural resources used are: resources production (per capita or as 
share of GDP) and resources rent (as share of GDP). Data on oil production, oil rent 
and mineral rent are available from the World Bank adjusted net saving dataset.67 Oil 
production, calculated as the unit price multiplied total production, provides a measure 
of the economic importance of resource extraction. Natural resources rent is calculated 
as the unit rent, that is, price net of cost, multiplied by the amount of resource 
extracted. Some scholars argue that rents are a better measure than resource export, 
especially when analysing the interplay between institutions and resources (de Soysa and 
Neumayer, 2007). This is because rents are a direct measure of the gains from natural 
resources. Again, we estimate two set of models. In the first one, only the lagged 
dependent variable is taken as endogenous; in the second set of specifications all 
regressors, except the year dummies, are treated as endogenous. Starting with tables 4a 
and 4b we analyse the impact of oil production relative to GDP on the interplay 
between FDI and institutions. In column four of table 4a the interactions of oil 
production with political stability and legal system are both negative and highly 
significant. In table 4b only the interaction between “law and order” and oil production 
is significant. In table 5a and 5b we measure natural resources with oil rent relative to 
GDP. The results in table 5a seem to confirm the findings in table 4a. Oil rents are 
positive and significantly related to FDI. The interactions between oil rent, stability and 
property rights are again significant and negative. In table 5b, however, only “law and 
order” and its interaction with oil rent are jointly significant at 5%. In tables 6a and 6b 
                                                
67 Minerals included in the calculations of rent are the following: tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, 
silver, bauxite and phosphate. 
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we do not find any evidence that mineral rent as a share of GDP or its interactions with 
political stability and “law and order” are significant determinants of FDI. 
In sum, when using alternative measures of natural resources, our robustness checks 
seem to confirm the findings summarized in the previous section. First, the extraction 
of oil has a significant impact on the interplay between political stability, property rights 
and FDI. Second, oil has a greater impact on the relationship between property rights 
and FDI compared to the relationship between stability and FDI. When we relax the 
exogeneity assumption, the interaction term between stability and FDI is no longer 
significant. Third, we do not find evidence that mineral extraction moderate the FDI-
institutions relationship. 
As a second check we use an alternative measure of FDI. In Table 7a and 7b we 
measure FDI in per capita term. First, in table 7a we replicate the results reported in 
table 1a, where we explored the impact of oil and metal export intensity on the interplay 
between FDI and institutions. Second, in table 7b we replicate the results reported in 
table 4a, where we measure resources endowment with oil production as a share of 
GDP. In both cases we can see that the interactive terms between the institutions 
analysed and natural resource remain significant. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The theoretical discussion and the econometric analysis carried out in this study aim to 
untangle the role of different institutions in attracting foreign investment. In particular, 
we wanted to analyse whether the presence of natural resources plays a moderating role 
in the institutions-FDI relationship. The existing theoretical and empirical literature has 
emphasized that good institutions are important for both foreign and domestic 
investors. Accordingly, we should expect political stability and property rights to be 
positively correlated with FDI. However, this may not be the case for MNC in natural 
resources because: (1) the latter can be isolated from most of the other sectors in the 
economy and institutional risk may be decreased by colluding with a local government, 
(2) high transaction costs can be compensated by higher returns results from 
participating in the resource rents. Our econometrics results show clearly that 
institutions do not act in isolation and that their effect on FDI is influenced by the 
natural resources, confirming recent findings of Asiedu and Lien (2011). However, this 
chapter adds to Asiedu and Lien (2011) in several ways. First, we explore the interplay 
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between stability, property rights and FDI, while Asiedu and Lien (2011) focus merely 
on democracy. As we argued above, although stability and property rights are closely 
related to democracy, they represent separate dimensions of a country’s institutional 
environment and they therefore merit a separate analysis. Our results show that natural 
resources significantly affect the impact of property rights and political stability on FDI. 
However, out of the two institutional characteristics analysed, the effect of property 
rights on FDI is more robust than that of political stability. Second, we contribute to 
the discussion on the impact of different types of natural resources on economic 
development. Our study finds that only oil, and not minerals or agricultural products, 
has a robust and significant moderating impact on the FDI-institutions relationship. 
The evidence on the effect of different types of natural resources on economic 
outcomes has stressed that lootable resources may be more harmful than diffuse 
resources, such as agricultural products. The economics literature has traditionally 
considered the effect of oil to be similar to that of minerals; however, political scientists 
have argued that oil-rich countries are different than other resource-rich countries. In 
particular, recent studies have found that the institutional environment of oil-producing 
economies does not reflect the country’s level of development, as measured by per 
capita income; they are weaker than expected and this in turn can have a negative 
impact on political instability and conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2005). Our 
study therefore shows how the distorted institutional setting of oil-rich countries may 
have a negative effect on development. Namely, we find that in oil-based economies 
investors are less sensitive to weak property rights protections and to some extent to 
political instability. If this is the case, the influence of FDI on the host country 
institutional environment may be of concern. We believe that what explains the 
different effects of oil as contrasted with that of metal ores, is that the former generates 
particularly strong economic rents given the current trend in energy prices. Thus, our 
findings give indirect support to a recent literature arguing that it is the amount of rent 
generated rather than the presence of natural resources that is a key factor in how 
natural resources affect development (Fearon, 2005). 
Third, we make use of alternative measures of natural resources and we not limit our 
analysis to resource export intensity. Unlike Asiedu and Lien (2011), which only use 
resource export intensity as a measure of resource endowment, we also replicate our 
results measuring resources with production and rent relative to GDP. Our robustness 
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checks ensure that the effect of oil endowment is robust to the use of alternative 
measures.  
Fourth, our preferred specification, as in Asiedu and Lien (2011), assumes all variables 
except the lag dependent variable to be exogenous. When we relax the exogeneity 
assumption we allow all independent variables to be included as GMM instruments, 
unlike Asiedu and Lien (2011), which only allow democracy and its interaction with 
resources export to be endogenous. Clearly, given that controls such as trade and GDP 
are likely to be endogenous, our choice of instruments seem more appropriate. 
In sum, our study contributes to the existing literature on the determinants of FDI, as 
we find novel evidence that the importance of institutions, in particular property rights 
and political stability, is mitigated by the presence of natural resources. Moreover, we 
have more trust in our results as these are based on stronger methodology and 
robustness checks as just argued. 
In term of future research the question addressed in this study may be better explored 
with the use of sector-level FDI data, which is currently not available for the period and 
the countries analysed. A limitation of this study is the use of aggregate data, which do 
not allow one to distinguish between the types of FDI. Instead, we have to rely on the 
assumption that in developing countries with high levels of natural resources, FDI tend 
to be concentrated in the resources sector.  
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Table 1 
 
 Variable name                                 Variable Label Source 
   
Lfdigdp                                    Log FDI inflow as  % of 
GDP 
UNCTAD 
l.LFDIpercap Lagged FDI inflow as  % 
of GDP 
UNCTAD 
LGDPcons         Log GDP in constant us $ World Bank (WB)- World 
Development indicators 
(WDI) 
LGDPPPcons       Log GDP per capita in 
constant us $ 
WB- WDI 
inflation        Inflation, consumer 
price annual % 
WB- WDI 
Ltrade  Log trade (import and 
export as percentage of 
GDP) 
WB- WDI 
nat Fuel and Metal Export as 
percentage of total 
export 
WB- WDI 
fuelex Fuel Export as 
percentage of total 
export 
WB- WDI 
Oresex Ores and metal export as 
percentage of total 
export 
 
agriex Agricultural Export as 
percentage of total 
export 
WB- WDI 
Polstab2 Political stability 
(principal component of 
internal/external 
conflict, government 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
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stability and ethnic 
tension) 
Law1 Law and Order ICRG 
Polity2 Democracy indicator PolityIV 
 
Table 2 
 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     Lfdigdp | 
         --. |      2543    .1955234    1.774239  -10.55869   4.522919 
         L1. |      2420    .1618515    1.777313  -10.55869   4.522919 
      Ltrade |      2646    4.148804    .6030345  -1.175052   5.636078 
    Lgdpcons |      2731    23.41773    1.779727    18.6116   28.83838 
   Lgdppcppp |      2627    8.247082    1.094083   5.016001   10.00149 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   inflation |      2444    73.41398    787.4922       -100   24411.03 
         nat |      2032    26.48632    29.36973          0   99.73957 
      oresex |      2071    8.701103    15.48403          0   88.81229 
      fuelex |      2045    17.76398    28.41176          0   99.73948 
      agriex |      2078    5.629801    10.06563   .0005647   93.82378 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    polstab2 |      1472   -.2573426    1.390298  -6.199394   2.555989 
        law1 |      2499    .5381363    .2199914          0          1 
     polity2 |      2696    1.684718    6.867579        -10         10 
 
Table 3 
 
 
             |  Lfdigdp L.L~igdp   Ltrade Lgdpcons Lgdppc~p inflat~n      nat 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Lfdigdp |   1.0000  
   L.Lfdigdp |   0.7979   1.0000  
      Ltrade |   0.3552   0.3560   1.0000  
    Lgdpcons |  -0.0390  -0.0270  -0.2811   1.0000  
   Lgdppcppp |   0.1662   0.1818   0.2858   0.5448   1.0000  
   inflation |  -0.0510  -0.0761  -0.0301  -0.0153  -0.0510   1.0000  
         nat |  -0.0652  -0.0797  -0.0098  -0.0160  -0.0042   0.0234   1.0000  
      oresex |   0.0859   0.0608   0.0246  -0.2298  -0.1867   0.0660   0.3378  
      fuelex |  -0.1128  -0.1092  -0.0172   0.1226   0.1134  -0.0094   0.8542  
      agriex |  -0.0995  -0.0829  -0.1466  -0.2537  -0.3042   0.0035  -0.1601  
    polstab2 |   0.1693   0.1916   0.2884   0.0748   0.4018  -0.0442  -0.1914  
        law1 |   0.2142   0.2040   0.2100   0.2797   0.4493  -0.0730  -0.1027  
     polity2 |   0.2821   0.2819   0.1540   0.2016   0.3482  -0.0015  -0.3997  
 
             |   oresex   fuelex   agriex polstab2     law1  polity2 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
      oresex |   1.0000  
      fuelex |  -0.2008   1.0000  
      agriex |  -0.0131  -0.1696   1.0000  
    polstab2 |   0.0034  -0.2036  -0.0792   1.0000  
        law1 |  -0.0575  -0.0772  -0.0634   0.5395   1.0000  
     polity2 |  -0.0143  -0.4057  -0.0703   0.1490   0.1529   1.0000  
      oresex |   0.0645   0.0468   0.0031  -0.2477  -0.2078   0.0683   0.3288  
      fuelex |  -0.1112  -0.1111   0.0122  -0.0229   0.0721  -0.0065   0.8759  
      agriex |  -0.0949  -0.0801  -0.1587  -0.2567  -0.3298   0.0090  -0.1335  
    polstab2 |   0.1655   0.1728   0.3097   0.1884   0.5044  -0.0461  -0.1683  
        law1 |   0.2182   0.2035   0.2176   0.4613   0.6445  -0.0784  -0.1549  
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Figure 5 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 9  
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Figure 11 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a- GMM 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.330*** 0.342*** 0.327*** 0.337*** 
 (0.0790) (0.0798) (0.0769) (0.0800) 
Ltrade 0.381*** 0.350*** 0.360*** 0.348*** 
 (0.129) (0.125) (0.126) (0.125) 
Lgdp -0.0353 -0.0420 -0.0428 -0.0440 
 (0.0363) (0.0325) (0.0348) (0.0329) 
Lgdp per capita -0.00928 0.0108 -0.0127 0.00334 
 (0.0675) (0.0599) (0.0661) (0.0621) 
Inflation  7.76e-06 7.26e-05 0.000133 0.000120 
 (0.000586) (0.000550) (0.000493) (0.000504) 
Nat 0.000727 0.0128** -0.000421 0.00879 
 (0.00214) (0.00541) (0.00226) (0.00716) 
Political 
Stability 
0.00879 0.0279 0.0751* 0.0572 
 (0.0333) (0.0335) (0.0393) (0.0386) 
Law & Order 0.535* 0.941*** 0.646** 0.885*** 
 (0.307) (0.327) (0.315) (0.330) 
polity2 0.0204** 0.0153* 0.0189** 0.0160* 
 (0.0100) (0.00912) (0.00945) (0.00931) 
nat*law  -0.0213**  -0.0153 
  (0.00977)  (0.0126) 
nat*polstab   -0.00304** -0.00159 
   (0.00137) (0.00167) 
Constant -0.167 -0.253 0.111 -0.0837 
 (0.977) (0.929) (0.963) (0.942) 
     
Observations 895 895 895 895 
Number of ID 92 92 92 92 
AR(1)- pvalue 1.26e-07 2.11e-07 1.24e-07 2.33e-07 
AR(2)-p value 0.331 0.342 0.365 0.358 
Hansen- p value 0.0464 0.0405 0.0506 0.0446 
Instrument 
Number 
23 24 24 25 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year dummies 
included but not reported. Dependent variable is the log of FDI per capita. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b – GMM Endogenous variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.388*** 0.425*** 0.376*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0879) (0.0936) (0.0873) (0.0892) 
Ltrade 0.717 0.673 0.397 0.684 
 (0.897) (1.119) (1.039) (1.241) 
Lgdpcons 0.313* 0.297* 0.329* 0.286 
 (0.166) (0.179) (0.185) (0.178) 
Lgdppcppp -0.575** -0.589* -0.649** -0.621** 
 (0.280) (0.309) (0.310) (0.307) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 8.03e-05 5.66e-05 0.000130 3.75e-05 
 (0.000713) (0.000783) (0.000691) (0.000819) 
Nat -0.0129 0.0547** -0.0200* 0.0476* 
 (0.00877) (0.0240) (0.0107) (0.0276) 
Political Stability 0.00277 -0.119 0.141 -0.0489 
 (0.0904) (0.119) (0.138) (0.168) 
law1 1.796* 4.521*** 2.002* 4.343*** 
 (0.940) (1.540) (1.023) (1.497) 
polity2 0.0518 0.0505 0.0592 0.0535 
 (0.0465) (0.0491) (0.0488) (0.0466) 
nat*law1  -0.122***  -0.113** 
  (0.0451)  (0.0452) 
 (0.0936) (0.101) (0.0996) (0.101) 
nat*polstab2   -0.00461 -0.00241 
   (0.00419) (0.00405) 
Constant -5.844 -6.692 -4.147 -6.053 
 (4.452) (5.851) (5.272) (6.378) 
     
Observations 895 895 895 895 
Number of ID 92 92 92 92 
AR(1)- pvalue 5.10e-06 1.34e-05 5.01e-06 7.51e-06 
AR(2)-p value 0.209 0.401 0.225 0.406 
Hansen- p value 0.666 0.624 0.651 0.770 
Instrument Number 39 42 42 45 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2a- GMM – Exogenous variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
    
L.Lfdigdp 0.336*** 0.349*** 0.332*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0793) (0.0763) 
Ltrade 0.382*** 0.331*** 0.349*** 
 (0.128) (0.118) (0.124) 
Lgdpcons -0.0258 -0.0334 -0.0324 
 (0.0358) (0.0314) (0.0328) 
Lgdppcppp 0.0261 0.0551 0.0471 
 (0.0683) (0.0584) (0.0635) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -9.45e-06 -4.77e-05 9.40e-05 
 (0.000612) (0.000612) (0.000537) 
Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) 0.00601** -0.00974 0.00629** 
 (0.00266) (0.0109) (0.00259) 
Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) -0.00116 0.0131** -0.00388 
 (0.00270) (0.00536) (0.00284) 
Political Stability -0.00505 0.0202 0.0647* 
 (0.0326) (0.0316) (0.0380) 
law1 0.485 0.653** 0.604** 
 (0.305) (0.318) (0.304) 
polity2 0.0141 0.00699 0.00819 
 (0.0102) (0.00870) (0.00991) 
oresex*law  0.0277  
  (0.0183)  
fuelex*law  -0.0252***  
  (0.00916)  
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oresex*pol.stab.   -0.00135 
   (0.00167) 
fuelex*polstab   -
0.00433*** 
   (0.00158) 
Constant -0.678 -0.590 -0.557 
 (1.003) (0.886) (0.946) 
    
Observations 895 895 895 
Number of ID 92 92 92 
AR(1)- pvalue 1.14e-07 1.96e-07 1.11e-07 
AR(2)-p value 0.342 0.322 0.398 
Hansen- p value 0.0464 0.0332 0.0505 
Instrument Number 24 26 26 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year dummies 
included but not reported. Dependent variable is the log of FDI per capita. 
 
TABLE 2b- GMM – Endogenous variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
    
L.Lfdigdp 0.398*** 0.409*** 0.388*** 
 (0.0914) (0.0967) (0.0881) 
Ltrade 0.753 0.742 0.490 
 (0.848) (0.863) (0.843) 
Lgdpcons 0.346* 0.305* 0.358* 
 (0.180) (0.181) (0.194) 
Lgdppcppp -0.663** -0.588** -0.719** 
 (0.285) (0.289) (0.307) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 2.87e-05 -2.55e-05 6.83e-05 
 (0.000726) (0.000780) (0.000723) 
Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) 0.00450 0.0159 0.00549 
 (0.0170) (0.0633) (0.0203) 
Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) -0.0156 0.0526** -0.0231** 
 (0.0103) (0.0230) (0.0112) 
Political Stability (ICRG) 0.0284 -0.0817 0.184 
 (0.101) (0.115) (0.153) 
Law (ICRG) 1.970** 4.073** 2.136** 
 (0.913) (1.582) (0.978) 
polity2 0.0717 0.0542 0.0791 
 (0.0490) (0.0481) (0.0492) 
Metal ex*law  -0.0165  
  (0.103)  
Fuel ex*law  -0.118***  
  (0.0454)  
Metal ex*polstab   -0.00578 
   (0.00487) 
Oil ex*polstab   -0.00665 
   (0.00488) 
Constant -6.376 -7.136 -5.033 
 (4.659) (5.289) (5.115) 
    
Observations 895 895 895 
Number of ID 92 92 92 
AR(1)- pvalue 8.35e-06 2.05e-05 5.79e-06 
AR(2)-p value 0.219 0.383 0.264 
Hansen- p value 0.695 0.587 0.895 
Instrument Number 42 48 48 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year dummies 
included but not reported. Dependent variable is the log of FDI per capita. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3a- GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.303*** 0.302*** 
 (0.0968) (0.0965) (0.0992) (0.0988) 
Ltrade 0.583*** 0.579*** 0.587*** 0.587*** 
 (0.197) (0.200) (0.193) (0.194) 
Lgdpcons -0.0553 -0.0568 -0.0533 -0.0533 
 (0.0631) (0.0650) (0.0604) (0.0611) 
Lgdppcppp -0.239 -0.244 -0.230 -0.229 
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 (0.230) (0.251) (0.216) (0.229) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -0.000229 -0.000234 -0.000277 -0.000276 
 (0.000676) (0.000693) (0.000709) (0.000714) 
Agricultural raw materials exports (% 
of merchandise exports)  
-0.0116** -0.00472 -0.0129** -0.0126 
 (0.00484) (0.0290) (0.00576) (0.0210) 
Political Stability -0.0491 -0.0496 0.00703 0.00695 
 (0.0649) (0.0667) (0.0565) (0.0560) 
Law 1.042 1.113 0.957 0.958 
 (0.672) (0.938) (0.599) (0.785) 
Polity 0.100 0.102 0.0972 0.0969 
 (0.0858) (0.0936) (0.0809) (0.0860) 
agriex*law1  -0.0125  -0.000580 
  (0.0574)  (0.0444) 
agriex*polstab2   -0.00862 -0.00858 
   (0.00800) (0.00805) 
Constant 0.789 0.840 0.709 0.706 
 (1.708) (1.868) (1.597) (1.696) 
     
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
Number of ID 113 113 113 113 
AR(1)- pvalue 3.00e-07 2.72e-07 2.24e-07 2.05e-07 
AR(2)-p value 0.160 0.161 0.111 0.112 
Hansen- p value 0.733 0.732 0.686 0.687 
Instrument Number 22 23 23 24 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year dummies 
included but not reported. Dependent variable is the log of FDI per capita. 
 
TABLE 3b- GMM – Endogenous variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.306*** 0.302*** 0.306*** 0.302*** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Ltrade 1.984*** 1.675** 2.122*** 1.951*** 
 (0.756) (0.763) (0.676) (0.746) 
Lgdpcons 0.0646 0.143 0.0635 0.136 
 (0.155) (0.144) (0.165) (0.151) 
Lgdppcppp -0.345 -0.183 -0.520 -0.476 
 (0.336) (0.336) (0.333) (0.384) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -0.000325 -0.000260 -0.000332 -0.000288 
 (0.000947) (0.000898) (0.000933) (0.000887) 
Agricultural raw materials exports (% 
of merchandise exports)  
0.00645 -0.138 0.000917 -0.120 
 (0.0133) (0.0926) (0.0140) (0.106) 
Political Stability -0.00674 -0.0505 0.0836 0.0944 
 (0.0829) (0.0780) (0.113) (0.0921) 
law1 1.211 -0.120 1.292* 0.277 
 (0.772) (0.856) (0.725) (1.065) 
polity2 0.0139 -0.0168 0.0355 0.0167 
 (0.0451) (0.0439) (0.0488) (0.0512) 
agriex*law1  0.246  0.192 
  (0.156)  (0.189) 
agriex*polstab2   -0.00613 -0.0107** 
   (0.00638) (0.00442) 
Constant -7.121 -8.138* -6.269 -6.928 
 (4.604) (4.519) (4.995) (4.808) 
     
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
Number of ID 113 113 113 113 
AR(1)- pvalue 1.39e-06 2.26e-06 1.38e-06 2.00e-06 
AR(2)-p value 0.187 0.209 0.135 0.124 
Hansen- p value 0.787 0.730 0.728 0.692 
Instrument Number 36 39 39 42 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year dummies 
included but not reported. Dependent variable is the log of FDI per capita. 
 
 
ROBOUSTNESS 
 
 
TABLE 4a-GMM- Exogenous instruments 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
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L.Lfdigdp 0.391*** 0.376*** 0.392*** 0.384*** 
 (0.0808) (0.0813) (0.0809) (0.0809) 
Ltrade 0.337** 0.311** 0.268** 0.260** 
 (0.137) (0.134) (0.121) (0.121) 
Lgdpcons -0.0364 -0.0450 -0.0460 -0.0500 
 (0.0368) (0.0352) (0.0329) (0.0327) 
Lgdppcppp -0.0951 -0.0686 -0.0581 -0.0465 
 (0.0658) (0.0663) (0.0608) (0.0619) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -0.000188* -
0.000222*** 
-
0.000363** 
-
0.000363*** 
 (0.000112) (7.81e-05) (0.000144) (0.000122) 
Oil prod/GDP 5.682*** 2.763 20.76*** 17.21*** 
 (2.016) (2.912) (5.430) (5.740) 
Polstab 0.0357 0.0632* 0.0462 0.0613* 
 (0.0331) (0.0343) (0.0319) (0.0327) 
Law 0.425 0.405 0.703*** 0.657** 
 (0.262) (0.262) (0.254) (0.257) 
Polity2 0.0295*** 0.0235** 0.0217** 0.0190** 
 (0.00998) (0.0103) (0.00894) (0.00931) 
oilprodgdp*polstab  -2.291*  -1.370* 
  (1.285)  (0.796) 
oilprodgdp*law   -29.64*** -26.11*** 
   (10.43) (10.01) 
Constant 0.729 0.911 0.837 0.933 
 (0.951) (0.925) (0.860) (0.861) 
     
Observations 881 881 881 881 
Number of ID 88 88 88 88 
AR(1)- pvalue 3.91e-07 4.44e-07 4.14e-07 4.35e-07 
AR(2)-p value 0.489 0.514 0.495 0.499 
Hansen- p value 0.0143 0.0171 0.0116 0.0141 
Instrument Number 23 24 24 25 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
TABLE 4b-GMM-Endogenous variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.421*** 0.416*** 0.447*** 0.443*** 
 (0.0913) (0.0889) (0.0851) (0.0830) 
Ltrade 2.181** 2.403** 0.300 0.308 
 (0.973) (1.022) (0.784) (0.768) 
Lgdpcons 0.203 0.144 0.251 0.219 
 (0.240) (0.270) (0.188) (0.176) 
Lgdppcppp -0.675** -0.675** -0.386* -0.363* 
 (0.289) (0.282) (0.219) (0.219) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual 
%) 
-
0.000378*** 
-
0.000406*** 
-
0.000591*** 
-
0.000591*** 
 (0.000102) (0.000107) (0.000149) (0.000162) 
Oil production/GDP 1.415 -2.225 37.82*** 36.91** 
 (4.385) (5.742) (13.52) (15.06) 
Polstab 0.0321 0.0960 0.0732 0.0988 
 (0.103) (0.107) (0.100) (0.105) 
law 1.289 1.184 2.388** 2.407*** 
 (0.938) (0.985) (0.938) (0.924) 
Polity2 0.0486* 0.0383 0.0228 0.0166 
 (0.0268) (0.0269) (0.0228) (0.0220) 
oilprodgdp*polstab  -2.102  -0.640 
  (1.709)  (0.833) 
oilprodgdp*law   -59.65** -59.68** 
   (25.35) (27.10) 
Constant -8.751* -8.139* -4.677 -4.123 
 (4.631) (4.859) (4.539) (4.415) 
     
Observations 881 881 881 881 
Number of ID 88 88 88 88 
AR(1)- pvalue 1.86e-05 1.42e-05 3.59e-06 2.79e-06 
AR(2)-p value 0.454 0.449 0.423 0.421 
Hansen- p value 0.453 0.579 0.458 0.530 
Instrument Number 39 42 42 45 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
TABLE 5a- GMM – Exogenous Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.390*** 0.379*** 0.399*** 0.389*** 
 (0.0809) (0.0822) (0.0810) (0.0816) 
Ltrade 0.383*** 0.332** 0.323** 0.305** 
 (0.145) (0.137) (0.131) (0.127) 
Lgdpcons -0.0350 -0.0454 -0.0395 -0.0453 
 (0.0372) (0.0348) (0.0328) (0.0326) 
Lgdppcppp -0.0903 -0.0630 -0.0511 -0.0431 
 (0.0685) (0.0657) (0.0626) (0.0625) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -4.41e-
05 
-
0.000144 
-0.000118 -0.000166 
 (9.33e-
05) 
(9.43e-
05) 
(0.000103) (0.000110) 
Oil Rent GDP 0.877* 0.505 3.420*** 2.483*** 
 (0.528) (0.463) (0.906) (0.838) 
Political Stability 0.0187 0.0651* 0.0262 0.0555* 
 (0.0341) (0.0346) (0.0332) (0.0330) 
law1 0.396 0.439 0.627** 0.593** 
 (0.270) (0.272) (0.265) (0.263) 
polity2 0.0273** 0.0216** 0.0187* 0.0171* 
 (0.0111) (0.0101) (0.00967) (0.00953) 
Oilrentgdp*polstab  -
0.873*** 
 -0.591* 
  (0.278)  (0.311) 
Oiilrentgdp*law   -4.978*** -3.638** 
   (1.416) (1.540) 
Constant 0.461 0.739 0.414 0.615 
 (0.989) (0.917) (0.901) (0.879) 
     
Observations 881 881 881 881 
Number of ID 88 88 88 88 
AR(1)- pvalue 3.35e-07 3.82e-07 4.65e-07 4.30e-07 
AR(2)-p value 0.540 0.572 0.537 0.560 
Hansen- p value 0.0138 0.0164 0.0122 0.0150 
Instrument Number 23 24 24 25 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
TABLE 5b- GMM – Endogenous Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.437*** 0.432*** 0.434*** 0.438*** 
 (0.0882) (0.0886) (0.0846) (0.0848) 
Ltrade 2.191*** 2.415*** 1.869*** 2.014*** 
 (0.635) (0.633) (0.654) (0.601) 
Lgdpcons 0.155 0.160 0.309 0.299 
 (0.234) (0.252) (0.215) (0.219) 
Lgdppcppp -0.607** -0.659*** -0.602** -0.654*** 
 (0.249) (0.252) (0.253) (0.239) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual 
%) 
-
0.000411*** 
-
0.000441*** 
-
0.000567*** 
-
0.000632*** 
 (0.000112) (0.000115) (0.000207) (0.000187) 
Oil Rent/GDP 0.474 0.430 6.408 7.318 
 (1.080) (1.099) (4.608) (4.629) 
Political Stability -0.0355 0.0213 0.0189 0.0456 
 (0.105) (0.107) (0.0904) (0.0972) 
Law 1.316 1.269 1.466 1.553* 
 (0.912) (0.944) (0.975) (0.917) 
polity2 0.0505 0.0485 0.0296 0.0349 
 (0.0375) (0.0385) (0.0342) (0.0343) 
Oilrentgdp*polstab2  -0.0539  -0.00896 
  (0.530)  (0.543) 
Oilrentgdp*law1   -11.20 -12.61 
   (8.709) (8.563) 
Constant -8.286* -8.875* -10.59** -10.62** 
 (4.439) (4.823) (4.398) (4.452) 
     
Observations 881 881 881 881 
Number of ID 88 88 88 88 
AR(1)- pvalue 6.78e-06 7.81e-06 5.90e-06 5.73e-06 
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AR(2)-p value 0.453 0.448 0.489 0.482 
Hansen- p value 0.479 0.562 0.552 0.516 
Instrument Number 39 42 42 45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
TABLE 6a- GMM- Exogenous Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.421*** 0.422*** 0.422*** 0.422*** 
 (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0679) (0.0678) 
Ltrade 0.441*** 0.446*** 0.447*** 0.447*** 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.146) (0.146) 
Lgdpcons -0.0176 -0.0153 -0.0150 -0.0154 
 (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0318) 
Lgdppcppp -0.0210 -0.0217 -0.0204 -0.0198 
 (0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0605) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 3.16e-05 2.51e-05 2.39e-05 2.45e-05 
 (8.49e-
05) 
(8.39e-
05) 
(8.42e-
05) 
(8.46e-
05) 
Mineral rents (% of GDP) -0.00854 -0.00637 -0.0537 -0.0720 
 (0.0157) (0.0111) (0.0497) (0.0445) 
Political Stability -0.0148 -0.0196 -0.0177 -0.0161 
 (0.0333) (0.0345) (0.0335) (0.0348) 
law1 0.365 0.352 0.323 0.314 
 (0.252) (0.251) (0.256) (0.259) 
polity 0.0137 0.0134 0.0132 0.0132 
 (0.00909) (0.00906) (0.00904) (0.00904) 
minrent*polstab  0.00958  -0.00540 
  (0.0138)  (0.0159) 
 (0.0774) (0.0776) (0.0779) (0.0771) 
minrent*law   0.0887 0.122 
   (0.0830) (0.0782) 
Constant -0.644 -0.711 -0.722 -0.712 
 (0.954) (0.965) (0.961) (0.966) 
     
Observations 980 980 980 980 
Number of ID 99 99 99 99 
AR(1)- pvalue 5.17e-08 5.11e-08 5.21e-08 5.23e-08 
AR(2)-p value 0.504 0.502 0.502 0.501 
Hansen- p value 0.0361 0.0326 0.0339 0.0343 
Instrument Number 23 24 24 25 
 
TABLE 6b- GMM- Endogenous Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp Lfdigdp 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.458*** 0.450*** 0.459*** 0.451*** 
 (0.0711) (0.0712) (0.0707) (0.0715) 
Ltrade 1.706*** 1.715*** 1.743*** 1.827*** 
 (0.471) (0.480) (0.469) (0.480) 
Lgdpcons 0.260* 0.282** 0.282** 0.308** 
 (0.135) (0.137) (0.136) (0.139) 
Lgdppcppp -0.529** -0.563** -0.554** -0.594*** 
 (0.220) (0.224) (0.222) (0.228) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual 
%) 
-
0.000298*** 
-
0.000290*** 
-
0.000324*** 
-
0.000324*** 
 (0.000102) (0.000107) (9.78e-05) (9.96e-05) 
Mineral rents (% of GDP) 0.0167 0.0184 -0.0754 0.0831 
 (0.0145) (0.0193) (0.0876) (0.156) 
Political Stability -0.0575 -0.0497 -0.0562 -0.0488 
 (0.0909) (0.0920) (0.0922) (0.0923) 
law1 1.158* 1.078 0.929 0.932 
 (0.696) (0.701) (0.709) (0.724) 
polity2 0.0228 0.0257 0.0258 0.0267 
 (0.0250) (0.0247) (0.0249) (0.0254) 
=minrent*polstab2  0.0385  0.0532 
  (0.0259)  (0.0484) 
minrent*law   0.169 -0.110 
   (0.160) (0.270) 
Constant -9.141*** -9.362*** -9.496*** -10.13*** 
 (2.914) (2.997) (2.908) (2.999) 
     
Observations 980 980 980 980 
Number of ID 99 99 99 99 
AR(1)- pvalue 5.68e-07 5.02e-07 5.57e-07 4.89e-07 
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AR(2)-p value 0.417 0.418 0.412 0.409 
Hansen- p value 0.768 0.818 0.785 0.544 
Instrument Number 42 45 45 48 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
TABLE 7a- GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LFDIpp LFDIpp LFDIpp LFDIpp 
     
L.LFDIpp 0.237*** 0.255*** 0.228*** 0.248*** 
 (0.0886) (0.0864) (0.0874) (0.0874) 
Ltrade 0.362** 0.320** 0.336** 0.318** 
 (0.156) (0.146) (0.154) (0.146) 
Lgdpcons -0.0627 -0.0710* -0.0726 -0.0735* 
 (0.0457) (0.0409) (0.0443) (0.0415) 
Lgdppcppp 0.876*** 0.882*** 0.881*** 0.882*** 
 (0.138) (0.133) (0.136) (0.134) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -0.00125 -0.00114 -0.00111 -0.00110 
 (0.00104) (0.000981) (0.000923) (0.000936) 
Nat -0.000641 0.0157** -0.00212 0.0115 
 (0.00292) (0.00738) (0.00310) (0.00937) 
Political Stability 0.0192 0.0446 0.104* 0.0761 
 (0.0425) (0.0428) (0.0562) (0.0519) 
law1 0.615 1.165*** 0.758* 1.107*** 
 (0.378) (0.403) (0.388) (0.408) 
polity2 0.0242* 0.0172 0.0224* 0.0179 
 (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
nat*law1  -0.0288**  -0.0225 
  (0.0133)  (0.0167) 
nat*polstab2   -0.00386** -0.00169 
   (0.00184) (0.00213) 
Constant -4.289*** -4.306*** -3.986*** -4.165*** 
 (1.347) (1.265) (1.292) (1.258) 
     
Observations 895 895 895 895 
Number of ID 92 92 92 92 
AR(1)- pvalue 3.60e-07 4.13e-07 5.06e-07 5.69e-07 
AR(2)-p value 0.449 0.465 0.527 0.494 
Hansen- p value 0.260 0.218 0.291 0.246 
Instrument Number 23 24 24 25 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent 
variable if the log of FDI per capita;  
 
Table 7b- GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LFDIpp LFDIpp LFDIpp LFDIpp 
     
L.LFDIpp 0.292*** 0.312*** 0.294*** 0.310*** 
 (0.107) (0.102) (0.104) (0.101) 
Ltrade 0.319* 0.256 0.282 0.249 
 (0.182) (0.156) (0.175) (0.156) 
Lgdpcons -0.0502 -0.0575 -0.0588 -0.0605 
 (0.0447) (0.0385) (0.0423) (0.0385) 
Lgdppcppp 0.705*** 0.748*** 0.733*** 0.754*** 
 (0.146) (0.148) (0.146) (0.147) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual 
%) 
-
0.000227*** 
-
0.000345*** 
-
0.000260*** 
-
0.000341*** 
 (8.13e-05) (8.17e-05) (7.25e-05) (8.02e-05) 
Oil production/GDP 5.118** 10.39*** 2.729 8.284** 
 (2.452) (2.346) (2.739) (3.391) 
Political Stability 0.0585 0.0697 0.0935** 0.0851* 
 (0.0443) (0.0431) (0.0475) (0.0447) 
law1 0.432 0.478 0.451 0.479 
 (0.327) (0.295) (0.320) (0.297) 
polity2 0.0342*** 0.0188 0.0273** 0.0180 
 (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0126) 
oilprodgdp*law1  -3.226***  -2.665** 
  (1.202)  (1.343) 
oilprodgdp*polstab2   -0.809** -0.402 
   (0.367) (0.413) 
Constant -3.152** -3.030** -2.993** -2.972** 
 (1.499) (1.338) (1.414) (1.330) 
     
Observations 881 881 881 881 
Number of ID 88 88 88 88 
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AR(1)- pvalue 3.58e-05 1.53e-05 2.47e-05 1.31e-05 
AR(2)-p value 0.664 0.620 0.690 0.631 
Hansen- p value 0.0960 0.116 0.100 0.113 
Instrument Number 23 24 24 25 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent 
variable if the log of FDI per capita. Years Dummy included but not reported 
 
 
Table 8- GMM 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Low Income 
Countries 
Middle Income 
Countries 
Low Income 
Countries 
Middle Income 
Countries 
     
L.Lfdigdp 0.333*** 0.318*** 0.412*** 0.341*** 
 (0.126) (0.0920) (0.112) (0.0969) 
Ltrade 0.609* 0.283** 0.0253 0.311** 
 (0.345) (0.111) (0.456) (0.123) 
Lgdpcons 0.111 -0.0802** -0.0717 -0.0554 
 (0.0796) (0.0354) (0.125) (0.0376) 
Lgdppcppp -0.793** -0.00395 -0.598** -0.0613 
 (0.375) (0.0828) (0.299) (0.0883) 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) 
-0.00532 0.000203 -0.00149 -0.000357*** 
 (0.00744) (0.000450) (0.00106) (0.000137) 
nat -0.00723 0.00397   
 (0.0103) (0.00830)   
Political Stability -0.0317 0.0633 0.122** 0.0509 
 (0.0760) (0.0474) (0.0503) (0.0404) 
Law 1.654** 0.517 0.907 0.462 
 (0.807) (0.333) (0.806) (0.284) 
polity2 -0.00156 0.0127 -0.0159 0.0221** 
 (0.0147) (0.0104) (0.0246) (0.0101) 
nat*law 0.0288 -0.0118   
 (0.0199) (0.0139)   
nat*polstab2 -0.00308 -0.00193   
 (0.00260) (0.00208)   
Oil production/GDP   45.08*** 15.15** 
   (9.275) (6.160) 
oilprodgdp*law   -54.70*** -23.10** 
   (14.04) (10.68) 
oilprodgdp*polstab   3.620 -1.503* 
   (2.483) (0.879) 
Constant 0.191 1.492 6.170* 1.142 
 (2.314) (0.940) (3.626) (0.922) 
     
Observations 195 700 154 727 
Number of Countries 21 77 16 78 
AR(1)- pvalue 0.0125 3.51e-06 0.00466 6.31e-06 
AR(2)-p value 0.359 0.149 0.194 0.176 
Hansen- p value 1 0.0723 1 0.0384 
Instrument Number 25 25 25 25 
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Chapter 4 – ‘Educational Scores: How does Russia fare?’* 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses two large multi-country datasets on educational scores – PISA and 
TIMSS – to examine the performance of Russia in comparative light as well as the 
factors associated with differences in educational outcomes in Russia. Despite the 
perception of a positive educational legacy, Russian scores are not stellar and have 
mostly deteriorated. Using an education production function, we distinguish between 
individual and family background factors and those relating to the school and 
institutional environment. We use pooled data, as well as cross sectional evidence, to 
look at the variation across countries before looking at within-country variation in 
Russia. We find - both in the cross-country estimates as also those using just Russia data 
– that a number of individual and family variables in particular - such as parental 
educational levels - are robustly associated with better educational outcomes. 
Institutional variables also matter – notably student-teacher ratios and indicators of 
school autonomy – but there are also some clear particularities in the Russian case.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This is a paper version of the chapter currently under review at the Journal of Comparative Economics. 
The paper is co-authored with Simon Commander. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A substantial body of research now exists that examines the impact of different 
measures of educational outcomes on both individual and economy-wide performance. 
This work has reflected a shift away from measures of educational inputs, such as years 
of schooling, to those that attempt to capture the value of the education that has been 
imparted. Hanushek and Woessman (2007, 2009, 2010), for example, have argued that 
differences in the quality of education matter more in explaining cross-country 
differences in productivity growth than differences in the average number of years of 
schooling or enrolment rates.  
Our paper extends this emphasis to look in detail at the quality of the education in a 
country – Russia - that as a previously planned economy was widely assumed to have 
generated better human capital than economies at broadly comparable levels of income. 
Although subsequent research has rather qualified this assumption – at least in the 
context of other transition economies 68  - little analysis has yet been done using 
individual educational scores, let alone in a way that allows cross-country and within-
country comparison. 
Transition has involved large and persistent shocks to physical capital stocks and, in 
some instances, large shifts in the composition of output. This has had implications for 
human capital, both through a shift in demand for particular skills as well as through the 
direct effect of resource allocations to education spending. In Russia, two significant 
processes have been at work. The first has involved the destruction or contraction of 
broad based manufacturing and the growing preponderance of natural resources in the 
structure of output and trade. One expectation could be that as the productive base of 
the economy has narrowed so will have the underlying skills or capability set. This 
narrowing might in turn have limited the ability to induce any further diversification of 
the economy.  
The second has been the impact of policy in the education sector, where a series of 
attempts at institutional change have been put in place. There have also been significant 
annual fluctuations in the volume of resources allocated by government to education. 
Indicatively, in the early 1970s roughly 7% of GDP was allocated to education. By the 
early 1990s this had fallen to around 3.5%, approaching 4% by 2006/7. In 1992 a new 
                                                
68 See, for example, Svejnar et al (199?), Brunello et al (2011) 
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law mandated that spending on education should not fall below 10% of the federal 
budget. In the last decade, this threshold has been reached or exceeded.   
Our paper uses two sets of international achievement scores – PISA and TIMMS – 
to examine differences in scores across a large group of countries sampled in these 
datasets, including Russia. It then tries to explain the variation in scores within Russia. 
By using both datasets, we are able to cover not only a range of disciplines from reading 
to mathematics and science but also to introduce a comparative element into the 
analysis.  
Needless to say, there are important caveats when using large multi-country datasets 
like PISA and TIMSS. Countries have very different educational systems – Russia and 
its Soviet legacy is a clear case in point – and there is a large set of possible country 
attributes that could be used to explain differences across countries69. Further, while 
these scores can be helpful in seeing how students perform in standardised tests in key 
disciplines, they are not necessarily very informative about the actual skills being 
acquired by those students, and hence their labour market prospects. Evidence from 
other transition countries that has looked explicitly at the relation between education 
and skills has found a surprisingly weak association. This has led employers to make 
hiring decisions based on attributes – such as age – rather than on reported educational 
attainment or degrees70. This apparent decoupling obviously raises some important 
questions as to the possible policy conclusions that can be drawn.  
As regards the measurement of educational attainment, TIMSS explicitly measures 
achievements relative to the curriculum, much of which in Russia remains only partially 
reformed. TIMSS is focussed on mathematics and science. By contrast, in PISA there is 
an explicit attempt to measure abilities that are needed to function in a modern 
economy and the instrument is hence explicitly dissociated from the formal curriculum. 
As well as mathematics and science, PISA also measures reading abilities. Using both 
datasets, despite their different methodologies provides the widest possible angle on 
how students, Russians in particular, perform across different disciplines as well as 
across time. In the text, we report results from the PISA dataset, presenting 
complementary results from the analysis of TIMSS mostly in appendices.  
                                                
69 A point made by Freeman et al (2010) who further note that cross-country studies will not give as 
robust conclusions about educational processes as random assignment studies or analysis based on 
particular inputs. 
70 See, for instance, Kollo (2007) 
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Our approach involves estimating education production functions that relate 
educational outcomes to characteristics in order to identify the relative impact of 
student, parent and school variables. For both PISA and TIMSS we pool the data over 
multiple rounds. In the pooled regressions with multiple country observations, we are 
able to pick out country-specific effects. We also offer alternative specifications that 
take account of the multilevel nature of the data. 
 
2. Russian Education in context 
 
The Russian education system, despite many changes, is still coloured by the legacy of 
the previous system and the incomplete reforms started since 1991. The Soviet system 
certainly achieved very strong enrolment results. These have subsequently declined. 
Between 2003 and 2008 alone gross enrolment rates for secondary education fell from 
93 to 85 and for primary education from 117 to 97.  
The legacy also included a highly centralised system of control – including of 
curricula, personnel, management as well as financing.  A feature of the changes 
introduced since 1991 has been the greater devolution of authority by the federal 
government to lower levels. This has not necessarily been positive. Financial constraints 
have been significant but have also varied widely across jurisdictions. There has been a 
creeping de facto privatisation of education. Schools and teachers have commonly 
imposed fees and levies, while some schools have also launched revenue-earning 
schemes of a non-educational nature. Some explicitly private institutions have also been 
established.  
The shift to greater decentralisation has been accompanied by great 
heterogeneity in spending and decision-making across regions and municipalities. For 
example, in 2001 over 35% of oblasts or regions spent between 500-1000 roubles per 
student, while just over 10% of regions spent over 1500. There has also been the 
emergence of special institutions, such as gymnasia, lycees, colleges, outside the basic 
public system. 
 While there is considerable debate about the appropriate policies to be pursued, 
there is relatively broad agreement that Russian education has only weakly focussed on 
educational outcomes, giving priority instead to standardised measures of inputs. These 
in turn have been compromised by varying budgetary means across regions. Antiquated 
curricula, low standards of pedagogy and management have been highlighted. This has 
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led some to promote policies designed to achieve new standards, the overhaul of 
curricula and teaching methods, more and better assessment of students and greater 
emphasis on learning outcomes, as well as more autonomy for schools71. 
Institutionally, the system has maintained a requirement for 10 years of 
compulsory education. Entry to primary school begins at 7 years, lower secondary at 
10/11 years and upper secondary at 15/16 years. As such, basic general education lasts 
for 9 years. At that point, students can pursue higher secondary or enter a vocational 
school.  The 8th grade or 15 year reference for the PISA and TIMSS datasets that we use 
in this paper thus captures students at the end of their lower secondary phase. 
  
3. Data 
 
We use two complementary data sources - the OECD’s Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) and the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement’s Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS). Both databases have been quite widely used and described. PISA is an 
international, standardised assessment of 15-year-old students’ performance in 
mathematics, science, and reading. It has been administered in all OECD countries as 
well as a growing number of non-OECD countries, of which Russia has been one. To 
date, 4 rounds have been collected in 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009. 35 countries, 
including Russia, have been included in each round. For each country, students have 
been randomly sampled within schools 72 . Students have been given a reading, 
mathematics and science literacy test. In addition, information on the students - such as 
family background, attitudes towards schooling and learning strategies - has been 
collected. Further, each round of PISA has collected information from school principals 
on school resources, such as the number of teachers in the school. This provides multi-
level information on students, their family environment and the schools they attend. 
TIMSS consists of international tests of mathematics and science for both 4th and 
8th grade students. In this paper we use the information for the 8th grade equivalent to 
15 years of age and hence comparable to PISA.  For TIMSS, schools in each country 
that have classes at 4th and 8th grades are sampled with classes within schools and 
students within classes sampled to achieve representativeness. TIMSS has now been 
                                                
71 See, for example, Canning (2004) 
72 See description in Anderson et al (2010). The primary sampling unit has been the school.  
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implemented in 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007. In 1995 and 1997 40 countries were 
surveyed, rising to 59 by 2007. Russia and 14 other countries, including the USA, 
England, Italy, Japan and Korea, have been present in each of the four rounds.  Unlike 
PISA which is disconnected from national curricula and aims to measure skills required 
to function in a modern economy, TIMSS aims to align its tests with the curricula 
taught in each of the surveyed countries. However, given that our interest is primarily in 
understanding whether Russian human capital is fit for purpose in a modern economy, 
the PISA approach has some advantage and hence priority in the text is given to 
presenting results from analysis of the PISA data. 
Both PISA and TIMSS have a broad coverage of students and apply a substantial 
number of questions by dividing tests into sub-clusters. In this design, each student 
responds to a fraction of the entire assessment73. Testing students only on a subset of 
questions could lead to substantial measurement error if the aim of the test is to 
measure students’ ability to answer all questions. Plausible values are a sample of scores 
from the distribution of a student’s scores as if the student had responded to all 
questions in the test. Plausible values are based on student responses to the subset of 
items they receive conditional on the background characteristics74. In PISA, these 
individual test scores are standardized in a subsequent step so that the unconditional 
sample mean of each round equals 500 and their unconditional sample standard error 
equals 100. TIMSS similarly standardises the average score across countries to 500 with 
a standard deviation of 100. 
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Figures 1-3 provide the PISA scores for Reading, Mathematics and Science for a subset 
of countries, including Russia, that have been present in all rounds (viz., 2000, 2003, 
2006 and 2009). For mathematics, Russia scores consistently higher than Brazil – and 
indeed other emerging markets covered by PISA. Its score is roughly comparable to 
that of the USA in all rounds, but notably lower than Asian countries, such as Japan or 
Korea, as well as the leading European countries, like Finland. The ratio of the top 
countries – Korea and Hong Kong - to Russia in 2009 was around 1.18. At the start of 
the period, Russia ranked 25th out of 35 countries for mathematics and this was stable 
                                                
73 Willms and Smith (2005) 
74 Mislevy (1991) 
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through to 200975. For both reading and science, Russian scores tend to be weaker 
relative to most of Europe, including other transition countries, as well as to Asia, 
although they still remain superior to emerging markets, such as Brazil. The ratio of the 
top countries to Russia was 1.17 and 1.14 respectively. For reading and science, Russia 
ranked 29/30th out of 35 at the start and end periods. By 2009 Russia’s mean reading 
score was statistically significantly lower than the OECD average, being roughly 
equivalent to Chile and Turkey. 
Figures 4-5 repeats the same exercise for TIMSS.  With this measure, Russia 
performs significantly better in both mathematics and science than in PISA. In the case 
of mathematics, Russian scores are slightly superior to the USA or England, as well as 
many European, including other transition, countries. They are significantly higher than 
other emerging markets in the sample, but lower than the leading Asian countries, such 
as Taipei, Japan or Korea. For science, Russian scores are also relatively high. The ratio 
of the top countries’ mean scores to Russia in 2007 was 1.15 in mathematics and 1.04 in 
science.   
With respect to dispersion in scores, the percentile ratio of the (90th/10th)/10th for 
each of the three disciplines ranges in PISA between 0.51-0.54 and is larger than the 
mean for the full sample (0.48-0.5) as well as for most countries in Western Europe, 
although quite comparable to the USA.  In the TIMSS date, dispersion in Russia for 
both mathematics and science is below the mean for the sample, comparable to the 
European countries and significantly lower than for other emerging markets. More 
generally, Freeman et al (2010) note that in the TIMSS, lower inequality in test scores 
tends to be associated with higher average scores. 
Country average scores suggest several initial conclusions. The first is that there are 
clear and significant differences in how Russia has scored depending on the instrument. 
The TIMSS scores give consistently higher outcomes in mathematics and science. This 
difference may reflect the different survey strategies that have been pursued. In PISA, in 
particular, although Russia has performed better than most other emerging markets, it 
has under-performed relative to the main body of OECD countries. The reading score 
has been particularly weak. Second, with the exception of the TIMSS science score, 
there has been no improvement in Russian scores since the mid-1990s.  
                                                
75 This compares to countries included in all rounds. By 2009 the total number of countries in the PISA 
sample had risen to 57. 
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Given the policy objectives of diversifying the economy and raising productivity, a 
further facet is also troubling. Figures 6 provide evidence from PISA concerning the 
upper part of the scores distribution. This indicator may be particularly relevant when 
considering the ability of an economy to innovate. It shows that by 2009 the share of 
top performers – defined as those attaining Level 5 or above - in reading, mathematics 
and science ranged between 10-5%, compared with 13-25% for the leading countries. In 
mathematics, for example, the top share in 2009 was around 6% in Russia compared to 
20-25 for Japan, Korea and Finland. Further, the top share had fallen sharply from 
around 10% in 2000. There has been no improvement in the reading share while that 
for sciences betrays no clear trend. In sum, Russia has a relatively low share of top 
performers that has declined in the case of mathematics and registered little or no 
improvement in the other disciplines over the past decade. In TIMSS the share in the 
top 10% of the distribution for mathematics and science was 11% and 14% 
respectively76. This again contrasts unfavourably with the leading countries, Japan and 
Korea, with shares of 20-37%, although is relatively high when compared with either 
Western Europe or North America.    
Other research has signalled the fact that there are non-trivial differences in scores 
across gender. As in Machin and Pekkarinen (2008), we use three indicators: the gender 
gap, the variance ratio and the ratio male to female top performers77. In general for both 
PISA and TIMMS, the gender gap favours boys in mathematics and girls in reading 
while the picture for science is mixed. The variance ratio and the ratio of male to female 
top performers also show that boys’ scores have greater variability compared to girls 
and that boys dominate in terms of top performers in mathematics and girls in reading.  
However, for Russia any advantage of boys over girls is smaller when compared to 
other countries. Figure 6 shows the gender gap in math and reading, calculated using 
PISA data from 2000 to 2009, for a selected number of countries. In Russia the gender 
gap for math is 0.06. This is well below the gender gap for the all sample, 0.13, and also 
lower than for other emerging economies, such as Brazil and Mexico with values of 0.26 
and 0.2, respectively. The gender gap for reading in Russia is -0.39 which is slightly 
higher than for the whole sample (-0.36) and considerably higher then Brazil (-0.28) or 
                                                
76 We do not have a comparable (Level 5 and above) measure for TIMSS so use the top 10% instead. 
77 The gender gap is the standardized mean difference in scores at mean value. The variance ratio is 
defined as the ratio of male to female variance. The ratio of male to female top performers is the ratio of 
the number of boys to the number of girls that have attained level 5 or above. 
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Mexico, (-0.26). The ratio of male to female top performers in mathematics is also lower 
than for other emerging markets. 
 
 
4. Determinants of Educational Performance 
4.1 Estimation Strategy 
 
We adopt an educational production function approach. Such a function can most 
generally be described by; 
 
F(y,x) ≤C          (1) 
 
where y is a vector of educational outcomes and x is a vector of inputs. C is a positive 
scalar and F represents the educational technology that transforms x into y. Inputs 
comprise a set of school related factors such as class size, student-teacher ratios, 
measures of teacher quality and experience. Educational outcomes represent the 
cognitive development of the student as given by standardised test scores or 
examination results. If an educational technology changes, the production possibilities 
frontier can either shift inwards or outwards as F is a strictly quasi-concave, twice 
differentiable function which forms a convex production set. Educational production 
functions can be estimated empirically. Frontier estimation aimed at evaluating the 
performance of schools in relation to the production frontier can be either parametric 
or non-parametric. This approach would be particularly relevant when the aim is to 
identify those schools which have the best possible outcomes for a given level of inputs. 
An alternative approach, which we rely on in this paper, is to estimate the educational 
production function using parametric methods in order to examine whether higher 
resource levels are associated with better outcomes, when controlling for attributes, 
both individual and family as well as institutional78.  
Despite being widely used in helping design policy79, education production 
functions have obvious shortcomings. Aside from the matter of getting good, 
comparable measures of outcomes, they may be poor tools for measuring the complex 
classroom processes that underpin learning80. Further, modeling outcomes without 
                                                
78 For example, see Mayston and Jesson (1999).  
79 See Kann and Kiefer (2007) 
80 Goldhaber and Brewer (1997). 
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allowing for the hierarchical nature of the data – such as clusters of students in 
classrooms, classes within schools and schools within educational management systems 
– may be problematic81. However, the most common critique concerns the potential 
endogeneity of educational outcomes. For example, parents may be able to select better 
schools. As such if the link between socio-economic characteristics and funding is not 
fully controlled for, a model of educational attainment may generate a spurious negative 
correlation between school resources and achievement82. One way of addressing issues 
of endogeneity is to estimate a model that controls for the pupil’s initial ability and 
socio-economic background as well as other variables, such as gender and ethnicity. 
Information on parents’ origin, education and the number of books at home83, variables 
that will not, or are unlikely to, change over time can serve as a proxy for prior inputs, 
allowing a causal relationship to be imputed84.   
Aside from family background variables, we could also expect there to be other 
factors that affect the educational performance of individuals and which may be 
considered as inputs into the production of education. These include teaching and 
administrative inputs as well as other institutional factors. The type of relevant variables 
include, teacher-pupil ratios, measures of teaching experience (such as years), teacher 
education, library size, number of computers, audio-visual equipment, number and 
quality of laboratories as well as information on the ownership of the school 85 . 
Interestingly, existing research has found a weak or absent systematic relationship 
between school expenditures and student performance, particularly in developing and 
emerging markets86. Moreover, there may be measurement issues as commonly used 
variables —such as teacher experience or education – may not be closely correlated 
with actual ability in the classroom. Similarly, although there is some evidence that 
students tend to perform better in schools that have autonomy in personnel and day-to-
day decisions, measures of autonomy are hard to implement as it is generally a decision 
for a country (or state) as a whole, leaving no comparison group within countries87.  
                                                
81 See Goldstein (1987), (1995). 
82 See Vignoles et al (2000) where there is a wider discussion of the theoretical and empirical strengths 
and shortcomings of this approach. 
83 See Cooper and Chon (1997), Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1991) 
84 Ammermueller (2007) 
85 See the discussion in Cooper and Chon (1997) 
86 See Banerjee et al (2007); Duflo et al (2009), Hanushek and Woesmann (2010) 
87 See Hanushek and Woesmann (2007), (2010) 
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In sum, the educational performance of individuals is likely to be affected by 
several types of inputs ranging from family background to teaching and administrative 
inputs as well as institutional factors.  
 
4.2 Implementation 
 
We pool the PISA data for four rounds (viz., 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009). We include 
only individual observations from 35 countries that have been included in all rounds, 
which yield over 405,000 observations. For TIMSS, we pool the data from the first two 
rounds (1995 and 1997) as well as from the later rounds (2003 and 2007) yielding nearly 
157,000 and over 237,000 observations respectively. This separation is because the 
survey instrument changed significantly between 1997 and 2003 rounds, thereby 
limiting comparability. Year and country dummies are included in all estimates88. To 
ensure that pooling is appropriate, we implemented a Chow test to see whether the 
coefficients from the pooled estimation were significantly different from those done on 
the cross sections. A cumulative test on all the coefficients of the variables that we have 
used shows that is appropriate to pool89.  
We estimate initially by ordinary least squares (OLS), 
                                                             
(2) 
where ES = educational score for mathematics, science or reading, X is a vector of 
individual characteristics, Y is a vector of family attributes, Z is a vector of school-
specific features, while C and T signify country and year controls.  The ES variables are 
the individual test scores for each discipline registered in either PISA or TIMSS by each 
student. For the PISA estimates, the vector, X, contains a combination of an 
individual’s age, gender, where born and language spoken at home. Family attributes, Y, 
comprise where a parent has been born and parents’ educational level, as well as the 
number of books in the household. The school or institutional variables (Z) include 
school size, the share of females in the school, student/teacher ratio, share of certified 
                                                
88 For TIMSS 1995 and 1997, 25 country dummies are introduced; for the later rounds, 36.  
89 Results available on request 
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teachers, ratio of computers to students, whether a school is private or public as well as 
its location (urban or otherwise)90.  
To look at whether the explanatory variables affect individuals differently 
contingent on their position in the educational scores distribution, we also estimate 
quantile regressions, using the 10th, 50th and 90th.  In contrast to the OLS mean 
regression, a median regression estimator minimizes the sum of absolute errors instead 
of squared errors. Correspondingly, all other conditional quantile functions minimize an 
asymmetrically weighted sum of absolute errors91. Throughout, we report results from 
the baseline OLS specification as well as from the 10th, median and 90th quantiles. 
Tables 1a-1c provide results with the PISA data estimated separately for each of 
the three disciplines. Several things stand out. In the first place, family background 
variables have a strong, significant association with educational scores. In particular, 
parents with low education and/or being born abroad has a clear negative association 
with scores, suggesting that migrants may do systematically worse in tests. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the finding that speaking the test language at home is also 
positive and highly significant for all disciplines. This appears to have the largest effect 
for the lowest quantile. Similarly, having many books at home has a strong positive 
association with a student’s performance.  
Turning to the institutional variables, as regards school location, being in a 
larger towns or city is associated with higher scores in all disciplines. A higher ratio of 
students to teachers is consistently negatively signed, with the coefficient being larger 
for the upper quantile. Having a higher share of certified teachers is unambiguously 
good for test scores across all disciplines, as is having a higher share of girls among the 
students.  In terms of school ownership, being private has no clear association with 
educational outcomes. An indicator of school resources – the ratio of PCs to students – 
seems to be significantly correlated with reading scores but not robustly with scores in 
the other disciplines. The results of the pooled regressions are confirmed when 
implementing using cross sections. Although there are shifts in the size of coefficients 
                                                
90 Not that with the TIMSS estimates reported in the appendices, we have slightly different variables 
available both relative to PISA and across the two panels.  
91 For a discussion of the properties of quantile regressions, see Buchinsky (1998). Applications can be 
found, inter alia, in Chamberlain (1994), Eide and Showalter (1998), Fertig and Schmidt (2002) 
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across years, the signs are largely stable and congruent with those from the pooled 
model92. 
Appendix Tables 1a-1d contain similar estimations for science and mathematics 
for the pooled TIMSS data. The results broadly confirm the findings from the PISA 
estimates whether with regard to the sign and significance of family background 
variables or institutional features of the school. Due to the nature of the available 
variables, we are able to explore more the effect of greater autonomy, such as a school 
having its own mathematics or science curriculum. More autonomy seems to be 
associated with better scores, while budget shortfalls for instructional material act 
adversely on the test score. Interestingly, for 2003 and 2007, we can look at school 
composition effects. We find that having a higher share of disadvantaged children has a 
clear negative association with scores. Indeed, the effect of moving from a high (>50%) 
to a low (<10%) share is both large and highly significant93.  
We now extend the analysis by looking at how Russian scores relate to the rest 
of the sample in the pooled dataset. We do this by interacting each of the explanatory 
variables with a Russia dummy. Table 2 reports the results using only the 50% quantile. 
It shows that with regard to most explanatory variables, the interaction terms mostly 
indicate an amplification of the association between that variable and performance in 
the Russia case. The exceptions are the number of books at home, the share of certified 
teachers and the ratio of PCs to students where the signs of the interaction term switch 
and where each of these variables has a smaller association in Russia relative to other 
countries.  
 
4.2 Within-country estimates for Russia 
 
We now shift the analysis and use only Russian data to look at within-country variation. 
We start by running pooled estimations before exploring further some cross-sections. 
The latter also allows us to use explanatory variables that are available only in particular 
                                                
92 These estimates are available on request. 
93  Freeman et al (2010) use the 2007 TIMSS to estimate the relationship between scores and 
characteristics separately for each country, rather than by pooling. They also find large cross-country 
variation in the impact of background on educational scores. The Russia coefficients for the amount of 
books at home and parents’ education are not trivial, being at around the median point for the latter. 
There is a small positive coefficient on the female variable and no apparent effect from the native-born 
dummy.  
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years. Unfortunately, although both PISA and TIMSS are collected at a regional level, 
neither dataset provides region identifiers, except in the case of PISA 2009. 
Table 3 presents the pooled estimates for mathematics, reading and science using 
PISA. For brevity, the results for only the 50% quantile are reported. It can be seen that 
student-specific variables, such as age and gender have explanatory power. Age and 
being female mostly enters negatively and is often significant. Being female has a clear 
negative impact on maths scores and to a lesser extent on science scores, at least for the 
90% quantile. The reverse is true for reading where females perform better and across 
the distribution.  The variables for the individual or family’s migration status are mostly 
insignificant. However, speaking the test language at home is positive and highly 
significant for all disciplines. This has the largest effect for the lower quantiles. Having 
many books at home has a strong positive impact on a student’s performance and there 
is relatively little variation in the coefficient sizes across quantiles.  As with the pooled 
country estimates, having a parent with low education predictably exerts a negative and 
significant effect.   
With regard to the institutional variables, the estimations paint a more mixed 
picture. School location unambiguously affects performance with students located in 
larger towns or cities doing consistently better94. Indeed, performance declines almost 
monotonically with the size of the location in which the student studies. School size is 
linked with a small but consistently positive impact on scores while a higher ratio of 
students to teachers is consistently negative. However, the computer/student ratio is 
always insignificant, while the share of certified teachers appears to have some positive 
association only with reading and science.  Interestingly, a school being in private 
ownership is negative and significant. This may result from the fact that outright 
privatisation of schools has been very limited in Russia (although de facto privatisation 
of many school functions is widespread) with private schools not offering any quality 
premium.   
Looking at this evidence for Russia, variables capturing the student’s 
background, as well as school or institutional features are, as in the pooled cross-
country estimates, important in individual performance. Students whose parents are 
poorly educated and/or have fewer books at home do unambiguously worse at these 
                                                
94 We would have liked to control for region or oblast but were unable as yet to get the data from the 
Russia national teams collecting the data. 
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tests, while being schooled in a village or small town also has a negative association with 
performance. Resource based views gain some credence, in that fewer teachers and, in 
some cases, fewer certified teachers have a deleterious effect on scores. Private 
ownership also has a negative effect.  With TIMSS data, Appendix Tables 2a-2b report 
results that are largely consistent with those using PISA. 
In an extension of this analysis using individual cross-sections for 2000, 2003, 
2006 and 2009 the broad findings reported here are upheld. In addition, some 
additional variables available for selective years can be used.  Thus, in 2000 and 2003 
having a parent in full time work had positive association with scores for all disciplines, 
although this was weakest for the 90th quantile.  Having a parent with tertiary education 
similarly had a strong positive association. Turning to measures of pedagogy or school 
management, the 2003 data allow looking at whether the number of instructional weeks 
and the frequency of testing have any association with scores. Both variables have a 
negative impact, although this is not always significant. Having streaming for students 
appears to have had a positive impact, particularly for mathematics scores in 2006, but 
had no impact when used in the 2003 cross-section estimate. A measure of greater 
school autonomy - derived from responses to questions concerning school level 
discretion over decisions on admissions, as well as hiring/firing and compensation of 
teachers - has some positive – but weak – correlation with scores with varying 
significance over disciplines and years. The 2006 round further introduced indicators 
for the extent to which a school was responsible for allocating resources and its 
curricula. Interestingly, greater autonomy by these measures has no evident impact on 
scores suggesting that decentralisation has not necessarily yielded beneficial results.  
Indeed, both private ownership and delegation appear not to have had any significant 
positive effect on scores in Russia.  
We also explore the sub-national dimension using the 2009 PISA data where 
region or oblast identifiers are available95. As shown by the distributional plot of the 
mathematics scores in Figure 8, the main cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg largely 
dominate other regions. This is also confirmed by quantile and OLS regressions where a 
dummy for the city of Moscow and Saint Petersburg is positive and significant, 
                                                
95 In Russia, PISA is implemented in a three stage sampling. In the first stage, geographical areas are 
sampled using probability proportional to size sampling. In the second stage, schools are sampled and 
finally, students are sampled within schools. 
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indicating that students in these cities perform consistently better then students from 
other regions96. 
 Finally, the quantile regressions generally suggest that there are relatively few 
statistically significant differences between different parts of the performance 
distribution regarding the impact of individual and family background variables. 
Estimating inter-quantile differences – specifically the 90%-10% difference - for the 
different discipline scores - for individual and family background variables in PISA, only 
age and sex and having many books at home have any significant differential effect. 
With TIMSS, among individual attributes, age and sex have some statistically different 
impact for the 10th versus the 90th quantiles97.  With regard to school level variables, the 
PISA results again pick out almost no significant differences, except for the share of 
girls in a school and, in the case of reading, the ratio of computers to students. With 
TIMSS, some of the location variables matter differentially as does shortage of teaching 
materials. 
 What do the Russian estimates tell us that are different from the pooled, cross-
country estimates? The answer is that the same individual and family background 
variables have explanatory power but it is with respect to the school or institutional 
features that differences enter. In particular, private schools have no positive impact on 
scores, the effects of teacher certification are either absent or weak, while the impact of 
financial resources – whether in aggregate or disaggregated – has a smaller and less 
significant association than in the larger multi-country estimates. Other factors, such as 
the student/teacher ratio, the share of girls, the location of the school and the share of 
disadvantaged students maintain similar signs and significance as in the larger sample. 
With the TIMSS data, having some autonomy over the curriculum is associated with 
better mathematics and science scores. 
 
4.3 Multilevel specification 
 
PISA and TIMMS have a multistage sampling design where schools are sampled first 
followed by students. As such, the dataset has multi-levels that may be selected with 
unequal probabilities that may make estimates, such as those we have used above, 
                                                
96 Results available on request 
97 For brevity, we do not report the results from the inter-quantile differences for reading, mathematics 
and science estimated using both PISA and TIMSS data. 
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biased. One way to deal with this is to use sampling weights in a multilevel linear 
model98, aimed at modelling the natural clustering of observations in groups (e.g. 
students in schools). Below, we use a two level random intercept model where the 
response  of unit i in cluster j can be specified as follows, 
 
 
 and  are vectors of the explanatory variables,  are the fixed regression 
coefficient and  are the multivariate random effect varying over cluster.   contains 
cluster specific effects of the covariates x given the random effects  .  
Table 4 report results from the Russia pooled PISA data.  It can be seen that the 
signs and significance closely replicate the results we have reported above. There are 
some differences, for example in PISA being located in a village is the only location 
variable that is significant in the case of mathematics. Yet, overall these estimates 
strongly confirm our earlier estimates that do not explicitly take into account the 
multilevel nature of the data. The TIMSS random intercept estimates indicate that 
student/teacher ratios, shortage of available resources are associated with lower scores99. 
An indicator of autonomy – whether a school can develop its own math and science 
curricula enters with a strongly positive and significant sign. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our paper has used two large datasets of educational scores – PISA and TIMSS - with 
repeated cross-sections to look at the association between scores and individual and 
family attributes as well as school and institutional features. The results presented in the 
main text of the paper are mostly from PISA due to the way in which scores are 
measured in that dataset and their cross-country comparability. However, throughout 
we complement the analysis by use of TIMSS which evaluates relative to a country’s 
curriculum. Our approach involves estimating an education production function using 
OLS and quantile regressions for a series of pooled datasets with multi-country 
observations over time. We also use interactions of the explanatory variables with a 
Russia dummy to examine whether Russia is different and, if so, in what ways. Further, 
                                                
98  Hesketh and Skrondal 2006 
99 TIMSS results available on request 
 161 
we analyse only the Russia data, pooling across years. As a cross-check, we also 
estimated discrete regressions using the cross-sectional evidence. Finally, we explicitly 
took into account the multilevel nature of the data and estimated using random 
intercepts and school weighting. The results were broadly consistent with our earlier 
estimates. 
  Clearly measuring educational achievements across and within countries is 
challenging for a variety of reasons, some of which we have mentioned above. The 
cross-country descriptive statistics highlight – particularly in the case of PISA – that 
Russia suffers from a relative weakness in reading skills. There has been no 
improvement over time. In both mathematics and science, Russian scores are un-
trended and remain slightly below the OECD core. Moreover - and likely to be 
particularly relevant when discussing the scope for innovation – top performers account 
for a relatively low share of students in all disciplines with either a deterioration over 
time (as with mathematics) or no discernible trend. Put in cross-country perspective, the 
share of top students in all disciplines has remained very significantly below the leading 
Asian and European countries, although superior to another leading emerging market, 
Brazil.  Further, in PISA particularly, there is a relatively large dispersion in scores 
across all disciplines for Russia. While scores from TIMSS show relatively strong 
performance in both mathematics and science this may be because of the way they are 
measured, viz., being related to the current curriculum. Given the problems that have 
been widely reported with the curricula100, these scores may flatter. 
The paper is able to pin down a robust association between scores and 
characteristics in common with findings from the wider literature. For the pooled cross 
country estimations using PISA, we find clear evidence that educational outcomes are 
robustly correlated with a number of individual and family background variables. For 
the latter, in particular, the number of books at home and parents’ educational level has 
a strong association. The evidence regarding institutional factors pins down the 
importance of location – with an unambiguous negative association between scores and 
size of the location in which a student resides, as well as the student-teacher ratio and 
the share of certified teachers in a given school. The evidence from TIMSS largely 
confirms these results with some extensions, due to the nature of the available variables. 
                                                
100 See, for example, Canning (2004), as well as various World Bank reports on the educational sector; 
www.worldbank.org 
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In particular, measures signalling greater autonomy at the level of the school and the 
intensity of classes are positively signed and also significant. 
When turning to the Russia data from PISA and TIMSS and looking at the 
within country variation, we find some similarity with the base estimates using the 
cross-country evidence. Thus, broadly the same individual and family background 
variables have explanatory power but it is with respect to the institutional measures that 
the picture becomes more mixed. Location – as in the multi-country sample – matters, 
while school size seems to have a positive association. Ownership has no significance, 
although this may well be related to the fact that the number of de jure private schools in 
Russia is fairly small. There is also some support for a resource-based view in that fewer 
teachers have an adverse association with scores. The student-teacher ratio is 
consistently significant. Indeed, looking at the marginal effects in cross-sectional 
estimates using the Russia PISA data, we found that the elasticity was around -0.1.  The 
cross-sectional evidence also identifies – using a number of variables – greater 
autonomy, notably with respect to curriculum setting, as being positively related to 
scores.  The quantile regressions suggest relatively few significant differences across the 
distribution, whether from individual, family or institutional factors.   
Finally, while measures such as PISA and TIMSS are particularly helpful for 
cross-country comparison and benchmarking, they are less suitable for designing policy 
at national or sub-national level. Nevertheless, our paper suggests that aside from 
persistent and hard-to-shift factors relating to family background, there are a number of 
policy options that are likely to help student scores. They range from providing 
additional resources, including facilitating lower student-teacher ratios, to greater 
autonomy for schools.  Local changes to curricula, for example, appear to be positively 
correlated with scores. The variation in scores across locations (and likely across 
regions) is substantial. Students in larger urban centres – particularly Moscow and St. 
Petersburg - perform notably better than those in smaller settlements, again suggesting 
considerable scope for policy driven improvements aimed at reducing the large spatial 
variation that exists in the country.  
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Figure 1 PISA Reading Scores, 2000-2009 
 
Figure 2 PISA Mathematics Scores, 2000-2009 
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Figure 3: PISA Science Scores: 2000-2009 
 
 
Figure 4: TIMSS Scores, 1995-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 168 
Figure 5 TIMSS Scores, 1995-2007 
 
 
 
Figure 6: PISA Russia percentage of top performer 
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Figure 7: Gender Gap in Mathematics and Reading (PISA) 
 
 
 
Figure 8: PISA 2009 – Russia Region Scores 
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Table 1a PISA Pooled – All Countries 
 OLS Quantile 50% Quantile 10% Quantile 90% 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES MATH 
     
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
age -10.83*** -11.02*** -10.53*** -9.027*** 
 (1.124) (1.201) (1.772) (1.419) 
Female Dummy -15.90*** -15.84*** -10.93*** -21.70*** 
 (0.626) (0.676) (0.950) (0.826) 
Student Born in 
Foreign Country 
-2.649 -4.083** -2.092 -0.354 
 (1.766) (1.856) (2.454) (2.357) 
Mother Born in 
Foreign Country 
-3.596** -4.985*** -4.489** -1.697 
 (1.567) (1.552) (2.194) (2.086) 
Father Born in 
Foreign Country 
-7.566*** -8.945*** -9.272*** -7.247*** 
 (1.553) (1.542) (2.213) (2.095) 
Test Language 
Spoken at Home 
16.35*** 13.85*** 15.98*** 15.12*** 
 (0.907) (0.957) (1.499) (1.108) 
Low mother edu -14.62*** -15.46*** -9.920*** -20.58*** 
 (0.817) (0.902) (1.388) (0.950) 
Low father edu -12.53*** -12.92*** -7.318*** -17.04*** 
 (0.773) (0.868) (1.336) (0.934) 
Many books at home 35.11*** 35.30*** 36.07*** 29.32*** 
 (0.740) (0.773) (1.127) (0.964) 
School Characteristics 
Schl size 0.00600*** 0.00648*** 0.00492*** 0.00612*** 
 (0.000556) (0.000628) (0.000925) (0.000613) 
Pc girls 16.52*** 14.82*** 23.58*** 9.905*** 
 (1.596) (1.704) (2.424) (2.059) 
Student/teacher -0.620*** -0.563*** -0.513*** -0.853*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0592) (0.0871) (0.0709) 
Prop certified 
teacher 
7.704*** 7.492*** 10.56*** 1.420 
 (1.218) (1.345) (1.935) (1.681) 
Computer/sch size 0.187 0.302 -19.39*** 1.483 
 (0.695) (0.566) (0.339) (0.996) 
Private school -0.289 -2.298* 0.414 -1.663 
 (1.179) (1.313) (1.797) (1.607) 
Village  -2.547** -2.936** 3.252** -7.217*** 
 (1.068) (1.185) (1.608) (1.406) 
Small Town -3.687*** -5.479*** 2.075 -6.379*** 
 (0.841) (0.918) (1.306) (1.092) 
Town -1.740** -2.168** -0.942 -3.910*** 
 (0.800) (0.849) (1.232) (1.048) 
 (3.961) (1.721) (2.325) (2.103) 
Constant 596.9*** 523.6*** 393.3*** 630.2*** 
 (18.54) (19.11) (28.31) (22.55) 
     
Observations 430,745 430,745 430,745 430,745 
R-squared 0.429    
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year, 
Countries and Grades dummy included but not reported. Countries included: AUS, AUT, 
BEL, BRA, CAN, CHE, CZE, DUE, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC, HKG, HUN, IND, IRL, ISL, 
ITA, JPN, KOR, LIE, LUX, LVA, MEX, NDL, NOR, NZL, POL, PRT, RUS, SWE, THA, USA.   
 
Table 1b PISA Pooled – All Countries 
 OLS Quantile 50% Quantile 10% Quantile 90% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES READING 
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
age -10.12*** -9.613*** -11.61*** -7.273*** 
 (1.027) (1.175) (1.721) (1.252) 
Female Dummy 23.62*** 21.99*** 29.23*** 16.45*** 
 (0.587) (0.666) (0.934) (0.745) 
Student Born in 
Foreign Country 
-5.417*** -3.968** -12.73*** -4.400** 
 (1.803) (1.837) (2.434) (2.178) 
Mother Born in 
Foreign Country 
-2.411* -5.109*** -2.052 -1.799 
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 (1.460) (1.521) (1.992) (1.870) 
Father Born in 
Foreign Country 
-7.370*** -7.968*** -8.345*** -3.036 
 (1.465) (1.502) (2.083) (1.863) 
Test Language 
Spoken at Home 
24.35*** 21.16*** 23.59*** 20.46*** 
 (0.822) (0.918) (1.426) (0.990) 
Low mother edu -15.31*** -15.35*** -9.888*** -20.08*** 
 (0.760) (0.896) (1.367) (0.943) 
Low father edu -10.58*** -10.28*** -7.262*** -14.94*** 
 (0.719) (0.869) (1.307) (0.902) 
Many books at home 29.32*** 29.41*** 34.54*** 17.42*** 
 (0.691) (0.755) (1.101) (0.865) 
School Characteristics 
Schl size 0.00840*** 0.00851*** 0.00831*** 0.00841*** 
 (0.000562) (0.000639) (0.00101) (0.000579) 
Pc girls 22.92*** 20.70*** 31.85*** 14.70*** 
 (1.426) (1.613) (2.342) (1.741) 
Student/teacher -0.548*** -0.555*** -0.156* -0.840*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0568) (0.0806) (0.0613) 
Prop certified 
teacher 
8.090*** 7.266*** 11.34*** 6.216*** 
 (1.039) (1.272) (1.798) (1.389) 
Computer/sch size 0.836** 1.530*** -9.357*** 0.836 
 (0.333) (0.420) (0.245) (0.537) 
Private school -2.058** -4.101*** -5.251*** -3.154** 
 (1.041) (1.241) (1.728) (1.415) 
Village  -8.274*** -9.831*** -3.815** -10.96*** 
 (0.980) (1.147) (1.576) (1.225) 
Small Town -9.610*** -10.38*** -8.000*** -10.19*** 
 (0.800) (0.904) (1.327) (0.989) 
Town -4.230*** -5.062*** -4.312*** -6.919*** 
 (0.742) (0.832) (1.183) (0.925) 
Constant 541.7*** 473.9*** 351.7*** 578.0*** 
 (16.76) (18.64) (27.37) (19.79) 
     
Observations 482,119 482,119 482,119 482,119 
R-squared 0.373    
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year, 
Countries and Grades dummy included but not reported. Countries included: AUS, AUT, 
BEL, BRA, CAN, CHE, CZE, DUE, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC, HKG, HUN, IND, IRL, ISL, 
ITA, JPN, KOR, LIE, LUX, LVA, MEX, NDL, NOR, NZL, POL, PRT, RUS, SWE, THA, USA.   
 
Table 1c PISA Pooled – All Countries 
 OLS Quantile 50% Quantile 10% Quantile 90% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SCIENCE 
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
age -6.867*** -7.662*** -7.671*** -6.547*** 
 (1.120) (1.331) (1.839) (1.503) 
Female Dummy -8.280*** -8.539*** -1.501 -15.27*** 
 (0.635) (0.749) (1.021) (0.878) 
Student Born in 
Foreign Country 
0.255 3.336 -4.894* 0.879 
 (1.880) (2.052) (2.754) (2.451) 
Mother Born in 
Foreign Country 
-6.868*** -10.57*** -8.337*** -6.934*** 
 (1.633) (1.727) (2.487) (2.122) 
Father Born in 
Foreign Country 
-10.60*** -12.28*** -10.68*** -9.585*** 
 (1.583) (1.684) (2.425) (2.039) 
Test Language 
Spoken at Home 
17.33*** 13.57*** 16.62*** 14.19*** 
 (0.867) (1.047) (1.549) (1.137) 
Low mother edu -15.83*** -16.78*** -10.21*** -21.72*** 
 (0.783) (0.990) (1.399) (1.039) 
Low father edu -12.54*** -11.32*** -6.848*** -17.82*** 
 (0.747) (0.960) (1.342) (0.999) 
Many books at home 37.00*** 37.65*** 35.06*** 30.16*** 
 (0.743) (0.854) (1.226) (1.018) 
School Characteristics 
Schl size 0.00644*** 0.00726*** 0.00531*** 0.00578*** 
 (0.000571) (0.000699) (0.00103) (0.000691) 
Pc girls 22.50*** 21.65*** 24.82*** 14.62*** 
 (1.614) (1.887) (2.681) (2.173) 
Student/teacher -0.550*** -0.541*** -0.441*** -0.642*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0658) (0.0975) (0.0739) 
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Prop certified 
teacher 
12.63*** 11.27*** 15.41*** 9.029*** 
 (1.188) (1.486) (2.108) (1.685) 
Computer/sch size 0.260 0.349 -12.11*** 0.684 
 (0.533) (0.582) (0.353) (0.722) 
Private school 3.680*** 1.626 1.326 1.569 
 (1.212) (1.459) (1.904) (1.860) 
Village  -3.277*** -1.637 1.643 -9.354*** 
 (1.069) (1.302) (1.778) (1.459) 
Small Town -3.096*** -3.976*** 0.460 -5.100*** 
 (0.862) (1.017) (1.408) (1.191) 
Town 0.176 -0.599 1.185 -2.302** 
 (0.816) (0.942) (1.294) (1.116) 
 (0)    
Constant 445.4*** 470.0*** 334.2*** 593.3*** 
 (17.74) (21.19) (29.10) (23.70) 
     
Observations 430,667 430,667 430,667 430,667 
R-squared 0.348    
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year, 
Countries and Grades dummy included but not reported. Countries included: AUS, AUT, 
BEL, BRA, CAN, CHE, CZE, DUE, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC, HKG, HUN, IND, IRL, ISL, 
ITA, JPN, KOR, LIE, LUX, LVA, MEX, NDL, NOR, NZL, POL, PRT, RUS, SWE, THA, USA.   
 
Table 2 PISA – Russia interactions 
Quantile  50% 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  MATH READING SCIENCE 
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
age  -9.098*** -7.264*** -7.939*** 
  (1.209) (1.089) (1.255) 
Female Dummy  -17.26*** 20.90*** -9.401*** 
  (0.688) (0.627) (0.715) 
Student Born in 
Foreign Country 
 -4.346** -7.595*** -1.209 
  (1.986) (1.812) (2.061) 
Mother Born in 
Foreign Country 
 -5.107*** -4.462*** -13.28*** 
  (1.645) (1.474) (1.712) 
Father Born in 
Foreign Country 
 -11.19*** -11.17*** -15.07*** 
  (1.649) (1.473) (1.676) 
Test Language 
Spoken at Home 
 12.64*** 18.49*** 10.23*** 
  (0.948) (0.834) (0.969) 
Low mother edu  -15.07*** -15.77*** -16.13*** 
  (0.871) (0.792) (0.893) 
Low father edu  -12.87*** -9.861*** -11.01*** 
  (0.840) (0.774) (0.870) 
Many books at home  36.07*** 29.94*** 38.69*** 
  (0.780) (0.703) (0.806) 
School Characteristics 
Schl size  0.00589*** 0.00724*** 0.00696*** 
  (0.000623) (0.000584) (0.000649) 
Pc girls  13.67*** 18.47*** 19.54*** 
  (1.680) (1.459) (1.741) 
Student/teacher  -0.406*** -0.395*** -0.417*** 
  (0.0597) (0.0528) (0.0622) 
Prop certified 
teacher 
 7.902*** 7.656*** 8.940*** 
  (1.366) (1.203) (1.413) 
Computer/sch size  0.484 1.563*** 0.470 
  (0.539) (0.366) (0.534) 
Private school  -2.092* -3.422*** 1.444 
  (1.259) (1.090) (1.309) 
Village   0.465 -5.042*** 1.964 
  (1.236) (1.107) (1.271) 
Small Town  -4.902*** -8.876*** -3.299*** 
  (0.930) (0.843) (0.965) 
Town  -1.570* -3.152*** 0.948 
  (0.865) (0.782) (0.900) 
Interaction Terms 
Russia * age  -17.65*** -24.84*** -9.636*** 
  (3.285) (2.835) (3.400) 
Russia * Female 
Dummy 
 7.927*** 8.050*** 5.816*** 
  (1.896) (1.645) (1.968) 
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Russia * Student 
Born in Foreign 
Country 
 0.179 11.26*** 15.36*** 
  (4.331) (3.839) (4.463) 
Russia * Mother 
Born in Foreign 
Country 
 2.338 3.002 12.22*** 
  (3.670) (3.260) (3.822) 
Russia *Father 
Born in Foreign 
Country 
 8.249** 13.26*** 11.32*** 
  (3.564) (3.146) (3.678) 
Russia * Test 
Language Spoken at 
Home 
 13.74*** 25.15*** 28.20*** 
  (3.494) (3.048) (3.628) 
Russia *  Low 
mother edu 
 -2.153 -9.305** -10.71** 
  (5.028) (4.133) (5.300) 
Russia * Low 
father edu 
 0.717 -4.844 -8.348* 
  (4.232) (3.525) (4.476) 
Russia *  Many 
books at home 
 -10.87*** -7.060*** -15.00*** 
  (2.296) (1.970) (2.385) 
Russia * Schl size  0.00434* 0.0133*** 0.00544** 
  (0.00226) (0.00199) (0.00232) 
Russia *  Pc girls  11.13* 29.89*** 21.82*** 
  (6.466) (5.672) (6.706) 
Russia *  
Student/teacher 
 -2.317*** -2.092*** -2.866*** 
  (0.179) (0.153) (0.186) 
Russia * Prop 
certified teacher 
 -8.027** -8.492*** 14.37*** 
  (3.742) (3.017) (3.879) 
Russia * 
Computer/sch size 
 -48.57*** -59.00*** 13.03 
  (8.661) (8.013) (8.999) 
Russia * Private 
school 
 -16.92 -30.19*** -36.75*** 
  (10.35) (9.687) (10.75) 
Russia *  Village   -30.18*** -31.06*** -34.73*** 
  (3.141) (2.680) (3.245) 
Russia * Small 
Town 
 -11.67*** -13.27*** -14.43*** 
  (2.755) (2.425) (2.858) 
Russia * Town  -11.58*** -14.29*** -15.89*** 
  (2.385) (2.066) (2.471) 
Constant  847.6*** 863.7*** 682.0*** 
  (49.61) (42.57) (51.41) 
     
Observations  430,745 482,119 430,667 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year, 
Countries and Grade dummies included but not reported. 
 
Table 3 PISA Russia estimates 
Quantile 50% 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES MATH READING SCIENCE 
Individual and Family Characteristics 
Age -21.59*** -19.64*** -14.68*** 
 (4.295) (3.742) (4.318) 
Female Dummy -9.606*** 29.48*** -2.861 
 (2.225) (1.940) (2.243) 
Student Born in 
Foreign Country 
-4.499 2.777 12.22** 
 (4.847) (4.325) (4.845) 
Mother Born in 
Foreign Country 
-1.548 -2.981 -4.128 
 (4.127) (3.712) (4.188) 
Father Born in 
Foreign Country 
-2.961 5.653 -3.129 
 (3.973) (3.546) (4.011) 
Test Language 
Spoken at Home 
27.39*** 40.67*** 40.31*** 
 (4.230) (3.738) (4.246) 
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Low mother edu -17.00*** -24.52*** -28.99*** 
 (6.229) (5.183) (6.355) 
Low father edu -13.80*** -17.89*** -16.80*** 
 (5.229) (4.403) (5.364) 
Many books at home 26.44*** 22.20*** 25.33*** 
 (2.736) (2.358) (2.762) 
School Characteristics 
Schl size 0.0106*** 0.0214*** 0.0120*** 
 (0.00273) (0.00243) (0.00275) 
Pc girls 29.77*** 43.34*** 41.76*** 
 (7.867) (7.001) (7.937) 
Student/teacher -2.560*** -2.729*** -2.844*** 
 (0.215) (0.186) (0.217) 
Prop certified 
teacher 
-0.169 10.67*** 14.90*** 
 (4.682) (3.759) (4.711) 
Computer/sch size -5.832 6.779 6.755 
 (12.10) (11.49) (12.23) 
Private school -14.54 -30.41** -29.55** 
 (12.81) (12.32) (13.07) 
Village  -29.05*** -40.77*** -29.04*** 
 (3.659) (3.140) (3.673) 
Small Town -13.52*** -21.68*** -16.09*** 
 (3.292) (2.918) (3.317) 
Town -10.97*** -17.40*** -14.20*** 
 (2.796) (2.437) (2.817) 
Constant 689.7*** 543.8*** 539.2*** 
 (70.47) (61.84) (70.55) 
    
Observations 12,719 15,308 12,716 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and 
Grades dummy included but not reported. 
 
 
Table 4 PISA: Multilevel estimation 
GLLAMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES MATH READING SCIENCE 
    
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
Age 17.72*** 12.38*** 15.53*** 
 (3.184) (2.258) (2.992) 
Female dummy -12.37*** 27.93*** -7.654*** 
 (1.775) (1.299) (1.932) 
Student born in 
foreign country  
-5.730* -3.405 2.529 
 (3.400) (2.919) (3.910) 
Mother born in 
foreign country 
-2.590 -3.521 -2.124 
 (2.931) (2.468) (3.182) 
Father born in 
foreign country 
-3.581 0.652 -5.136 
 (2.974) (2.373) (3.308) 
Test language at 
home 
19.05*** 27.36*** 29.28*** 
 (6.642) (2.909) (5.110) 
Low mother 
education 
-26.27*** -22.67*** -35.43*** 
 (5.704) (5.314) (5.588) 
Low father 
education 
-12.19* -10.16** -15.68*** 
 (6.510) (4.607) (5.495) 
Many books at 
home 
33.52*** 29.20*** 28.04*** 
 (1.918) (1.439) (1.954) 
School Characteristics 
School size 0.00209 0.00451* 0.00135 
 (0.00657) (0.00265) (0.00586) 
Percentage of 
girls 
26.96 22.72*** 17.43 
 (24.89) (7.881) (18.88) 
Student/teacher -1.621*** -1.245*** -1.494*** 
 (0.618) (0.217) (0.578) 
Proportion 
certified 
teachers 
16.59* 8.433 17.93** 
 175 
 (9.331) (5.543) (7.895) 
Computers/school 
size 
-9.488 15.70 -1.840 
 (28.86) (12.42) (25.90) 
Private School 
dummy 
-25.52** -40.79*** -29.93*** 
 (10.33) (3.963) (7.778) 
School in village -9.194 -18.60*** -17.61** 
 (9.349) (3.463) (7.349) 
School in small 
town 
-5.352 -17.23*** -12.74** 
 (8.805) (3.060) (6.412) 
School in town 33.41 12.98 18.11 
 (144.8) (31,687) (941.7) 
Lns1 4.385 4.341 4.429*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00583) (0.00773) 
School 47.45 41.65 42.34*** 
 (2.387) (1.679) (2.259) 
    
Observations 12,719 15,308 12,716 
Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year and Grade Dummy 
and constant included but not reported. 
Gllamm estimates use the following weight (weighting follows Longford 1995a,  
1996):  
gen sqw= w_fstuwt^2 
egen sumsqw=sum(sqw), by( schoolid2 ) 
egen sumw=sum( w_fstuwt ), by ( schoolid2 ) 
gen pwt1s1= w_fstuwt* sumw/ sumsqw 
final weight is the inverse of pwt1s1  
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Table 1a TIMSS Pooled – All Countries 1995 and 1999 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE- 
MATH SCORES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Quantile 50% Quantile 10% Quantile 90% 
     
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
Student Age -0.07* -0.11*** 0.00 0.05 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.047) (0.049) 
Female Dummy -9.14*** -10.34*** -3.43** -13.23*** 
 (0.670) (0.823) (1.153) (1.039) 
Test language at home 23.54*** 22.87*** 22.45*** 24.22*** 
 (1.104) (1.282) (1.796) (1.715) 
Student born in test 
country  
11.94*** 11.32*** 16.06*** 5.01* 
 (1.478) (1.721) (2.532) (2.127) 
Mother born in test 
country 
-2.78 -2.29 5.71* -8.80*** 
 (1.643) (2.038) (2.849) (2.387) 
Father born in test 
country 
5.76*** 4.92* 5.14 7.19** 
 (1.584) (2.020) (2.720) (2.348) 
Books at home 0-10 -74.20*** -74.03*** -74.76*** -72.53*** 
 (1.322) (1.542) (2.262) (1.965) 
Books at home 11-25 -55.79*** -58.19*** -52.99*** -54.60*** 
 (1.147) (1.395) (1.987) (1.740) 
Books at home 26-100 -34.25*** -35.17*** -31.30*** -35.52*** 
 (0.980) (1.206) (1.666) (1.519) 
Books at home 101-200 -12.69*** -13.04*** -9.10*** -14.21*** 
 (1.079) (1.335) (1.853) (1.714) 
School Characteristics 
Student/teacher -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.07 -0.31*** 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.056) (0.055) 
School in isolated 
area 
-16.10*** -16.54*** -13.00*** -15.13*** 
 (1.736) (2.155) (3.160) (2.518) 
School in village -21.42*** -20.56*** -19.43*** -21.37*** 
 (0.954) (1.162) (1.634) (1.463) 
School in outskirt of 
town 
-4.42*** -4.84*** -2.63 -5.10*** 
 (0.800) (0.985) (1.406) (1.237) 
School own math 
curriculum 
11.21*** 10.46*** 10.51*** 11.18*** 
 (0.834) (1.048) (1.408) (1.261) 
Shortage 
instructional 
material- a little 
-6.66*** -6.39*** -5.16*** -7.60*** 
 (0.850) (1.040) (1.488) (1.303) 
Shortage 
instructional 
material- some 
-9.64*** -9.80*** -6.28*** -10.74*** 
 (0.968) (1.198) (1.680) (1.535) 
Shortage 
instructional 
material- a lot 
-10.23*** -10.89*** -6.52** -10.44*** 
 (1.185) (1.424) (2.059) (1.788) 
     
Observations 156,820 156,820 156,820 156,820 
R-squared 0.43    
Robust standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Constant, 
year and country dummies included but not reported below. Countries included: 
Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Check Rep, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Neatherland, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovak Rep, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, USA, England, Belgium 
Omitted dummies: the number of books at home > 200; school location is school located 
close to town/city centre; Shortage instructional material none. 
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Table 1b TIMSS Pooled – All Countries 1995 and 1999 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE- 
SCIENCE SCORES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Quantile 50% Quantile 10% Quantile 90% 
     
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
Student Age 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.15*** 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.048) (0.044) 
Female Dummy -20.76*** -22.91*** -13.91*** -24.41*** 
 (0.709) (0.905) (1.211) (0.978) 
Test language at home 33.08*** 31.13*** 30.78*** 28.60*** 
 (1.192) (1.412) (2.025) (1.604) 
Student born in test 
country  
10.55*** 8.77*** 18.25*** 2.70 
 (1.578) (1.894) (2.715) (1.952) 
Mother born in test 
country 
1.66 1.55 6.72* -2.46 
 (1.816) (2.254) (2.915) (2.345) 
Father born in test 
country 
10.54*** 10.42*** 11.86*** 9.75*** 
 (1.770) (2.219) (2.914) (2.281) 
Books at home 0-10 -78.50*** -77.87*** -76.29*** -78.31*** 
 (1.379) (1.696) (2.372) (1.856) 
Books at home 11-25 -59.85*** -60.51*** -55.60*** -62.22*** 
 (1.232) (1.534) (2.117) (1.641) 
Books at home 26-100 -38.04*** -38.85*** -33.69*** -41.22*** 
 (1.042) (1.325) (1.730) (1.438) 
Books at home 101-200 -15.28*** -15.83*** -11.98*** -18.12*** 
 (1.161) (1.468) (1.959) (1.596) 
School Characteristics 
Student/teacher -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.04 -0.40*** 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.055) (0.054) 
School in isolated 
area 
-7.79*** -4.99* -8.30* -9.41*** 
 (1.816) (2.365) (3.406) (2.292) 
School in village -15.52*** -14.02*** -14.41*** -13.39*** 
 (1.033) (1.275) (1.724) (1.399) 
School in outskirt of 
town 
0.07 -0.02 2.87* -1.72 
 (0.836) (1.084) (1.448) (1.182) 
School own math 
curriculum 
10.97*** 10.36*** 9.91*** 9.60*** 
 (0.853) (1.116) (1.529) (1.148) 
Shortage 
instructional 
material- a little 
-6.19*** -5.39*** -6.47*** -7.27*** 
 (0.906) (1.145) (1.563) (1.250) 
Shortage 
instructional 
material- some 
-8.45*** -7.33*** -4.09* -11.14*** 
 (1.014) (1.317) (1.738) (1.449) 
Shortage 
instructional 
material- a lot 
-9.16*** -7.62*** -7.46*** -8.97*** 
 (1.264) (1.569) (2.167) (1.676) 
     
Observations 156,391 156,391 156,391 156,391 
R-squared 0.38    
Robust standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Constant, 
year and country dummies included but not reported below. Countries included: 
Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Check Rep, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Neatherland, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovak Rep, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, USA, England, Belgium.  
Omitted dummies: the number of books at home > 200; school location is school located 
close to town/city centre; Shortage instructional material no 
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Table 1c TIMSS Pooled – All Countries 2003 and 2007 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE- 
MATH SCORES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Quantile 50% Quantile 10% Quantile 90% 
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
 
AGE -14.76*** -15.42*** -15.30*** -14.09*** 
 (0.442) (0.498) (0.711) (0.507) 
Female dummy -3.44*** -4.91*** 1.25 -7.57*** 
 (0.544) (0.642) (0.834) (0.728) 
books at home 1 shelf 7.12*** 7.43*** 9.46*** 5.02*** 
 (0.828) (0.956) (1.215) (1.096) 
books at home 1 
bookcase 
26.13*** 27.28*** 27.21*** 26.51*** 
 (0.863) (0.995) (1.312) (1.137) 
books at home 2 
bookcase 
38.26*** 39.26*** 36.99*** 38.25*** 
 (1.041) (1.207) (1.634) (1.372) 
books at home >=3 
bookcase 
46.21*** 49.85*** 41.50*** 47.59*** 
 (1.038) (1.217) (1.680) (1.343) 
Mother has ISCED 2  0.73 0.10 3.62* 1.41 
 (0.992) (1.140) (1.508) (1.282) 
Mother has ISCED 3 7.16*** 7.24*** 7.15*** 6.65*** 
 (0.935) (1.089) (1.414) (1.257) 
Mother has ISCED 4 13.31*** 13.54*** 13.09*** 13.67*** 
 (1.005) (1.188) (1.522) (1.446) 
Mother has ISCED 5 16.35*** 16.08*** 18.24*** 13.96*** 
 (1.410) (1.697) (2.239) (1.984) 
Mother has 1st degree 23.47*** 22.31*** 22.34*** 22.66*** 
 (1.231) (1.488) (1.961) (1.735) 
Mother has > 1st degree 16.48*** 16.04*** 15.83*** 14.99*** 
 (1.229) (1.511) (1.978) (1.722) 
Father has ISCED 2  -1.67 -0.17 -3.75* -4.72*** 
 (1.030) (1.176) (1.576) (1.298) 
Father has ISCED 3 4.29*** 4.07*** 4.57** 1.64 
 (0.924) (1.084) (1.403) (1.245) 
Father has ISCED 4 6.55*** 7.02*** 7.21*** 3.87** 
 (0.981) (1.168) (1.527) (1.397) 
Father has ISCED 5 11.24*** 10.72*** 11.65*** 10.76*** 
 (1.475) (1.694) (2.224) (2.009) 
Father has 1st degree 24.36*** 24.81*** 25.60*** 21.46*** 
 (1.171) (1.414) (1.854) (1.639) 
Father has > 1st degree 20.40*** 20.60*** 19.65*** 17.31*** 
 (1.125) (1.368) (1.806) (1.563) 
mother born in country 
of test= no 
3.49** 3.82** -2.95 12.34*** 
 (1.320) (1.482) (1.985) (1.682) 
father born in country 
of test= no 
-3.42** -2.66 -6.54*** -2.91 
 (1.273) (1.452) (1.953) (1.650) 
student born in country 
of test= no 
-38.28*** -38.63*** -42.34*** -32.36*** 
 (1.122) (1.226) (1.624) (1.380) 
School Characteristics 
     
School in town > 500000  10.87*** 11.11*** 9.52*** 6.64*** 
 (1.129) (1.339) (1.727) (1.528) 
school in town 100001 – 
500000 PEOPLE 
8.14*** 5.64*** 11.45*** 3.27* 
 (1.161) (1.392) (1.781) (1.592) 
school in town 50001 – 
100000 PEOPLE 
9.12*** 9.04*** 11.65*** 2.30 
 (1.224) (1.468) (1.876) (1.702) 
school in town 15001- 
50000 PEOPLE 
2.99** 1.52 6.32*** -1.53 
 (1.134) (1.376) (1.736) (1.601) 
school in town with 
3001 -15000 PEOPLE 
0.28 1.02 2.13 -4.37** 
 (1.109) (1.326) (1.697) (1.540) 
% students 
disadvantaged 
background: 0-10 
32.69*** 34.00*** 35.36*** 28.93*** 
 (0.848) (1.007) (1.328) (1.153) 
% students 
disadvantaged economic 
background:11-25 
22.19*** 23.95*** 24.62*** 20.87*** 
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 (0.798) (0.937) (1.221) (1.096) 
students disadvantaged 
economic background:26-
50 
11.78*** 12.53*** 13.94*** 10.98*** 
 (0.797) (0.927) (1.220) (1.057) 
math classes are split 
by group ability 
0.52 0.99 -0.44 1.19 
 (0.628) (0.753) (0.978) (0.840) 
Additional math classes 8.17*** 7.20*** 7.06*** 10.50*** 
 (0.607) (0.727) (0.944) (0.821) 
math remedial classes -0.69 -0.85 -0.73 -1.79 
 (0.683) (0.813) (1.066) (0.928) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – none 
-1.99 -2.53 -0.24 -3.18* 
 (1.158) (1.359) (1.772) (1.459) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – little 
-8.25*** -8.71*** -9.27*** -6.96*** 
 (1.164) (1.350) (1.762) (1.476) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – some 
-6.69*** -7.81*** -6.17*** -7.40*** 
 (1.165) (1.355) (1.760) (1.468) 
Shortage budget for 
materials- none 
9.23*** 9.41*** 7.43*** 11.58*** 
 (1.187) (1.376) (1.799) (1.501) 
Shortage budget for 
materials- a little 
4.96*** 6.83*** 2.80 5.21*** 
 (1.185) (1.360) (1.801) (1.481) 
Shortage budget for 
materials-some 
7.23*** 8.49*** 7.82*** 6.14*** 
 (1.180) (1.368) (1.784) (1.488) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- a little 
5.55*** 6.81*** 2.59 7.05*** 
 (0.964) (1.139) (1.517) (1.216) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- some 
2.35* 3.46** -0.88 5.56*** 
 (1.038) (1.222) (1.604) (1.304) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- a lot 
3.94*** 4.59*** 1.40 5.11*** 
 (1.105) (1.292) (1.733) (1.355) 
Observations 237,363 237,363 237,363 237,363 
R-squared 0.51    
  . . . 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Constant, 
year and country dummies included but not reported below.  
Countries included: Australia, Bahrain, Armenia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Taipei, Cyprus   
Palestine, Ghana, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan , Jordan      
Korea, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco , Norway, Romania, Russia, Saudi   
Singapore, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, USA, Serbia,  England, Scotland. Omitted 
country for OLS regression is Cyprus & Romania; Omitted country for quantiles are 
Romania & Bahrain.  
Omitted variables: n of books at home none or very few; mother/father has ISCED 1 or 
did not go to school; school in town with < 3000 people; Shortage 
budget/material/teachers – a lot;  
 
 
Table 1d TIMSS Pooled – All Countries 2003 and 2007 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE- 
SCIENCE SCORES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Quantile 50% Quantile 10% Quantile 90% 
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
 
AGE -13.40*** -13.35*** -14.15*** -11.52*** 
 (0.423) (0.434) (0.695) (0.502) 
Female dummy -8.93*** -10.04*** -4.42*** -13.29*** 
 (0.521) (0.552) (0.823) (0.724) 
books at home 1 shelf 10.46*** 10.40*** 11.56*** 8.11*** 
 (0.788) (0.825) (1.209) (1.094) 
books at home 1 
bookcase 
28.00*** 28.44*** 27.05*** 26.89*** 
 (0.830) (0.857) (1.331) (1.112) 
books at home 2 
bookcase 
40.31*** 41.28*** 38.08*** 39.56*** 
 (1.008) (1.037) (1.621) (1.412) 
books at home >=3 
bookcase 
51.14*** 54.12*** 48.28*** 52.52*** 
 (1.013) (1.045) (1.637) (1.335) 
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Mother has ISCED 2  -1.31 -1.02 0.60 -2.26 
 (0.946) (0.989) (1.464) (1.296) 
Mother has ISCED 3 5.61*** 6.86*** 5.80*** 3.44** 
 (0.891) (0.937) (1.367) (1.240) 
Mother has ISCED 4 13.33*** 14.20*** 14.31*** 10.86*** 
 (0.964) (1.020) (1.495) (1.351) 
Mother has ISCED 5 13.26*** 14.62*** 16.09*** 11.22*** 
 (1.344) (1.455) (2.203) (1.933) 
Mother has 1st degree 20.70*** 21.93*** 20.94*** 18.07*** 
 (1.204) (1.276) (1.889) (1.701) 
Mother has > 1st degree 16.43*** 18.08*** 14.41*** 14.66*** 
 (1.240) (1.302) (1.991) (1.766) 
Father has ISCED 2  -2.46* -2.64** -2.64 -1.27 
 (0.982) (1.020) (1.529) (1.321) 
Father has ISCED 3 4.94*** 4.08*** 6.80*** 4.27*** 
 (0.885) (0.933) (1.367) (1.220) 
Father has ISCED 4 7.74*** 7.79*** 8.72*** 5.35*** 
 (0.943) (1.003) (1.469) (1.320) 
Father has ISCED 5 8.86*** 7.91*** 9.83*** 5.50** 
 (1.364) (1.451) (2.245) (1.930) 
Father has 1st degree 20.73*** 20.24*** 25.30*** 16.12*** 
 (1.121) (1.213) (1.783) (1.620) 
Father has > 1st degree 17.46*** 18.25*** 17.99*** 14.44*** 
 (1.120) (1.180) (1.773) (1.566) 
mother born in country 
of test= no 
-1.12 -0.76 -3.15 2.43 
 (1.316) (1.271) (2.081) (1.685) 
father born in country 
of test= no 
-8.13*** -10.22*** -11.39*** -6.18*** 
 (1.283) (1.247) (2.053) (1.672) 
student born in country 
of test= no 
-39.23*** -39.80*** -43.13*** -30.51*** 
 (1.068) (1.055) (1.572) (1.365) 
School Characteristics 
School in town > 500000  4.47*** 4.55*** 4.89** 3.56* 
 (1.093) (1.166) (1.692) (1.530) 
school in town 100001 – 
500000 PEOPLE 
3.33** 3.83** 3.73* 0.44 
 (1.120) (1.206) (1.749) (1.586) 
school in town 50001 – 
100000 PEOPLE 
5.21*** 6.61*** 3.77* 1.71 
 (1.184) (1.275) (1.846) (1.681) 
school in town 15001- 
50000 PEOPLE 
1.85 2.49* 3.04 -0.04 
 (1.102) (1.194) (1.672) (1.582) 
school in town with 
3001 -15000 PEOPLE 
-1.79 -0.39 -1.93 -2.47 
 (1.087) (1.152) (1.660) (1.535) 
% students 
disadvantaged 
background: 0-10 
31.04*** 30.46*** 36.75*** 27.76*** 
 (0.817) (0.863) (1.323) (1.140) 
% students 
disadvantaged economic 
background:11-25 
22.29*** 22.34*** 24.53*** 20.33*** 
 (0.774) (0.806) (1.232) (1.080) 
students disadvantaged 
economic background:26-
50 
11.55*** 12.45*** 13.74*** 11.03*** 
 (0.766) (0.799) (1.207) (1.056) 
math classes are split 
by group ability 
-1.27 -1.63* -0.87 -1.52 
 (0.683) (0.713) (1.052) (0.945) 
Additional math classes 5.49*** 5.61*** 5.11*** 7.37*** 
 (0.610) (0.641) (0.984) (0.851) 
math remedial classes 3.83*** 4.73*** 5.75*** 1.08 
 (0.622) (0.646) (0.983) (0.853) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – none 
1.23 0.22 4.57* -2.63 
 (1.106) (1.169) (1.797) (1.470) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – little 
-4.51*** -5.18*** -4.44* -4.91*** 
 (1.110) (1.162) (1.805) (1.477) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – some 
-3.47** -5.25*** -1.81 -4.95*** 
 (1.099) (1.163) (1.815) (1.477) 
Shortage budget for 
materials- none 
3.96*** 3.88** 2.65 6.80*** 
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 (1.130) (1.194) (1.790) (1.518) 
Shortage budget for 
materials- a little 
0.88 0.76 -1.84 3.36* 
 (1.119) (1.180) (1.798) (1.495) 
Shortage budget for 
materials-some 
3.81*** 3.61** 4.27* 4.84** 
 (1.107) (1.187) (1.808) (1.503) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- a little 
4.76*** 5.89*** 3.27* 7.70*** 
 (0.922) (0.985) (1.515) (1.217) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- some 
-1.18 0.35 -3.37* 2.80* 
 (0.982) (1.057) (1.618) (1.305) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- a lot 
0.17 1.43 -2.16 3.30* 
 (1.036) (1.117) (1.736) (1.361) 
R-squared 0.45    
Adj. R-squared 0.45 . . . 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Constant, 
year and country dummies included but not reported below.  
Countries included: Australia, Bahrain, Armenia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Taipei, Cyprus   
Palestine, Ghana, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan , Jordan      
Korea, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco , Norway, Romania, Russia, Saudi   
Singapore, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, USA, Serbia,  England, Scotland. 
omitted countries: Cyprus & Romania. Constant Included but not reported.  
Omitted variables: n of books at home none or very few; mother/father has ISCED 1 or 
did not go to school; school in town with < 3000 people; Shortage 
budget/material/teachers – a lot;  
 
 
Table 2a TIMSS Russia estimates: 1995 and 1999 
 
 (1) (2) 
 MATH SCIENCE 
VARIABLES Quantile 50% Quantile 50% 
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
   
Student Age -1.67** -2.42*** 
 (0.584) (0.555) 
Female Dummy -3.11 -20.11*** 
 (2.643) (2.671) 
Test language at home -12.23 7.44 
 (6.331) (6.396) 
Student born in test 
country  
3.03 -1.20 
 (5.926) (6.008) 
Mother born in test 
country 
0.57 -1.74 
 (5.118) (5.186) 
Father born in test 
country 
5.16 0.94 
 (4.943) (5.013) 
Books at home 0-10 -78.31*** -74.02*** 
 (8.619) (8.754) 
Books at home 11-25 -54.95*** -38.44*** 
 (4.943) (4.998) 
Books at home 26-100 -33.75*** -27.53*** 
 (3.487) (3.521) 
Books at home 101-200 -14.44*** -9.49** 
 (3.597) (3.631) 
School Characteristics 
Student/teacher -0.70* -1.01** 
 (0.324) (0.323) 
School in isolated 
area 
-42.73*** 10.06 
 (12.669) (12.814) 
School in village -34.98*** -31.52*** 
 (3.232) (3.297) 
School in outskirt of 
town 
-16.24 -11.38 
 (8.368) (8.448) 
School own math 
curriculum 
35.94*** 11.36** 
 (4.508) (3.613) 
Shortage 
instructional 
-19.33* -33.13*** 
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material- a little 
 (8.779) (8.949) 
Shortage 
instructional 
material- some 
-12.80 -13.29 
 (7.105) (7.198) 
Shortage 
instructional 
material- a lot 
-12.97 -14.45* 
 (6.977) (7.099) 
   
Observations 7,195 7,221 
   
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Constant and 
year dummies included but not reported below.  
Omitted dummies: the number of books at home > 200; school location is school located 
close to town/city centre; Shortage instructional material none. 
 
 
Table 2b TIMSS Russia estimates: 2003 and 2007 
 
 (2) 
MATH 
(3) 
SCIENCE 
VARIABLES Quantile 50% Quantile 50% 
Individual Characteristics and Family Background 
   
Age -13.97*** -8.76*** 
 (1.862) (1.918) 
Female dummy 1.22 -15.62*** 
 (2.133) (2.201) 
Books at home 1 shelf 4.23 7.90 
 (5.899) (6.105) 
books at home 1 
bookcase 
18.03** 26.80*** 
 (5.672) (5.883) 
books at home 2 
bookcase 
27.05*** 28.85*** 
 (5.855) (6.070) 
books at home >=3 
bookcase 
31.01*** 39.58*** 
 (6.058) (6.275) 
mother has ISCED 2  -12.05 -7.15 
 (6.648) (6.769) 
mother has ISCED 3 -4.33 -7.80 
 (4.895) (5.011) 
mother has ISCED 4 15.16*** 16.99*** 
 (3.803) (3.929) 
mother has ISCED 5 23.81*** 19.66*** 
 (4.878) (5.001) 
mother has 1st degree 27.02*** 22.91*** 
 (4.407) (4.555) 
mother has > 1st degree 25.51*** 32.59*** 
 (4.873) (5.061) 
father has ISCED 2  -25.20*** -24.08*** 
 (6.144) (6.349) 
Father has ISCED 3 -12.66** -0.73 
 (4.403) (4.483) 
Father has ISCED 4 3.34 3.91 
 (3.169) (3.280) 
Father has ISCED 5 16.90*** 9.60* 
 (4.721) (4.862) 
Father has 1st degree 13.11** 19.56*** 
 (4.106) (4.226) 
father has > 1st degree 10.73* 7.67 
 (4.632) (4.799) 
mother born in country 
of test= no 
3.98 -1.10 
 (4.309) (4.482) 
father born in country 
of test= no 
-3.48 -5.17 
 (3.979) (4.123) 
student born in country 
of test= no 
-4.61 -7.66 
 (4.717) (4.892) 
School Characteristics 
school in town > 500000  16.37*** 18.23*** 
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 (3.606) (3.768) 
school in town 100001 - 
500000 PEOPLE 
3.29 7.04 
 (3.705) (3.752) 
school in town 50001 - 
100000 PEOPLE 
-7.27 -0.61 
 (4.302) (4.405) 
school in town 15001- 
50000 PEOPLE 
-13.78*** -5.61 
 (4.038) (4.272) 
school in town with 
3001 -15000 PEOPLE 
-13.45*** -5.32 
 (3.791) (3.848) 
% students 
disadvantaged 
background: 0-10 
21.78*** 3.63 
 (3.736) (3.820) 
% students 
disadvantaged economic 
background:11-25 
12.52*** 5.28 
 (3.387) (3.457) 
students disadvantaged 
economic background:26-
50 
1.93 -2.62 
 (3.505) (3.653) 
math classes are split 
by group ability 
5.90** 5.57* 
 (2.142) (2.266) 
Additional math classes 17.87*** 10.48*** 
 (2.408) (2.662) 
math remedial classes -3.42 -3.18 
 (2.282) (2.315) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – none 
-1.71 14.14*** 
 (4.111) (4.077) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – little 
5.31 14.11*** 
 (4.118) (4.076) 
Shortage budget for 
supply – some 
4.75 7.53* 
 (3.868) (3.808) 
Shortage budget for 
materials- none 
0.74 0.92 
 (3.997) (4.149) 
Shortage budget for 
materials- a little 
2.46 5.40 
 (4.295) (4.485) 
Shortage budget for 
materials-some 
-6.27 -1.79 
 (3.814) (3.929) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- a little 
-2.18 -9.97** 
 (3.282) (3.435) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- some 
-3.06 -10.08* 
 (4.674) (4.847) 
Shortage budget for 
teachers- a lot 
-4.07 -7.06 
 (4.134) (4.248) 
   
Observations 7,917 7,929 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Constant 
and, year dummies included but not reported below. Omitted variables: no of books at 
home= none or very few; mother/father has ISCED 1 or did not go to school; school in 
town with < 3000 people; Shortage budget/material/teachers=a lot 
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Conclusion 
 
This PhD dissertation investigates themes that are central to economic and social 
development. In particular we analyse three keys aspects of development: poverty, 
foreign direct investment and education. By focusing on monetary and non-monetary 
issues, we endorse a broad view of economic development. Accordingly, the thesis 
consists of three parts that aim at answering three distinct but interrelated questions: (i) 
to what extent does economic growth reduce poverty, and what are the factors 
enhancing or hampering the effects of growth on poverty; (ii) how does the institutional 
setting typical of resource-rich countries affect the inflow of foreign investment; (iii) 
taking Russia as a case study, what are the socioeconomic and institutional factors 
associated with individual educational performance. 
 
The first part of the thesis (chapter 1 and 2) deals with poverty. Reducing poverty is one 
of the main national and international development goals, however this target is often 
ambiguous as poverty has complex and multiple meanings. The conceptual complexity 
of poverty has been mirrored by the proliferation of definitions and indicators. From a 
policy perspective, clarifying it is particularly important as different poverty indicators 
do not identify as poor the same individuals, and in turn lead to diverging poverty 
estimates.  Therefore researchers and policy makers should carefully choose among the 
available poverty definitions and indicators. Chapter 1 reviews the conceptual 
approaches to poverty and the issues related to its measurement. We present a set of 
arguments for adopting a monetary approach to poverty. Among the monetary poverty 
measures available, we make the case for using the World Bank’s “dollar a day” poverty 
line. We stress that, despite its limitations, the Word bank indicators are the only one 
suitable for comparing countries over time. In sum, we highlight that, although there is 
no “right” poverty measure, researchers should select the most appropriate indicator by 
considering the goals of the analysis to be carried out. In our case the chosen measure 
allows us to quantify and compare poverty across countries. Accordingly, the second 
chapter studies in depth the determinants of poverty rates; in particular it focuses on the 
role of economic growth.    Our main findings concerning poverty are both consistent 
with the literature and extend it. First, we find that economic growth, as measured by 
changes in mean income, is positively associated with lower poverty rates. However, we 
go further and find that past levels of poverty and inequality influence the effect of 
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growth on the poverty rate; in particular, higher initial levels of poverty and inequality 
decrease the effect of growth on poverty reduction. Concerned to better understand the 
persistence of poverty in parts of the developing world we then explore the specific 
country level conditions that can generate a poverty-trap like mechanism. We find 
powerful evidence that increased health, schooling, credit and lower conflict decrease 
the growth elasticity of poverty (i.e. poverty is reduced more in response to growth). 
Our findings therefore suggest that both poverty itself and non-monetary conditions 
related to the level of development prevent the full realization of the beneficial effects 
of growth. That is, poverty – broadly defined – begets poverty and tackling the 
persistence of poverty therefore requires tackling the poverty trap and the institutions 
which shape it. Of course, intuitively, this has been known, but our aggregate analysis 
quantifies these links more precisely and highlights that it is this set of self-reinforcing 
institutional and policy deficiencies which explain the persistence of poverty.  
 
From this, we draw several distinctive policy conclusions. First and foremost, factors 
other than economic growth play a significant role in the process of poverty reduction. 
Hence, when addressing poverty, heavier accent should be put on policy measures that 
influence non-monetary dimensions. Put differently, poverty reduction strategies should 
take a longer-term perspective. In this respect, policy measures enhancing health and 
education could have a tremendous effect on decreasing poverty both directly and 
indirectly by increasing the poverty response to growth.  
 
Policy makers aiming to promote development, have not only focused on poverty, but 
have also adopted a number of measures to promote foreign direct investment (FDI). 
FDIs are a crucial part of the development process as they have the potential of 
promoting growth and generating positive externalities (e.g. improving management 
practices, promoting technology and innovation). As such it is important to understand 
the motives of firms’ internationalisation. Accordingly, the second part of the thesis 
(chapter 3) analyses the location drivers of foreign direct investments, paying particular 
attention to the interplay between political stability, property rights, FDI and natural 
resources. Our empirical analysis is undertaken on a panel dataset of 92 low and middle-
income countries spanning the period between 1996 and 2009.  We employ system 
GMM technique to control for endogeneity and reverse causality in particular.  
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Our headline contribution to the existing literature establishes that the presence of 
natural resources significantly affects the institutions-FDI relationship. The results 
clearly show that institutions (political stability and property rights), do not act in 
isolation, but their effect on FDI is influenced by the presence of natural resources. Our 
analysis extends previous findings that FDI in the primary sector are less sensitive to the 
level of democracy. However our results are novel as, to our knowledge, we are the first 
to analyse the interaction between political stability, property rights and natural 
resources. Most specifically we find evidence that it is oil, but not minerals or 
agricultural products, that has a robust and significant moderating impact on the FDI-
institutions relationship. This suggests that it is not just any resource rents that matter, 
but particularly those highly concentrated resource rents (as in the oil sector) which 
have potentially negative effects under weak institutional environments.  
 
Building on our results from chapter 2 that highlight the importance of human capital, 
the third part of the thesis, chapter 4, examines Russia’s educational performance in a 
comparative light and analyses the factors associated with educational outcomes. Russia 
is a particularly relevant example of a quickly growing country undergoing substantial 
social and economic change, and also a country where the economy, politics and society 
is influenced by the special interests originated in the oil and gas sector. Since the early 
90s a number of political and economic reforms were launched to support the transition 
from a planned to a market economy. As part of the transition process, the education 
system also underwent substantial modernisation. The most significant change has been 
an increasing decentralisation. In spite of the efforts made, the legacy of the Soviet 
system persists and the education system has often been criticised for having inadequate 
curricula and management. Russia’s contemporary history makes it an interesting case in 
which to investigate educational performance. In chapter 4, we make use of two large 
educational surveys, PISA and TIMMS, to explore cross-country and within Russia 
variation in educational scores.  
The cross country as well as the Russia ‘case-study’ results show that a number of 
individual and family variables in particular - such as parental educational levels - are 
robustly associated with improved educational outcomes. In terms of school level 
variables both analyses show that schools in cities perform consistently better than 
those in small towns and in rural locations. This is consistent with the literature. 
However, the within country estimates allow us to better explore more directly which 
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institutional setup is most effective in improving educational quality. We find that the 
student-teacher ratios and indicators of school autonomy  have a positive and 
significant impact on educational scores. This seems important in the Russian context as 
the evidence on the effect of school resources and autonomy on students’ performances 
remains controversial. Our results on the Russian data indicate that policy measures 
aimed at improving student-teacher ratios and autonomy are likely to improve 
educational performances. Moreover the results point that there is scope for policies 
aimed at reducing the disparities in educational scores across urban and rural locations. 
Addressing education inequality can help in tackling Russia’s growing economic 
inequality and social polarization related to it imbalances in sectoral structure of 
production.  Therefore appropriate public intervention in education can help in raising 
human capital and reducing inequality, which, as also highlighted by our discussion in 
chapter 2, can reduce poverty and promote development. 
 
Overall, we add to the existing literature in several crucially important ways: (i) we 
investigate the role of economic growth in poverty reduction by exploring a set of 
conditioning factors which prove to significantly affect the poverty elasticity of growth. 
We find that, among the variables analysed, initial conditions in inequality and poverty, 
and human capital, as measured by health and education, have the largest impact on the 
response of poverty to growth. We therefore conclude that economic growth alone is 
unlikely to address poverty reduction, but that it needs to be complemented by a set of 
policies targeting inequality and human capital; (ii) we determine that in resource-rich 
countries, the presence of natural resources, in particular oil, significantly impacts the 
effect of institutions on FDI. Our results show that the positive impact of institutions 
on FDI is mitigated by the presence of natural resources. It is clear that in this instance, 
institutional reforms alone are unlikely to promote foreign investments. Moreover the 
distorted intuitional setting of resource rich economies is likely to attenuate the positive 
impact of FDI on the host country;  (iii) we explore the cross-country and within Russia 
variation in educational scores by making novel use of the data available from PISA and 
TIMMS. Our empirical analysis establishes a robust correlation between educational 
scores and a set of individual, family and school characteristics. The analysis on both the 
Russia and cross-country sample shows that parental educational levels are robustly 
associated with better educational outcomes. The evidence on the institutional factors 
shows the specificity of Russia compared to the cross-country evidence. In this instance 
 188 
the student-teacher ratio and level of autonomy positively impact on students’ 
educational scores. 
 
Finally, as this is an empirical project, there are typical caveats to keep in mind when 
interpreting the results. First of all, like in other empirical studies, some of the proxies 
adopted in this thesis have been subject to criticisms. In particular, in the second 
chapter we used the “dollar a day poverty line”. This indicator has attracted critics, both 
at conceptual and at practical levels. For instance there are issues in terms of 
comparability across surveys and PPP exchange rates used to calculate the poverty line. 
However, we spent considerable amounts of time arguing that alternative measures are 
at least as problematic. The educational surveys employed in the last chapter have also 
been criticised. Most concerns surround the practical implementation of the surveys, for 
example, how students are tested and how the data is collected. Moreover, researchers 
noted that the international comparability of the surveys may be limited. This is because 
the students’ response is likely to be affected by the country’s cultural context.  
 
Second, econometric analyses are sensitive to specification, sample coverage and 
estimators employed. To address these problems, we have tried to implement a wide 
range of appropriate robustness checks. For instance, in the second chapter, we 
replicate our results for different levels of the poverty line. In the fourth chapter we 
used different measures of FDI and natural resources. Finally in the last chapter we 
employ two datasets and for each one we replicate the estimates of the educational 
production function with three estimators. 
 
Third, for what concerns chapter 2 and 3, we do acknowledge the limitations of a cross-
country research study. Chapter 2 focuses on aggregate measures of poverty. However 
as discussed in out first chapter, poverty is essentially an individual phenomenon. 
Hence, a good way forward in strengthening our research would be to complement our 
analysis with a microanalysis of poverty determinants. In terms of chapter 4 we have to 
rely on the assumption that in developing countries with a high level of natural 
resources, FDI are concentrated in the resources sector. Therefore the question 
addressed in this chapter may be better explored with the use of sector-level FDI data, 
which is currently not available for the period and the countries analyzed. There is a 
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difficult tradeoff between depth and width of the data and the quality of estimators is 
conditional on the latter. 
  
Notwithstanding these inevitable caveats, we argue that this thesis contributes 
substantively to the existing economic literature through its exploration of three key 
issues at the heart of development:  poverty, education and foreign investments. These 
strongly inter-related topics have long attracted the attention of economists and social 
scientists and they remain central to today’s global economy. 
 
 
 
